Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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Foreword

This handbook is written for battalion and brigade commanders and staffs to assist them with identifying those issues that most effect staff actions in the first 100 days of combat, the most dangerous and uncertain period. The information in this handbook is from your peers—commanders and staff members that served or are currently serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Key lessons:

- Use your predeployment time to reorganize the headquarters to mirror a tactical operations center (TOC) and align the staff around TOC functions.
- Assign all administrative predeployment tasks and missions to the rear detachment headquarters.
- An effective relief in place/transfer of authority begins with a good predeployment site survey and follow-up on all requests for information.
- The large number of independent, small-unit (company and below) missions and the increased amount and velocity of intelligence create a greater workload for the battalion S2 section.
- The commander and the staff have direct roles in maintaining Soldier discipline and mitigating complacent attitudes/behaviors.
- Many commanders and staffs at the brigade and below do not understand their roles in personnel recovery (PR) actions (defining PR, planning, and execution).

Read this handbook carefully. Take it with you to theater. Get the job done and bring all your people home.


Steven Mains
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned
# First 100 Days Commander and Staff Handbook

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

DVD enclosed in the back cover includes the following GTAs: 24-01-003, Iraq Culture; 30-02-001, A Soldier’s Guide to Direct Questioning, Reporting, and Detainee Operations (ES2); 90-01-008, Tactical Site Exploitation; 30-03-002, HIIDE; 30-03-001, Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT); 90-01-001, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Vehicular Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED); 03-06-010, Actions Upon Attack or Discovery of Chemical Agents; 90-01-007, Counter-Sniper Pocket Guide, and 80-01-002, Capture Avoidance/Personnel Recovery Plan.
Introduction

“Just that the first 100 days are probably the most dangerous because you do not know what is going on or at least you will feel that way. The Soldiers must listen to their officers and senior enlisted to get a feel for the situation.”

Sergeant Major, Primary Staff

There is a wide-ranging belief throughout the U.S. Army that the first few weeks of combat are the most dangerous for Soldiers. These first 100 days are critical to the survival of Soldiers. In this initial period, Soldiers, their leaders, and units acclimatize to the tactical environment, the enemy, and themselves. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) set out to examine this period and the casualty issue from a Soldier’s point of view. Our task was to get the Soldiers’ perspectives and insights from their first few months of combat and determine why they survived and what factors contributed most to their survival. Finally, we wanted it straight from the Soldiers, in their own words.

Warfare in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the business of small units, company and below. These small units are subordinates of larger headquarters, with staffs that provide the resources, the control, and overall support to combat conducted at the small-unit level. Commanders and staffs at the battalion and brigade are the overall purveyors of combat operations in OIF. In August 2007, we surveyed commanders and staffs on several critical issues that impact the first 100 days of operations in OIF. This survey provided generalizations about issues staffs at the battalion and brigade dealt with in transitioning to combat in OIF.

The basis for the material in this handbook came from what battalion and brigade commanders and staff members told CALL in August 2007 survey responses. The handbook addresses staff issues that affect the execution of missions and staff tasks in those first 100 days.

This handbook is not a step-by-step instruction manual for staff operations in combat. Tactics, techniques, and procedures are constantly changing as the tactical situation and the enemy change. This handbook emphasizes topics experienced commanders and staff members considered important.

This handbook contains no magic formulas, silver bullets, or good-luck charms. It is straight talk derived from the real experiences of Soldiers. Its purpose is to help commanders (and their staffs) lead their Soldiers through the initial period of deployment unscathed by combat or noncombat injuries or worse. Rather than tell you what to do, this handbook is designed to make you think through a situation in order to survive.
Chapter 1

Section 1. Pre Deployment Site Survey (PDSS)

“The PDSS gave a quick snapshot of the site and unit mission – which often was not consistent with information passed at the mobilization station and home station.”

Major, Primary Staff Officer

“We delayed the [PDSS] trip until three months out, and it allowed you to see the fight, see what the unit was doing, and get a very good feel for the battle space, and what was required.”

Major, Primary Staff Officer

“PDSS is critical. As a staff, I feel that we would have been a lot more effective had we known where our units were going to be placed and who they would be supporting or working with.”

Master Sergeant, Primary Staff

U.S. Forces Command mandates that all units brigade and above conduct a leaders’ reconnaissance before the unit begins its collective training cycle in preparation for deployment. An effective PDSS will inform the unit on the area of operations (AO) and the combat tasks and missions the unit is expected to fulfill once deployed. The PDSS drives the training plans for all of the predeployment activities. After the initial PDSS, the staff and commanders should conduct an internal briefing (similar in format to a quarterly training brief). This briefing helps to outline the training needed and focus the leadership on those core issues and shortfalls critical for preparation.

A good window for scheduling the PDSS is three to six months out (norm is 90 days) from the start of the deployment. This time frame is close enough to the rotation period that the mission and AO of the unit being replaced is not expected to change significantly and far enough in advance to allow for programming resources and scheduling training. This schedule also provides the staff sufficient time to review and adopt staff practices and products it expects to use after the transfer of authority (TOA).

Share the information gathered by the PDSS team with the rest of the staff and the subordinate commanders and staffs. The period immediately after the staff and leaders’ return from the PDSS is a good time to begin following the expected battle rhythm of the outgoing unit at a pace similar to operations in the AO. Over time, the staff will build the “muscle memory” for daily operations. This practice goes a long way in easing the transition once the brigade/battalion deploys.
Who should go (or can go) on the PDSS? What should the team do while in the AO? Some general considerations from the survey include the following:

- **Take enough personnel to reasonably cover all the areas concerned in the time allotted for the PDSS.** The PDSS team should include representatives from each staff section. In addition to the commander and the command sergeant major, a recommended minimum team should consist of:
  - S3 representative for current operations.
  - S2 representative for current intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.
  - Plans (combined S2/S3).
  - S4/Property book officer representative (identify stay behind supplies/equipment and inventory/hand receipts).
  - S6 representative (communications and networks).
  - Headquarters Company (mayor cell/life support cell).

- **The PDSS process should focus on staff functions and the transition and not exclusively on the commander.**

- **Prepare a list of requests for information (RFIs) from the staff and subordinates to go with the PDSS team.** The team uses this list to ensure all the key information is covered during its time with the outgoing unit.

- **Have a checklist of staff materials/documents for the PDSS team to obtain during its time with the outgoing staff.** See “What to bring back” below.

- **Open a line of communication with the outgoing unit.** Establish a routine means and schedule of communicating between units to allow for coordination prior to the PDSS. Use this communications link to continue the dialogue with the outgoing unit, answer additional RFIs, and update both staffs to any changes that occur after the PDSS.

The staff must prepare a PDSS checklist based on the commander’s guidance and its initial mission analysis. The staff survey suggested including the following areas/items on a PDSS checklist:

- Digital pictures of key places, infrastructure, and local persons of importance or influence. The commander and the staff should conduct a reconnaissance of the real estate where the unit will operate (“boots on the ground”).

- Current enemy situation. Include current enemy tactics and practices, incidents, and experiences of enemy operations.
• Current tactics, techniques, and procedures and best practices used by the outgoing unit.

• Changes in the operational environment that have taken place during the deployment of the current unit.

• Day to day functional schedule of the staff and subordinate staffs:
  ° Battle rhythm
  ° Reporting schedules
  ° Briefing schedules
  ° Battle tracking methodology
  ° Daily information requirements (lower and higher)

• Any additional or different staffing requirements and duties that your unit must fill prior to deploying, including liaison officer requirements.

• Policies and practices for dealing with contractors working on the forward operations base (FOB) (U.S., local nationals, and third country nationals).

• Support relationships (especially with contract support).

• Intelligence resources available from assets external to the unit.

• All RFIs should be answered or arrangements made to get follow-up information.

What should personnel bring back from the PDSS?

• Current operations summary and intelligence summary with operational maps/overlays.

• Copies of all standing operating procedures, report formats, and standardized briefing formats, digitally if possible.

• Maps/drawings of the FOB and digital pictures of the facilities, if possible.

• A list of stay-behind or theater-provided equipment, materials, and supplies that will pass from the outgoing unit to your unit. Include maintenance status and identify any equipment shortfalls.

• Continuity books for each staff section.

Relief in Place Planning

A good PDSS followed by continuous communication and information sharing contribute to a successful relief in place (RIP)/TOA. Planning for the RIP/TOA should begin just after the PDSS (or about 90 days out). During the planning, the staff needs to do a good troops-to-task evaluation to ensure that the correct staff members with the right staff skills are employed in the RIP.
Chapter 1
Section 2. Staff Predeployment Training

“During pre-mob training, [we] had no knowledge on [the] combat mission. [We were] kept in the dark until [we] arrived in theater. Pre-mob training [was] lacking in details”

Captain, Primary Staff

“TOC operations was the most important staff training we accomplished in pre-deployment”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

“The staff portion [of our training] was ad hoc. All we had to work with was the skill sets of the personnel on-hand; the learning curve was very high. Both the staff and the Soldiers had to adapt quickly.”

Master Sergeant, Special Staff

The end state of staff predeployment training is a seamless assumption of staff responsibility within the area of operations. When properly executed, the unit going through predeployment training assumes the deployed commander’s overall plan.

Key Staff Tasks

The survey identified the following key staff tasks as essential to mission execution in the first 100 days of deployment:

- Tactical operations center (TOC) operations:
  - Battle rhythm and reporting
  - Battle drills and standing operating procedures (SOPs)
  - Orders development
- Battle tracking
- Targeting cycle
- Military decision-making process (MDMP) and staff integration
- Intelligence collection
- Command and control systems integration (Command Post of the Future, Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Blue Force Tracker, etc.)
Predeployment Training

Keys to effective pre-deployment training program:

- **Immediate actions upon receiving the deployment order.** At receipt of a deployment order, many significant transactions should occur immediately between the deployed unit and deploying unit:
  
  - As soon as possible, establish contact with the unit in country. The unit going through predeployment training needs to receive the outgoing unit’s staff assessment of the current operational situations and tactical tasks, the area of operations, and the enemy.
  
  - This information should drive the training plan and prepare the staff for its deployment. Establishing this early planning and sharing of information will ensure continuity and unity of effort as the commander and staff prepare for deployment.
  
  - Initially, accept what products and tactics, techniques, and procedures the currently deployed unit provided during the PDSS and then build from there.
  
  - Study this initial information carefully, noting differences in your unit’s resources, organizational structure, and functions. Consider how your staff will adjust to compensate for these differences.

- **Replicate the operational environment during predeployment training.** Begin by building a TOC within the current garrison headquarters’ building. Replace the standard staff geometry (compartmented by staff sections) with a unit TOC. Have the staff configure the unit’s garrison headquarters to mirror the field command posts in form and function:
  
  - Find a large, open room or a number of adjacent offices in which to locate the TOC. Convert this area into a facsimile of a field command post (using tactical SOPs; faces; places; systems; and displays, including Secret Internet Protocol Router connectivity). Make the headquarters the TOC for sustained operations.
  
  - Organize the staff around functional operations rather than separating them in different offices or cubicles. For example, position the S3 Battle Captains’ desks next to the battalion S2’s desk.
  
  - Practice the staff MDMP; identify steps that can be abbreviated when a hasty MDMP is needed.
  
  - Functions or systems that are not organic or unmanned should be left empty as visible, continual reminders of that gap in capability and “who else needs to know.”
Begin to build the staff and headquarters battle rhythm and reporting schedule. The staff can begin to conduct commander updates using a battle update briefing format.

Adapt current staff SOPs to this environment or develop new ones. This is a good time to design and implement staff tools, aids, and data-tracking products. Adapt the battle tracking tools/formats used by the unit you will replace to track predeployment preparations.

Look for ways/means to immerse the staff (especially intelligence, current operations, and staff planners) in the on-going operations conducted in theater. Use your staff to conduct “long-range” planning for the unit presently operating in the area your unit will assume (they retain the close-in fight). This arrangement allows the commander and staff to avoid stove piping and to train as they will fight in the upcoming deployment.

- **Design realistic and rigorous training events.** The predeployment training must be a forcing mechanism for training unit staffs to conduct staff planning and execution within the current operating environment. All battalion-level commanders required an external evaluation. Brigade headquarters requires a Battle Command Training Program-type command post exercise.

  - Train-up exercises should immerse the commander and the staff in the counterinsurgency environment and the actual operational environment. If possible, connect via SIPR to the current unit to enable the staff to coordinate, fuse intelligence, and obtain situational awareness in the area where they will fight.

  - Significant battalion staff functions such as pattern analysis, intelligence driven operations, area of operation development, and engagement strategies should be included in the exercise design.

  - During train-up, commanders and staffs must visualize their systems of meetings, attendees, products, and formats in a manner similar to the MDMP or targeting drills. After these systems are identified, form the staff teams/working groups and practice formatting and developing products.

  - Train-up scenarios must focus on training company/troop leaders on information collection, collation, and dissemination.

  - Other governmental agency role players must be replicated by representative role players.

  - Use a scripted and Joint Master Scenario Event List (JMSEL)-driven exercise. Base JMSEL events on actual recent message traffic to replicate the environment.
• **Integrate brigade and battalion staff operations.** Use this time to integrate requirements from the brigade staff to the battalion staffs. Pay particular attention to:

  ° The difference between size and functions of the brigade staff compared to the battalion staffs. The brigade can easily overwhelm the battalion staffs with requirements.

  ° The unique challenge of operating a battalion in a counterinsurgency environment. Many functions, such as nonlethal effects coordination, civil affairs, information operations, and increased intelligence analysis workload migrate to the battalion staffs.

  ° Information requirements placed on the battalion in order to keep the volume of requests manageable. Eliminate overlapping or redundant reporting and consolidate information in existing reports. Have the brigade staff share information from the existing battalion reports.

  ° Augmenting battalion staffs with additional skilled personnel from the brigade staff, such as engineer, civil affairs, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and contracting officers.

  ° The immense volume of reporting requirements, both internal and external. (One battalion completed 30,000 reports and 1,500 detainee packets in an 11-month rotation). Consider that the number and types of sources providing and requesting information may double or triple (joint and coalition commands, other government agencies, nongovernmental agencies, etc.)

• **Rear detachment headquarters and staff training.** Early in the predeployment process, build the rear detachment team with a quality staff. Remember that the rear detachment is important to the success of your mission. A brigade’s rear detachment staff should be equal to other battalion staffs, with a clear chain of command and unit identity:

  ° Stand up the rear detachment headquarters at the same time you convert the headquarters to a TOC footing.

  ° Use the rear detachment staff as a rear command post. Assign all administrative predeployment tasks and missions to the rear detachment headquarters to include all the tasks required to get the unit off the installation. Have the rear headquarters battle track these requirements.

  ° Replicate the deployment conditions and ensure the rear detachment headquarters and staff train and exercise the systems necessary to succeed once the unit departs home station. (The brigade and battalion staffs will have limited contact with the rear detachment staff once the unit deploys).
Include the rear detachment staff when building your battle rhythm and battle tracking.

Include the rear detachment headquarters in the brigade mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). Use the time between the MRE and deployment to correct identified deficiencies.

**Plan to conduct training events simultaneously.** Brigade-sized units should plan to conduct coordinated simultaneous training events and predeployment activities to ensure successful predeployment operations. Major events that must be planned and coordinated simultaneously include:

- Organizing the battalions and brigade for combat.
- Unit personnel fills and Soldier Readiness Processing.
- Equipment maintenance and preparing for deployment.
- Getting Soldiers and units validated for deployment in accordance with U.S. Forces Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command predeployment training program standards.
- Developing and publishing the deployment order and operations plan.
- Refining rear detachment and Family Readiness Group structures and responsibilities.
Chapter 1

Section 3. Relief in Place (RIP)/Transfer of Authority (TOA)

“Establishment of [early] contact with your replacement [unit] ensures a successful RIP/TOA. We were in contact with them as our footprint changed, and any other major issues/concerns that occurred that would impact them.”

Command Sergeant Major

“Help the newcomers to become aware of the operation and systems. More importantly, let the new unit take over and run things their own way wherever possible. Get out of the way. It’s their game now.”

Master Sergeant, Special Staff

The RIP/TOA process can make or break the first 100 days of a unit’s rotation. An effective RIP/TOA eases the transition between units and allows the staff to adapt to the operational environment and the unit to prepare to execute combat tasks and missions. Every rotation is different; therefore, every RIP/TOA transition is unique; do not short-change the process.

The incoming and outgoing staffs must meticulously plan RIP activities and designate responsibilities. The finished plan should consist of a detailed list of tasks to accomplish.

The commander should consider sending some of the key primary staff forward early (with the advanced echelon). The S2, S3, and S4 can begin the preliminary work for the execution of the RIP before the remainder of the staff and the subordinate headquarters arrive.

Conducting the RIP

Most transitions span a ten- to fourteen-day period; however, the more time your unit and the outgoing unit can spend together the better. The staff must make the best use of the time available for the RIP and both staffs should strive to make the RIP successful. The incoming unit staff must discard any perception that they are better or smarter that the staff they are replacing or that they “know it all.” The standing operating procedures (SOPs) and continuity books obtained during the predeployment site survey will assist the incoming staff in adapting to day-to-day requirements. The outgoing staff must make ever effort to answer all requests for information from the incoming staff.

The outgoing staff owes the new staff its best effort in getting them up to speed. The outgoing staff should be wary of the distractions, especially the desire to “get out of Dodge.” Take the time and make the effort to do this right. The success of the mission and the well-being of the Soldiers depend on it!

Both staffs should work side by side during the transition period (the left seat/right seat ride). The incoming staff should assume responsibility for the daily operations
as soon as feasible; the outgoing staff should conduct the “over-the-shoulder” watch. During this initial period, concentrate on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and SOPs that are working and adapt them to your unit. A longer RIP process provides more time for the incoming staff to become comfortable with implementing the existing SOPs. Avoid changing the existing SOPs and TTP until after your staff has had several weeks to settle in. After a considered evaluation as to why changes are needed, adjust them as needed. When feasible, the outgoing unit should leave in place all computers/software/databases. In the first few weeks after the TOA, the “status quo” is usually the best policy.

Inventory equipment and transfer accountability for material that stays in place. Work the process between the staffs before the incoming unit deploys. The outgoing staff cannot clear the operational theater until they complete this process.

RIP is the time for the outgoing unit leadership to introduce the incoming unit leadership to the local community leaders they deal with on a routine basis. This practice helps avoid breaks in the intelligence networks developed over the time by the outgoing unit and will reduce the time the citizens need to build their trust in you after the old unit departs.

The outgoing unit leadership should not hide any shortcomings in its conduct of operations. The incoming unit will discover any faults in time anyway. Do not try to mask the bad news or avoid the discussion of any “unfinished business.” If there are problems, inform the incoming unit leadership. It may save someone’s life!

TOA should occur at the point when:

- The incoming staff has established the battle rhythm.
- The incoming staff has effective battle tracking and good operational awareness of the area of operations (AO).
- The incoming staff is comfortable with SOPs and staff TTP.
- A liaison is established with higher and adjacent headquarters and other agencies as required.
- Supply accountability is transferred to incoming staff.
- Support relationships are in place (including contractor support).

Signs of potentially ineffective RIP:

- Outgoing unit is focused on going home rather than completing an effective RIP process.
- The process is rushed or allocated insufficient time to complete.
- Key personnel (incoming or outgoing) are not present during the RIP activities.
- The outgoing unit is slow to answer or ignores requests for information or provides irrelevant information.
• Operational summaries (OPSUMs), intelligence summaries (INSUMs), and significant action (SIGACTs) are not up to date.

• Execution of RIP/TOA is disorganized, not synchronized with higher command and subordinates, or skips key steps.

• The outgoing staff does not provide an “over the shoulder look” of the incoming staff.

• The outgoing staff offers false reassurances that “you can handle it” even if something is not covered in the transition.

**RIP/TOA Guides**

Use the following guides to help plan and conduct your RIP/TOA. They are not intended to dictate exactly how your staff conducts the RIP/TOA, nor are these guides all-inclusive. Use these as staff guides in building the battalion and brigade RIP checklists that are specific to your mission.

When planning the RIP, be sure to read and adhere to the SOPs of your headquarters and its next higher headquarters. If it is available, get a copy of the outbound unit RIP/TOA after-action review, which should suggest areas that you must include in the transition.

The information included here will assist the commander and staff in putting together an effective RIP so that your unit is ready to take charge of the mission at the TOA. The guides list a task and standard for each of the RIP areas concerned. These guides also support reporting with a tracking methodology (Go-No Go, Red-Amber-Green). The staff can use these to preload tasks and issues for the RIP process.

Split the time available equally for your RIP. During the first half, the outgoing unit leads and the incoming unit observes. Mid-way through the process, the outgoing unit switches seats with the incoming unit, and the incoming unit works through the process. Right seat leads, left seat observes.
Operational Overview Briefs (All Staff)

**Staff preparation:** Both staffs have copies of the existing written guidance and policy letters and operational and tactical maps of the operational environment.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff conducts operational overview brief to incoming staff members.
- Outgoing staff highlights types of missions and roles performed with incoming staff.
- Outgoing staff highlights location and contact numbers for other U.S. and coalition forces operating within the area.
- Outgoing staff highlights location, activity, and contact numbers (if known) for other U.S., coalition, and other nonmilitary agencies operating within the area.
- Incoming staff receives copies of all briefings, operations orders, and fragmentary orders from the last 60 days.
- Incoming staff understands location and boundaries of adjacent U.S. and coalition forces operating within its AO.
- Incoming staff members complete question and answer periods with outgoing staff members following all briefings.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff is oriented on all aspects of current operations within its operational environment.
Standing Operating Procedure, Battle Rhythm, and Battle Drill Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (All Staff)

Staff preparation: Incoming staff has all units’ tactical SOPs, special (section) SOPs, staff battle drill (TTP), and reporting requirements to higher headquarters.

Tasks:

- Outgoing staff executes SOP orientation brief to incoming staff members (by section).

- Incoming staff personnel learn SOP requirements during the “left-seat ride” portion and implement SOP requirements during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.

- Incoming staff members adapt to outgoing staff’s battle rhythm (standard meeting and reporting schedule) during the “left-seat ride” portion and incorporate this into their battle rhythm during “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.

- Outgoing staff briefs tactical TTP and battle drills used and refined over the length of its tour, to include:
  - Vehicle load plans.
  - Pre-setting frequencies in communications equipment.
  - Monitoring different communications nets while mounted and dismounted.
  - Damaged vehicle security and recovery.
  - Landing zone security in event of aerial medical evacuation.
  - Over watch of discovered or suspected improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
  - Receiving reports and battle tracking.
  - Reporting to staff tactical operations center (TOC) during operations.

- Incoming staff observes the execution of staff TTP and battle drills by outgoing staff during the “left-seat ride” portion of RIP.

- Incoming staff incorporates and further refines learned staff TTP and battle drills during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.

End state: Incoming staff has established a battle rhythm and incorporated existing SOPs and TTP in its staff functions.
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<td><strong>Staff preparation:</strong> Outgoing staff plans and leads the AO reconnaissance. The incoming staff has the current OPSUM and situational maps and photographs for situational awareness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tasks:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incoming staff receives operational overview brief from outgoing staff prior to reconnaissance of the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on all key tribal and religious demographics prior to conducting the reconnaissance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incoming staff has knowledge of friendly situation, to include locations and actions of active combat patrols and combat logistics patrols within AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outgoing and incoming staff execute reconnaissance of key terrain and key infrastructure facilities within the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incoming staff possesses situational awareness and understanding of key terrain, key infrastructure facilities, key government facilities, and religious sites located within its AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on prominent local nationals within the AO (known tribal, religious, political, police, and military leaders) friendly to U.S. and coalition forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outgoing staff provides a list of points of contact and phone numbers for the local sheiks, mullahs, and imams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incoming commander and key staff members are introduced to prominent local leaders when and where possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on local nationals that are suspected of directly supporting insurgent or criminal groups within AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End state:</strong> At TOA, incoming staff members have conducted a reconnaissance of key physical terrain, key infrastructure, key facilities, and influential leaders within AO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## AO Intelligence Review (S2, S2X, S3, S7, S9, and Chaplain)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with the current OPSUMs, INTSUMs, and SIGACTs for the last 60 days.

**Tasks:**
- Outgoing staff briefs the current INTSUMs and SIGACTS.
- Outgoing staff briefs threat groups, affiliations, and persons of interest suspected of being involved in insurgent activity.
- Outgoing staff briefs insurgent and criminal activity in AO during past 60 days.
- Incoming staff understands predominant insurgent tactics used within AO.
- Incoming staff understands location of all areas where enemy activity is high.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff has situational understanding of all insurgent and criminal activity within AO during the past 60 days.
**Intelligence Exploitation Review**
*(S2, S2X, S3 [Battle Captain], S7, and Chaplain)*

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with a list of the current intelligence operations and assets operating within its AO.

**Tasks:**
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on organic and available intelligence systems including the process for attaining intelligence and/or collection support from adjacent and higher headquarters’ assets.
- Incoming unit understands all current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity in the AO.
- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on available sources of and how to request best practices to leverage imagery products.
- Outgoing instructs incoming staff on available sources of:
  - Signals intelligence products and cell phone exploitation procedures.
  - Computer exploitation procedures.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on current human intelligence operations, (passive collections and every Soldier is a sensor).
- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on the process for targeting and target folder development.
- Incoming staff observes reporting and tracking of enemy activity in AO by outgoing staff during the “left-seat ride” portion and implements method during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on intelligence support to its information operations (IO). Incoming staff assumes support to IO during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff understands all of the present intelligence exploitation processes and intelligence activities in its AO.
Detainee Operations (S2, S2X, S3, Military Police Platoon Leader)

Staff preparation: Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with its SOP and TTP for processing detainees.

Tasks:

- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on its detainee operations:
  - Rules for determining who to take as a detainee
  - Procedures for collecting evidence and maintaining the chain of custody
  - Rules for tactical questioning and who conducts interrogations
  - Procedures for tracking detainee information
- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on its procedures for using biometrics tools (enrolling detainee, screening locals, and transferring data to higher headquarters).
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on the current be-on-the-lookout-for (BOLO), persons of interest, and high-value target lists.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on evacuation timeline requirements in theater, location of the internment facilities, and procedures for detainee transfer. Incoming staff must demonstrate understanding during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on the procedures for evacuating detainees needing medical treatment at the time of capture. Incoming staff must demonstrate understanding during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming staff assumes control of detainee operations during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.

End state: At TOA, incoming staff has control of the detainee operations within the AO.
Personnel Operations (S1)

**Staff preparation**: Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with the higher headquarters’ SOP and policy letters (awards, evaluations reports, personnel actions, etc.).

**Tasks**:
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on higher headquarters and supporting headquarters’ SOPs, policies, and TTP for personnel actions.
-Incoming unit understands all theater policies for forms and publication management, official mail, Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act inquiries, and Congressional inquiries.
-Incoming staff understands the process and requirements for personnel accountability and strength reporting in the theater and demonstrates this knowledge during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on responsibilities for casualty correspondence (letters of sympathy and condolence).
- Incoming staff understands the procedures for reporting casualties, tracking status through evacuation, and recovery and evacuation of personal effects.
- Incoming staff understands the theater replacement operations process.
- Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on local policies for conducting public affairs operations.
- Incoming staff understands how to obtain external legal affairs support to include service transfers, line of duty investigations, conscientious objector processing, summary court officer appointments, and military justice.
- Incoming staff understands the postal operations process.
- Incoming staff takes over all personnel actions and stay-behind military records.

**End state**: At TOA, incoming staff has assumed control of human resources core missions and actions.
### Conduct Property Inventories and Physical Property Transfer of Stay-Behind Equipment (Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and Theater-Provided Equipment) (S4, Property Book Officer, Hand Receipt Holders)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff has all installation and organizational property hand receipts and shortage annexes on hand. All applicable technical manuals are available for reference.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff has all identified shortages on a valid requisition and provides the document numbers to the incoming staff.
- Both staffs conducting inventories have copies of the hand receipts and shortage annexes prior to beginning the inventory.
- Outgoing units lay out 100 percent of the equipment for inspection and inventory. Incoming and outgoing staffs complete a joint inventory of all equipment (by serial number, where applicable).
- Both staffs verify serial numbers of all sensitive items.
- Outgoing staff initiates reports of survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.
- Incoming staff verifies and signs installation and organizational hand receipt and takes physical possession of all equipment.
- Incoming staff submits hand receipt paperwork to property book team in sector in accordance with applicable policy directives.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming staff has conducted a 100 percent inventory, accounted for (by serial number where required), signed for, and possesses 100 percent of all designated stay-behind equipment (SBE) with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
**Conduct Installation Property Transfer (S4, Property Book Officer)**

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff provides the installation property hand receipt with all shortage annexes. Applicable owner’s manuals and operating manuals are available to the staff for reference.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff provides incoming staff with any owner’s manuals or product components’ listings for off-the-shelf items.

- Outgoing staff personnel have 100 percent of the equipment laid out or have identified the equipment’s location (if item cannot be disconnected) prior to the inventory.

- Both incoming and outgoing staffs complete the joint inventory of all equipment (by serial number, where applicable).

- Outgoing staff initiates reports of survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.

- Incoming staff verifies and signs installation hand receipt and provides copies to installation property book team in sector and takes physical possession of all installation property.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming staff has conducted a 100 percent inventory, accounted for (by serial number where required), signed for, and possesses 100 percent of all installation property with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Maintenance Program for Stay Behind Equipment
(XO, Maintenance Officer)

Staff preparation: Outgoing maintenance staff has provided all valid Department of the Army Form 5988, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet*, to the incoming staff. Outgoing maintenance staff provides all technical manuals to the incoming maintenance staff.

Tasks:
- Outgoing and incoming staff conduct joint preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
- Outgoing staff briefs process for maintenance and repair at the direct support maintenance level, and incoming maintenance staff understands how to contact the direct support maintenance activity.
- Outgoing staff conducts orientation visit to external maintenance facilities (i.e., contract maintenance support and/or U.S. staff maintenance collection point) and receives points of contact for scheduling maintenance repair to vehicles, radios, and weapons.
- Outgoing maintenance staff briefs incoming maintenance staff on the current periodic services schedule for SBE.
- Incoming staff establishes necessary maintenance accounts and verifies equipment in Unit Level Logistics System-Ground.
- Outgoing staff briefs service data for all ancillary equipment (weapons, communications equipment, and night vision goggles).
- Incoming staff understands method of reporting battle losses and requisitioning replacement equipment.
- Incoming staff assumes maintenance mission.

End state: Prior to TOA, incoming maintenance staff has conducted a 100 percent PMCS on all SBE, understands the procedures for external maintenance support, and has assumed maintenance mission.
Religious Support Program (Religious Support Team)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing chaplain and chaplain assistant have provided incoming chaplain and chaplain assistant with the current religious support summary and all SIGACTs for the last 60 days.

**Tasks:**

- Review and transfer battle book.
- Review operations orders and fragmentary orders.
- Review command and religious support reports.
- Reconnaissance forward operations bases, medical treatment facilities, morgues, and chapels.
- Rehearse mass casualty plans.
- Transfer worship service coverage.
- Transfer casualty ministry coverage.
- Transfer property and hand receipts.
- Transfer morgue ministry.
- Review memorial service SOP.
- Review religions coverage plan.
- Review advising the commander and staff products.
- Review military decision-making process products.
- Meet leaders of civil-military operations.
- Meet leaders of information operations and psychological operations.
- Participate on operational planning boards and cells.
- Participate in operations and situational update briefings.
- Meet key religious leaders.
- Review religious leader liaison materials and products.
- Review environmental leave, suicide, and reunion briefings.
- Review funding procedures.
- Review religious support team travel and security procedures.
- Conduct TOA.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming chaplain and chaplain assistant have a thorough knowledge of the command’s religious support program and key religious leader points of contact and are integrated into the staff decision-making process.
Chapter 1
Section 4. Complacency and Indiscipline

“I was able to rotate “on the FOB” [forward operations base] Soldiers with Soldiers who routinely worked off the FOB. This helped both sets of soldiers retain and/or regain perspective on their jobs. I had my command sergeant major, physicians assistant, chaplain, and staff conduct leader ride-alongs on patrols and missions to check on patrol techniques, dealing with the population, PCC/PCI [precombat checks/precombat inspections], patrol briefs, etc. We ran patrol lanes for every patrol on the FOB to tighten up procedures for CASEVAC [casualty evacuation], 5/25s, etc.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

“Get out and see the Soldiers in the AO. Know what they are doing. Enforce standards everywhere you go. Also, relieve officers who cannot meet the standards, use Article 15s sparingly but effectively against staff sergeants and sergeants who will not meet the standards. Reward Soldiers found doing the right things.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

Fighting Complacency

Complacency is cited more often than any other single factor as contributing to casualties in Iraq. For units deployed in combat, casualties reduce the probability that the operational mission will be fully accomplished. The wounding, injury, or death of a Soldier has a detrimental impact on the morale of the Soldiers in a unit. When a Soldier is lost due to complacency or lack of discipline, it often compounds the remorse that Soldiers and leaders feel. Complacency feeds indiscipline, and left unchecked, it will spread rapidly through a unit. Commanders and staffs must recognize the signs of complacent behaviors and attitudes and move quickly to correct the situation.

Soldiers used the following descriptive phrases to define complacency:

- Being unaware of surroundings (lack of situational awareness)
- Lack of attention to detail
- Failure to follow established standards or procedures
- Carelessness
- Indiscipline (or lack of discipline)
- Lost battlefield focus
- Did not bring their “A” game
- Did not have their heads in the game
- Underestimated or did not have respect for the enemy
- Got too comfortable with the surroundings

The meaning complacency among Soldiers in Iraq departs from any formal definition of the word in one major respect: Very few Soldiers said they were unaware of the actual dangers or hazards of their environment. They knew the dangers and still became complacent. This suggests that the Soldier’s attitude toward the dangers posed by his environment is a key element in his complacent behavior.

Apart from the Soldier himself and his peers, leadership at the unit level most influences a Soldier’s attitude. Soldiers (with a few exceptions) obey orders and perform as disciplined professionals when leaders hold them to a standard. The commander must articulate that standard through a policy that confronts complacency in his command. The staff (and subordinate leaders) must administer the policy, while enforcing the standards.

**Role of the Commander**

In the survey, commanders said their role in countering complacency is two-fold: 1) Set the standards for Soldier behavior and duty performance and communicate the standards clearly, and 2) Instill in the leadership a sense of responsibility for enforcing the standard. Brigade and battalion commanders (and their command sergeants major) used several means to set and communicate these standards. They communicated standards through officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) professional development programs that impressed on leaders, at every level, that they were accountable for standards and discipline. In addition, leadership presence and interactions with Soldiers reinforced the standards.

**Role of the Staff**

The staff is responsible for the taking the commander’s guidance and turning it into policies and procedures that communicate the commanders’ intent and provide measures of performance and measures of effectiveness by which the leaders can evaluate their performance. The staff also is a direct representative of the commander. The staff is equally responsible (along with the leadership) for enforcing these standards of performance. The staff provides the means that support the commander’s policy and practices for maintaining discipline and mitigating complacency.
Techniques

Brigade and battalion commanders and staffs listed several differing techniques they used to reduce complacency and indiscipline in their units. Those most frequently mentioned are:

- Keep Soldiers busy and mission focused through continuous relevant training.
- Hold leaders directly responsible for enforcing standards and making on-the-spot corrections. Use NCOs as the first line of defense in correcting complacent behavior.
- Leaders (this includes the staff) should have daily contact with Soldiers (leader ride-along and leader battlefield circulation).
- Use the staff to conduct spot checks and regular inspections including staff-conducted PCC and PCI.
- Rotate units and Soldiers through differing missions or vary routine tasks.
- Reward positive behavior or practices when observed.
- Communicate with Soldiers and leaders (keeping them up to date on issues).
- Routinely schedule a regular day off to Soldiers. Protect this policy ruthlessly.
- Provide morale, welfare, and recreation activities.
- Build regular unit activities (“fun run,” athletic competitions, etc.) to foster *esprit-de-corps* and competition and bolster individual Soldiers’ pride.
- Connect Soldiers with their unit religious support team (RST). Use the RST as a means to monitor Soldiers’ morale.
- Punish (Uniform Code of Military Justice) repeat offenders and/or Soldiers who violate general orders. Punishment must be just and fit the severity of the violation.
Dealing with Stress and Fatigue

Stress and/or fatigue are often cited as the most common factors contributing to complacency or indiscipline. Multitudes of stressors accompany service in Iraq. A stressor is any event or situation that requires a non-routine change in adaptation or behavior:

- Physical stressors include external environmental conditions such as heat and noise, equipment weight, and the terrain underfoot.
- Mental stressors involve information that places demands on either your thoughts or feelings.
- Combat stressors can be physical or mental and occur during the course of combat-related duties. Combat stressors can result from enemy action, your unit, or your home life.

Stress is what your body and mind do to counteract stressors:

- Positive stress helps you respond appropriately to normal stressors; some amount of stress is necessary to prompt effective responses.
- Too little stress may make you distracted, forgetful, or cause you to fall asleep.
- Too much stress may make you focus on only one aspect of a task, neglecting the larger picture.
- Extreme stress may cause you to “freeze up” or become agitated and flee.
- Prolonged extreme stress can cause physical and mental disablement.

Physical fatigue results from:

- Hard or prolonged work.
- Muscle tiredness.
- Aerobic fatigue.
- Sleep deprivation.
- Physical illness.
- Intense emotions, such as anxiety and fear.

Mental fatigue results from:

- Prolonged mental effort on a specific task.
- Emotions such as boredom or uncertainty.
Inappropriate reactions to combat-induced stress are called misconduct stress behaviors and include unacceptable and even criminal activities, such as:

- Substance abuse.
- Brutal violence.
- Recklessness.
- Desertion.
- Malingering.
- Fraternization.

Battle fatigue and combat stress reaction is usually present, at some level, in all personnel in a theater of combat operations. Small-unit leaders have the ability to apply the following treatment steps:

- Reassure Soldiers.
- Provide Soldiers opportunities for rest and sleep.
- Provide food and fluids.
- Provide opportunities for personal hygiene (potable water, clean uniform).
- Provide a time and place for the Soldier to talk about what happened.
- Restore the Soldier’s identity and confidence by assigning useful work.

These treatment steps should be administered quickly and as close to the Soldier’s unit as possible.
Chapter 2
Section 1. Cultural Awareness

“We were way off the mark on cultural awareness. We did not study the different tribal affiliations or extremist interoperations and their effect on the areas we operated in. We expended too much effort trying to understand what was offensive or polite interaction with the populace.”

Command Sergeant Major, Battalion

“In my opinion it was not properly conducted. It was far too brief, the detail focused on irrelevant information which would be appropriate for tourists.”

Master Sergeant, Special Staff

“Basic language and CA help, but until you immerse yourself in the specific problems of an AO the cultural ramifications of operations you will not understand the specific requirements of your AO.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Brigade Combat Team Primary Staff

Cultural awareness is essential to the basic mission of every unit that operates in the Central Command theater. While it should be on a commander’s top three “things to do before deployment” list, it is perhaps one of the most overlooked training requirements. Knowing the customs of the host nation will facilitate better communication and understanding.

Introduction

Knowing some of the basic tenets of Iraqi culture is a critical component of ongoing contemporary operations. Commanders and staff members who understand and incorporate cultural considerations into planning and operations will significantly improve their units’ effectiveness during the first 100 days of deployment. Cultural awareness is similar to situational awareness (SA). Just as good SA can lead to situational understanding (SU), cultural awareness can lead to cultural understanding.

SA is knowing what is happening around you, and SU is understanding why things are happening around you. The key variable leading from SA to SU is experience. An observer, analyst, or operator in a given area who maintains SA will develop SU over time. The same relationship between cultural awareness and cultural understanding is possible if leaders and units prepare and incorporate cultural considerations into all aspects of training and in planning and conducting operations in theater. Commanders and staffs validated the necessity of cultural predeployment training and the need to incorporate cultural aspects into the planning and conduct of operations.
Culture and Cultural Awareness Defined

Culture is a shared set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors. Culture is shaped by many factors, including history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality. Culture evolves in response to various pressures and influences and is learned through socialization; it is not inherent. In short, a culture provides a lens through which its members see and understand the world. In a military context, think of culture as simply another element of terrain, parallel to geographic terrain. Just as a hill or saddle affect a Soldier’s ability to maneuver, so can religion, perceptions, and language help military planners find centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and assist in campaign planning and the proper allocation of resources.

Cultural awareness is the ability to recognize and understand the effects of culture on people’s values and behaviors. In the military context, cultural awareness can be defined as the “cognizance of cultural terrain for military operations and the connections between culture and warfighting.” Cultural awareness implies the need to consider cultural terrain in military operations, to know what cultural factors influence a given situation and why, and to obtain a specified level of understanding for a target culture. This section begins with a succinct list of key parameters common in theater and then examines culture in terms of preparatory training and integrating cultural factors into planning and execution. The section concludes with a brief synopsis of culture as it pertains to battle command.

Aspects of Arab Culture

Iraqi identities:

- 97 percent Muslim (33 percent Sunni and 65 percent Shi’a)
- 3 percent Christians

Key leaders:

- Sheikh is a leader of a tribe.
- Imam is a Shi’a scholar cleric.
- Mukhtar is a local mayor (the title can also refer to a mediator).

Beliefs and values:

- A person’s dignity, honor, and reputation are paramount.
- Always act in a manner that leaves a good impression.
- Loyalty to family takes precedence.
- Social class and family background are major determinates of personal status.
Self-perceptions:

- Everyone believes in God.
- Humans cannot control all events.
- Piety is a most admirable trait.
- There is no separation between church and state.
- Liberal interpretations of established religious practices are rejected.

Relationship building:

- Never openly refuse a friend’s request.
- A verbal promise has its own value.
- Non-committal answers are common.
- Introductions determine social status and influence networking.
- Start meetings with a few minutes of light conversation.
- Begin and end conversations with a handshake.
- Learn Iraqi greetings and farewells as a minimum.
- Avoid criticism in front of others – begin with a good point.
- Get personal.

Do not be concerned if:

- Iraqis get personal quickly in conversation.
- Iraqis discuss money.
- Iraqis ask questions about marital status or children.

Sensitive subjects:

- Religion and politics (both can be risky)
- Conversion to Islam
- Frank statements or inadvertent comments about disagreements
- Questions on sensitive subjects
Training

Soldiers in Iraq learned about general cultural themes that became integral to their daily operations and the effect their actions and equipment had on the populace. Immediately after deploying to Iraq, several cultural factors began affecting the execution of missions in the area of operations. Soldiers identified six critical factors:

- **Naming conventions and transliterations.** Both became major problems in tracking persons of interest.

- **Nonverbal cues during questioning and interrogation.** The difference in body language and gestures became both an intelligence issue and a safety issue.

- **Gaining personal respect.** Facial hair, age, and knowledge of the Koran command respect and reverence in the Muslim World.

- **Clerics and mosques as key cultural influences.** The clerics and their mosques were key influences of public perception and action.

- **Religious sect differences.** Sect differences were an important factor in the fabric of any region. There were Sunni, Shi’a, and Christian areas in Baghdad, and each district had its own distinct cultural nuance.

- **Honor in the Arab culture is paramount.** U.S. Soldiers must understand that Arabs will deceive or mislead if in their estimation it retains their honor in the face of their family, sect, or tribe (saving face).

The commander and staff must consider basic pieces of cultural awareness when conducting training for Soldiers:

- Basic language skills help the Soldier gain the respect and trust of Iraqi citizens, even if the Soldier’s fluency is minimal.

- Using the proper forms of greetings and basic interrogatives is instrumental in building relationships on the street.

- Understanding sect differences can help Soldiers interpret what happens day-to-day, and this understanding has a positive effect on daily operations and mission execution.

- A lack of a standard transliteration guide and standard naming conventions causes confusion in identifying specific Iraqis.

- Mosques and clerics were the key influences on public perception and activity in each area.

- Continue to teach basic knowledge of the Koran and Islamic law to enable de-briefers to effectively conduct Muslim detainee questioning.
Planning and Operations

In addition to insuring Soldiers are properly trained and prepared for operations in theater, commanders and staffs must incorporate cultural considerations in the planning and conduct of all operations. The acronym METT (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available was amended to METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) to incorporate cultural considerations.

The following are suggested techniques for integrating cultural sensitivity into combat operations:

- **Cultural awareness training.** Soldiers must know what is culturally acceptable in Iraq.

- **Language training.** Language training is an invaluable skill. Every unit has its language training challenges, but some training is better than no training. Knowing some of the language helps break down cultural barriers.

- **Leader training.** Develop scenario-based vignettes involving escalation of force issues (EOF) and integrate them into training exercises.

- **Rules of engagement (ROE) and EOF training.** ROE and EOF vignettes are culturally sensitive. Every Soldier will have to make a life-or-death decision within seconds. Understanding ROE and EOF enhances Soldiers’ chances of making the right decisions. Incorporate these scenarios into all levels of training.

- **Diversify training events.** Combine ROE, EOF, role-playing, and civilians on the battlefield into all tactical exercises. Without putting Soldiers at risk, ensure there are consequences for cultural ignorance and rewards for incorporating cultural sensitivity into combat operations.

- **Draw the line.** Emphasize that cultural sensitivity should in no way jeopardize the lives of Soldiers. Ensure that Soldiers understand that tactical decisions that are not culturally sensitive must be made; but whenever possible, “the culture of our organization” is care toward civilians and treating the populace with dignity and respect.

- **Information operations (IO) training.** Conduct training at all levels, from private to battalion commander. IO is a powerful tool, and grasping the concept of how to integrate it into daily operations is paramount. Knowing IO is the name of the game; incorporate it at all levels of training.

- **Every Soldier is a sensor.** Every Soldier is an intelligence collector and must understand that he could observe something important. Verbal engagements on the battlefield happen more than lethal engagements and must receive the same amount of attention. Debriefings are critical.

- **Civil affairs training.** Conduct predeployment training to understand public works, such as trash collection and water works as well as how
local governments work. Columbus, GA, or Killeen, TX, is nowhere near Mosul, Iraq, but these cities do provide leaders a working model on which to base their “nation builder” roles. Leaders should attend local government meetings and observe how members raise, discuss, and resolve issues in a small city government.

- **Embrace the culture.** This technique is difficult but possible. Understanding Iraqis and how they think, operate, and act are combat multipliers, which also reinforce the idea that neither the Iraqi people nor Islam is the enemy—insurgents are the enemies.

Key insights and lessons learned:

- To build trust and foster goodwill, units should take cultural factors into account when planning and conducting operations.

- Respecting the observance of Iraqi holidays and cultural norms can go a long way in establishing trust.

- During high-intensity combat operations, Soldiers must remain culturally aware.

- Because of the significance of Friday prayers and funeral services in the Islamic faith, units need to factor cultural concerns into the targeting process.

- When anti-coalition leaders are replaced, it is important to know who will take their place, what the new leaders’ beliefs are, and who might try to retaliate against the removal of their leader.

- Unit intelligence analysts should factor cultural variables into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process using the existing doctrine as a baseline.

- Providing access to information and creating the Baghdad Press Club facilitated the distribution of coalition messages to all areas of Baghdad.

- Press meetings helped bridge the cultural gaps between Iraqis and coalition forces through question-and-answer sessions and progress updates.

- Leaders must not underestimate the emotional stress and frustration some Soldiers endure while fighting a counterinsurgency. Leaders must be aware of the potentially adverse effect that stress might have on their Soldiers’ internalization and application of cultural awareness values during a long and violent deployment.

- Soldiers in units participating in heavy fighting and suffering many casualties may tend to become culturally insensitive at higher rates than other Soldiers. Soldiers who have participated in multiple Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments may share the same tendencies.
• There is a time about two months before redeployment when Soldiers become increasingly culturally insensitive.

• Strong, positive leadership and meaningful reinforcing training are essential in maintaining cultural awareness among deployed Soldiers.

**Cultural Awareness Enables Battle Command**

Commanders and leaders reported that cultural awareness was extremely important to their success, second only to combat proficiency. Senior commanders reported that cultural awareness enabled successful battle command and military operations. Being culturally aware allowed the commander to:

• Accurately visualize the battlefield and conceive future courses of action.

• Enable Soldiers to conduct military operations that maximized the Iraqi’s positive perception of U.S. forces.

• Deter acceptance and support for the insurgents.

**Key insights/lessons learned:**

• Cultural awareness enables successful battle command by enhancing commanders’ visualizations of today’s battlefields and assisting the development of future courses of action.

• Commanders generally had far greater cultural awareness than their staffs. Understanding this problem and taking action to counter it prevented serious battle command disconnects.

• Commanders often engaged appropriate staff members in free-flowing “skull sessions” and war gaming to convey their thoughts and ideas. Commanders were diligent in their efforts to state their planning guidance and intent accurately.

• Staff members must recognize the importance of cultural awareness and work hard to visualize atmospherics.

• Commanders should consider inviting appropriate key staff members to accompany them during meetings, patrols, and other operations.

• Update briefs are important opportunities for staff to hear commanders speak about “atmospherics” and their sense of cultural factors in their area of interest.

• Commanders may consider implementing programs enabling staff officers of all positions and at all levels to attend meetings and occasionally accompany patrols with subordinate units.

• To ensure that Army units mitigate risk during combat operations, commanders should include cultural factors when developing mission intent and the commander’s critical information requirements.
Command and Staff Local Knowledge

The following local knowledge is important for commanders and their staffs:

- People’s attitude
- Information operations
- Economic influences
- Social and religious influences
- Criminal activities
Chapter 2

Section 2. Precombat Checks (PCC) and Precombat Inspections (PCI)

“Leader checks before during and after patrols are essential. It is not enough for a leader to simply do a PCI and then send the patrol off the FOB. A leader has to ride along observe the mission, see how the patrol operates, see how the Soldiers interact with the population, listen to the radio chatter, observe TTPs and conduct post patrol activities. The commander can use the CSM, Chaplain, PA, and Staff to help him and the company commanders with the survivability of the Soldiers in this way.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Battalion Commander

“PCCs and PCIs became more centralized as well to ensure that vehicles were dispatched, FBCB2s were operational, weapons cleaned etc. Half way through the deployment soldiers and leaders get sloppy/lazy and allow standards to slip. We would periodically inspect patrols for certain items to ensure that the companies continued to enforce standards.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Battalion Commander

“The PCCs/PCIs were done at least 4 hours before roll out. We had actual Battalion Staff, i.e., S6/Commo, Maintenance, checking all of the vehicles before roll out. CLP Commanders/Leaders also conducted their on-the-spot checks of each Soldier during this time, to make sure everyone was prepared for the mission. This time period gave the S6 and maintenance time to make any repairs that were necessary. Putting a team together whose main focus/mission was the preparation of the CLPs, definitely left room for little error.”

Master Sergeant, Battalion Command Section

Checks and Inspections

A unit that has a well-established system of checks and inspections will consistently perform to standard. Commanders and staffs must establish checks and inspections that support the unit’s mission-essential task list. Once established, the leader must ensure that Soldiers perform the checks and inspections before and after any kind of operation. Checks and inspections fall into the following categories:

- Precombat checks (PCC)
- Precombat inspections (PCI)
- Postcombat checks and postcombat inspections

PCC aid the commander in preparing his units for combat operations. The commander and all subordinate leaders have the responsibility to conduct PCC. The staff is responsible for determining what is checked, how it is checked, and who
does the checking. The most useful tool for conducting the PCC is a standardized checklist. The staff must develop checklists for individuals, vehicles, weapons, and equipment. These checklists should be generic, but easily tailored to fit a unit’s specific needs. Leaders at all levels use these checklists in their planning and in preparing instructions to their subordinate leaders.

PCI validate that Soldiers have performed PCC. The commander and staff use the PCI as a means to check the immediate readiness of the patrol and individual Soldiers for combat. Many staffs included battle drill rehearsals (or immediate action drills) and mission tasks in the PCI. The staff should establish a standardized place and time (in relation to start point of the patrol) for conducting PCI. Again the commander, through the staff directives, assigns the responsibility for conducting the PCI. In the survey, many commanders preferred to use a layered approach; lower-level leaders do the initial checks, company leaders validate the checks, and designated staff members conduct a final check.

The commander and staff must allocate sufficient time to ensure that leaders perform inspections. Time must also be available for corrective actions should an individual or item fail the inspection. Depending on the amount of items to check and any rehearsal time needed, the time required to conduct PCI can range from two to four hours.

In addition, commanders and staffs in theater must constantly assess and evaluate what checks and inspections are being conducted as changes in threat activity, operational tempo, and duration of deployment influence Soldiers’ readiness. The staff must constantly monitor the PCC and PCI to ensure that the items and areas checked are legitimate. Changes to the PCC and PCI are most often needed when the unit experiences:

- Changes in friendly TTP (or battle drills).
- New equipment fielding (for example, Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare or Unmanned Aerial System).
- New enemy tactics and weapons.
- Changes in the environment (weather).
- Shortfalls identified in the post mission AAR.
- Soldier and/or leader complacency.

Most units conducted postcombat checks as part of their post-mission recovery to identify and address shortages or maintenance problems before the next mission. Leaders can also identify Soldier skills that need retraining. Some staffs add the after-action review to the postcombat checks. The standards the commander sets will determine the unit’s ability to perform in combat.

Postcombat checks are identical in form to PCC but differ in substance. Soldiers still perform checks on individuals, vehicles, weapons, and equipment; however, the focus changes to repairing and refitting these items to a reusable condition. Soldiers may need to replenish expendable items and replace lost items. Units
replace their basic-load items and ensure that equipment has its full complement of petroleum, oil, and lubricants. Units evacuate damaged and non-operational equipment for repair. Soldiers also attend to individual needs. Soldiers require rest and refitting, and leaders should address medical and morale problems.

Like PCI, leaders must plan and conduct postcombat inspections. Since postcombat operations are heavily maintenance-oriented, the leader should seek the aid of his vehicle, communications, and supply personnel to assist him in conducting his inspections. These individuals are capable of making immediate repairs and serve as expert advisers. Inspections must focus on serviceability. Vehicles and equipment must operate to standard. A check of all radios requires a net station positioned at a distance consistent with combat conditions. It does a unit no good to be able to talk only in an assembly area. Allocate sufficient time to perform these inspections and pay strict attention to detail. An inspection that checks only one of every three weapons ensures that the unit is only one-third operable. Conduct a 100 percent inspection of everything.

The following table provides an example of a PCC. Following the table is an example of a combat logistics patrol PCI checklist. The commander and command sergeant major can rotate the inspectors’ responsibilities throughout the staff to train subordinate leaders and provide a thorough inspection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle preparations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loaded according to the load plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle refueled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water cans full, Class I (rations) stowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment cleaned and stowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-aid kit/combat-lifesaver bag complete and stowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle dispatched, technical manual present, vehicle tool kit stowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic load of ammunition stowed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radios operational, mounted, and secured; connections and receptacles cleaned and frequencies set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenna matching unit(s) operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications security equipment operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones operational and stowed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global Positioning System, OE-254 antenna, satellite communications complete, operational, and stowed

All required nets entered and monitored

**Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear**

M11 decontamination (decon) apparatus mounted and operational

Hasty decon kit with DS-2 and nitrogen bottles stowed

Automatic chemical alarm operational and mounted

M256 kits stowed

Optics

Night-vision devices and binoculars cleaned, operational, and stowed

Combat optics serviced and zeroed

**Maintenance**

Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) conducted on all equipment

DA Form 2404(s), Organization-Level Maintenance Inspection Sheet, completed on all equipment

**Armaments**

All weapons cleaned and test-fired

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**Example Combat Logistics Patrol PCC/PCI Checklist**

Before each convoy moves out, the convoy commander must conduct a safety briefing along with PCC and PCI. The following list of the minimum requirements before vehicles move by convoy to a new location is not all-inclusive. Leaders may use these recommendations to add to the unit’s convoy SOP for both offensive and stability and reconstruction operations:

- Strip maps with checkpoints issued to all vehicles (with six-digit grids as a minimum)
- Battle book check by key leaders; operations orders; maps and/or an All Source Analysis System-Light printout of the area
- Enforced intervals between all vehicles
• Adequate fuel on hand for all vehicles
• Adequate recovery equipment for each vehicle, such as tow bars, chains, wreckers, cables, and shovels to get out of sand
• GPS for each vehicle (military or civilian GPS devices), minimum front and rear
• “Air guards” to observe bridges overhead; watch out for chokepoints; watch out for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines, and potential ambush sites
• Night vision goggles with head/helmet harnesses on hand for each vehicle
• Vehicles with crew-served weapons in the convoy
• Vehicles with frequency modulation communications in the convoy
• PMCS before operations
• Standard safety briefing
• Actions to take if a vehicle breaks down
• Rehearsal of reactions to ambushes, IEDs, land mines, and sniper and artillery/mortar attacks
• Casualty evacuation/medical evacuation rehearsal
• A check with battalion S2 (Intelligence Officer) on possible enemy locations and threats and actions within the past 24-48 hours
• Avoid chokepoints, if at all possible
• A sensitive items check
• Hardening of vehicles by using items such as sandbags and makeshift armor fabrication

Commanders and staffs must ensure that potential convoy commanders and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs) have checklists readily available to determine if their convoys are ready to go. It is critical that NCOs conduct PCC for all the Soldiers in the convoy before movement, and that the convoy commander with the NCOIC of the convoy conduct the PCI before all movements. These checks are critical to the survival of Soldiers in a convoy.
Chapter 2

Section 3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Escalation of Force (EOF) Considerations for the Battle Staff

“EOF is a bigger issue than ROE. This is all TTP at lower level. The BCT must clearly articulate expectations. The CSM worked this hard with the NCOs of the command.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, it is important to meet stringent force protection (FP) requirements, accomplish the mission, and minimize chances for collateral damage against other friendly forces and friendly citizens.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

A commander issues ROE through the battle staff. ROE inform Soldiers and leaders when, under what circumstances, and by what methods force can be applied. Lower-level commands cannot modify ROE.

The battle staff must help clarify in written plans and orders what Soldiers and leaders need to know and rehearse concerning ROE and EOF procedures. The staff should develop contingencies for even routine missions. Emplacing available FP equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase Soldiers’ reaction time at potential escalation of force (EOF) event areas.

Detailed and innovative planning, battle staff oversight, and strong troop-leading procedures (TLP) can extend the reaction time Soldiers need to de-escalate potentially volatile engagements. During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, leaders must incorporate both lethal and nonlethal means into mission planning, as well as weigh and adjust follow-on effects during execution.

Importance of ROE:

- ROE reinforce the laws of war.
- ROE prevents Soldiers from violating the laws of war, international law, and U.S. law.
- ROE minimize injury to civilians and damage to civilian property.

Escalation of Force

EOF goes hand in hand with the ROE. EOF procedures prescribe a step-by-step graduated response for the application of force. EOF procedures are common in COIN operational environments, such as Iraq, where the enemy uses civilians and coalition forces to mask its presence. The intent of EOF is to reduce the potential for unintended casualties that result from using lethal means as a first resort.
ROE starts with the use of nonlethal methods of force, if employing those measures will achieve the desired effect without endangering the Soldier or others. When conditions permit, Soldiers should use nonlethal means, such as visible or audible warnings, demonstration of their weapons, blocking access, physically detaining a person, firing a warning shot, and/or firing a disabling shot at a vehicle to gain compliance. EOF is not an ordinary substitute for ROE; it is a part or component of the ROE.

Soldiers must understand the critical aspects of successful EOF:

- Early warning for people approaching a coalition position
- Clear intent of what people approaching a coalition position must do to avoid the use of force
- Clear triggers for escalating force from nonlethal to lethal based on the ROE

The battle staff should set conditions for success by issuing training guidance that reinforces standards for EOF-related tactics, techniques, and procedures. ROE and EOF enhance FP and aid mission accomplishment. The staff should help provide required resources (such as FP equipment and traffic control point kits from the Rapid Equipping Force) to subordinate units to facilitate EOF-related training scenarios. These scenarios protect Soldiers and empower them to make the appropriate EOF decisions during actual operations. Training EOF procedures helps Soldiers recognize conditions where the use of nonlethal means may de-escalate potentially threatening situations.

Soldiers should not fear informal or formal investigations for possible violations of ROE and EOF procedures. The overriding purpose of these investigations is to establish the facts of each individual case and to determine if the Soldier or unit involved applied the ROE and EOF procedures as intended. Most investigations result in a determination that a Soldier or unit acted properly.

The Soldier’s Right to Self-Defense

ROE always contain provisions that permit units and Soldiers to use force in self-defense. When confronted with hostile intent or when a hostile act occurs, use of force in self-defense is authorized for as long as the hostile intent or hostile acts continue. The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond decisively to the demonstration of hostile intent or hostile acts. The action or response must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude based on the totality of circumstances (proportionality).

Training ROE and EOF

Practice in the application of ROE and EOF procedures starts during predeployment training; make it rigorous, realistic, and innovative. Results of well-thought-out EOF-integrated training will help prepare Soldiers for the complex challenges they will face in COIN operations. Constant practice is the key to a Soldier’s ability to recognize a situation and the appropriate ROE.

The battle staff needs to review ROE and EOF procedures on a regular basis. Know and rehearse ROE and EOF procedures using sample scenarios before every
mission. Develop contingencies, even for routine missions. Detailed and innovative planning and strong TLP can extend the reaction time your Soldiers need to de-escalate potentially volatile engagements. Incorporate lethal and nonlethal means into mission planning and weigh and adjust the follow-on effects during execution. Employing available FP equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase a Soldier’s reaction time in potential EOF events.

EOF mission planning

Members of the staff should strive to maintain situational understanding of their areas of operation (AO) and areas of responsibility (AOR). Staffs gain and maintain situational understanding by leveraging information gathered from higher, lower, and adjacent units using digital and analog communications. Other means of gathering information include maps, intelligence summaries, situation reports, and engaging the local population. The eight steps of TLP are the framework for EOF mission planning considerations:

- **Receive mission.** Consider the ROE/EOF implications.

- **Issue warning order.** Allocate time to integrate EOF-related procedures into training preparation, including precombat checks, precombat inspections, rehearsals, and movement.

- **Make a tentative plan:**
  - Assess training, equipment, and FP capabilities (including nonlethal means) to counter threats.
  - Consider current and review past EOF incidents and locations in your AO/AOR.
  - Determine/assess if the civilian population is pro-coalition forces, anti-coalition forces, or neutral.
  - Incorporate enemy pattern analysis into EOF planning.
  - Consider enemy composition; disposition; strength; recent activities; ability to reinforce; and possible courses of action, including using civilians as cover.
  - Assess enemy size, capabilities, and potential tactics within and outside the AO.

- **Initiate movement.** Be prepared to execute preplanned and rehearsed ROE/EOF procedures, including the effects of integrating enablers: fire support, explosive ordnance disposal, attack aviation, quick reaction force, medical evacuation, and FP equipment.

- **Reconnoiter.** Consider civil considerations that can affect ROE/EOF:
  - Urban or rural areas
  - Built-up, battle-damaged, and religious structures
Local population disposition

Local leaders’ (tribal, religious, and civic) allegiance to coalition forces, and their influence on local population

- **Complete plan.** Provide clear ROE/EOF guidance in commander’s intent and develop contingencies that adapt to changing battlefield conditions. Include information operations to get your message out in order to mitigate possible misunderstandings of events and de-escalate possible volatile situations.

- **Issue operations order:**
  - Include mission, risk management/safety considerations, and current ROE/EOF policies/procedures.
  - Adjust the plan based on updated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; troops-to-tasks; and available FP equipment.
  - Make final coordination with adjacent units, ready-reaction forces, and higher headquarters prior to issuing the order.
  - Conduct updated combined mission, safety, and ROE/EOF briefings and back brief to commander/designated representative.

- **Supervise.** Keep higher headquarters’ command post informed of the unit’s status, tactical situation, and FP posture. Ensure Soldiers enforce ROE/EOF procedures during operations and report incidents.

Each EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. The lives of Soldiers and innocent civilians depend on your ability to ready your unit to mentally and physically deal with each conceivable EOF situation that may arise. The mission comes first; however, judicious use of force is a proven combat multiplier supporting mission accomplishment. Lack of forethought to include EOF-integrated scenarios during training may result in unnecessary casualties in operations. Effective EOF integration into predeployment training, mission planning, and execution reinforces coalition FP, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success.
Chapter 3
Section 1. Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“We had every patrol come and debrief the battalion S2. We equipped every</td>
<td>Major, Battalion Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patrol with IRs and IO messages to discuss with people they met.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The single largest area of growth was the linkage of actionable intel and</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel, Brigade Combat Team Primary Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations. We developed a daily targeting resource board that was used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over the CPOF system to allocate/de-conflict resources. The plans and S2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>section must have scheduled time with the commander weekly. Get the rhythm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established early on and maintain it over time.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We ended up using company level intelligence reps (usually the company</td>
<td>Major, Command Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSOs) to discuss targeting and intelligence requirements (at the battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level) weekly. Then we would have a battalion level targeting meeting with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all of the commanders one every other week.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Battle update briefs were used as the primary tool to issue intelligence</td>
<td>Sergeant Major, Battalion Command Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>updates and Commanders guidance.”</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Commander and Staff First 100 Days survey revealed several common trends. Recurring topics included the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) and every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2), as well as the need to develop detailed means and methods of pre-briefing and debriefing all operations, the need to disseminate information quickly and accurately both up and down, and the need to quickly identify actionable intelligence and integrate it into operations. Understanding, training for, and incorporating these concepts into operations during predeployment and the initial phases of deployment will streamline organizational adjustments and enable commanders and staffs to be effective in the initial phases of the unit’s operational deployment. Consideration of these ideas and concepts will aid commanders and staffs in the collection and analysis of data that build a picture of enemy capabilities and sometimes predict enemy actions.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) operating environment, the very nature of the enemy dilutes the capacity of many of the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) technical means for collection. Insurgents use the cover of everyday life and the people to mask their activities. Therefore, high-tech means for collection give way to basic HUMINT collection at the battalion and brigade level.
Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Staff Sections

The survey indicated many S2 sections were not prepared for the volume of intelligence generated in a COIN environment. The volume of HUMINT reports, the infusion of automated information management systems (Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Command Post of the Future, All Source Analysis System, etc.) coupled with information from higher sources, detainee debriefings, and informer walk-in information can and will quickly overwhelm the intelligence staff section. The surveys recommended a range of measures S2 sections used to help meet this challenge:

- **Augmenting the S2 section with “non-intelligence” Soldiers.** The non-intelligence Soldiers selected had to possess the necessary metal aptitude and skill sets and have good critical thinking skills. Rank is less important than skill. Augmentation was usually “out-of hide” from within the unit’s headquarters.

- **Company-level intelligence officers (or sections).** Units developed company-level intelligence sections, very often using the fire support officer. The company intelligence teams augmented the S2 by doing most of the up-front work for HUMINT collection (with their Soldiers on the ground) and by working with the S2 to disseminate intelligence.

- **Refining intelligence.** Better understanding the commander’s critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements allows the S2 to focus the efforts of the section and reduce the number of specific items of information the section must track.

- **Automated systems.** Using automated information storage for later analysis and building tools, such as simple spreadsheets, assists the analysis process.

- **Cross training.** Cross training the members of the S2 section in the skills of others allows the section to provide 24-hour operations.

Before deployment, be sure the intelligence officer (section) understands the basic intelligence functions of battle tracking, pattern analysis, and debriefing. Link these company intelligence officers with the battalion S-2 before deployment.

**Human Intelligence and Every Soldier is a Sensor**

Basic HUMINT collection is the business of every Soldier who walks a patrol, moves in a convoy, or occupies a checkpoint. Every Soldier, regardless of his military occupational specialty or duty position, has a part to play in gathering information for use by intelligence analysts. This concept is the essence of “Every Soldier is a Sensor,” commonly referred to as ES2. Every commander should constantly reinforce the ES2 concept with his Soldiers. As part of your ES2 training, require Soldiers to be competent in techniques for gaining situational awareness within the area of operations.

The S2 supports this effort by providing every convoy and every Soldier that moves outside the wire the information requirements. Staffs must develop ways to provide Soldiers with the most updated information available and develop systems to
debrief, collect, consolidate, and analyze information derived from ES2. The S2 should subsequently debrief every patrol, conduct analysis for actionable intelligence returned to the company, and pass information attained from the patrol up the chain to the next higher headquarters.

Every mission is a source of information. Every mission should end with a written “patrol report.” Patrol leaders and convoy commanders are responsible for preparing this report. Patrol members should put the information collected into a written patrol report. These reports form the basis for the S2’s analysis of intelligence for immediate action and the trends the S2 forwards to the next level intelligence fusion section.

Information Dissemination

Another area addressed repeatedly in the survey was the need to disseminate information quickly and accurately. Respondents identified many methods and techniques; however, whatever methods the unit uses should ensure the timely and accurate dissemination of information. Some methods identified in the survey include the following:

- Battle update brief (BUB)
- Daily intelligence update
- Synchronization meeting
- Morning update brief
- Daily staff update
- Back briefs
  - Guard force
  - Quick reaction force
  - Contract workers
  - PatROLS
- Daily report
- Shift change briefing
- Detailed prebriefings and debriefings before and after every operation

Integrating Actionable Intelligence into Operations

The survey results also clearly articulated the need for intelligence to drive operations and the necessity of quickly transforming raw information into actionable intelligence. Commanders and staffs must understand and capitalize on the fact that Soldiers on patrols and convoys are the best collectors of intelligence. The S2 staff, working with the company intelligence officers, must have an
effective mechanism for recording this information, analyzing it for actionable items, and getting it to both to the companies and the higher headquarters.

For example: A patrol brings back documents or equipment found in a cache. The S2 section evacuates these to an exploitation cell that returns a set of fingerprints in the form of biometric data. A follow-up cordon and knock operation near the cache and the proper use of biometrics equipment produce a matching set of fingerprints from a detainee. Thorough tactical questioning of the detainee produces a name and a meeting location. A surveillance operation of the meeting location produces further intelligence and a subsequent raid, which produces more intelligence and evidence.
Chapter 3

Section 2. Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE)

In a general sense, TSE is the action taken to ensure that documents, materials, and personnel information are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated in order to facilitate follow-on actions. TSE focuses on the actions taken by Soldiers and leaders at the point of initial contact. When conducted correctly, TSE can provide further intelligence for future operations, answer information requirements, and provide evidence to keep detainees in prison.

Why is TSE important to the staff? First, in many cases, information gathered from the squad and platoon level produces intelligence that the battalion can immediately exploit. This information continues on to the brigade or higher-level fusion cells for further analysis and exploitation with specialized teams/assets. This analysis fuels future operations, which in turn produces more intelligence, constantly fueling the targeting cycle.

Staffs working this cycle (TSE, intelligence, and targeting) can quickly take apart the network of an insurgency or at least damage it to such an extent as to make it a low-level threat. For example, the documents or equipment found in a cache produce fingerprints. A follow-up cordon and knock operation near the cache and the proper use of biometrics equipment produce a matching set of fingerprints from a detainee. Thorough tactical questioning of the detainee produces a name and a meeting location. A surveillance operation of the meeting location produces further intelligence and a subsequent raid, which produces more intelligence and evidence. Without proper TSE at the cache, the fingerprints would have been destroyed, and no subsequent operations would have been identified through the targeting process.

The method Soldiers use to collect and record the salient facts of the capture has a direct and significant impact on whether or not the detainee is prosecuted through the court system.

Tactical Site Exploitation Planning and Constraints

Planning

During the mission analysis process, the battalion must understand that TSE is always an implied task for the staff and subordinate units. While the battalion will rarely have dedicated weapons intelligence teams (WITs) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets, they may be the priority of effort, and the response times for these specialty assets have to be considered.

In certain cases, such as cache search and cordon and search missions, TSE becomes a specified task. At the tactical unit level, TSE execution is either hasty or deliberate. Hasty TSE occurs when there is not enough time or the enemy threat is too high to complete a thorough TSE. The unit or element on the ground utilizes its organic TSE team and conducts a quick exploitation before leaving the site. Units conduct deliberate TSE when they have enough time and assets to secure a site while the battalion brings the TSE team to the site or requests other assets from brigade. Time available for TSE is a major consideration for the battalion staff. At the battalion and brigade levels of TSE, the TSE cell (which may also be an element of the S2 shop) takes the acquired information/intelligence and evidence...
and uses the appropriate assets to conduct analysis. The TSE cell then inputs the intelligence into the targeting process, thus fueling the targeting cycle at a level where the following other assets may be available:

- Additional EOD and WITs.
- Signals intelligence teams.
- Document exploitation teams from division or corps.
- Aviation or unmanned aerial system assets to conduct further surveillance and reconnaissance.
- Civil affairs teams.
- Iraqi Advisory Task Force assets.
- Public affairs assets. (When host nation reporters document the successful and carefully executed exploitation of a large cache in a cemetery, the local populace can see from a trusted source that coalition forces do not desecrate graves. Positive coverage of coalition operations can help turn the population against the insurgency.)
- Psychological operations (PSYOP) teams and operations. (PSYOP discourage civil populations from interfering with coalition operations, induce cooperation from the local populace, and reduce collateral damage by giving instructions to noncombatants in the area.)
- Other governmental agencies or government assets (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation).

During large battalion and brigade operations, the unit may want to consider establishing a temporary exploitation center to handle large volumes of material. This center can quickly receive evidence and intelligence, analyze and exploit the material, and produce actionable intelligence for combat units to continue operations.

The battalion staff must also consider the training, availability, and use of biometrics equipment, specifically the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identify Detection Equipment (HIIDE). Biometrics refers to the use of physical characteristics (e.g., fingerprints and iris of the eye) to identify an individual.

**Additional planning guidelines**

Personal safety is paramount for all personnel deploying on military search operations. Consider and address all environmental hazards as well as enemy threat in the planning and execution phases of all search operations. Achieve search safety by mitigating the risk. Also, consider the following:

- **Minimum personnel in an operating area.** Search pairs should ideally operate with some sort of buffer zone (such as a room) between them and the next pair.
• **Minimum time over target.** If a suspect item is found, the searcher must decide if the find is life threatening. If so, the searcher spends minimum time at the target. If the find is non-life threatening, the searcher should take the time required to record the details of the find before withdrawing.

• **Secondary hazards.** Consider all secondary hazards, such as chlorine gas in a water plant, sewage, overhead power cables, electrical outlets and wiring, hotplates/burners, broken glass, cleaning supplies, overhead items, and sub-par construction of steps or flooring.

• **Distraction free.** Searchers should be free from distractions. Search operations require the total attention of the participants. Leaders must ensure that visits of senior officers, the media, or any personnel not directly involved in the search do not distract searchers.

• **Prioritize.** Where to search first will depend on the type of search. Where possible, search likely hide locations first, as in an area search. However, other types of searches have a set sequence that should not be broken. Occupied house searches will always begin with searching the kitchen and bathroom first.

• **Minimize disruption and destruction.** The disruption and destructiveness caused by search operations should be proportional to the intensity of current military operations and the urgency of uncovering a potential search target. Military search operations should minimize both the destruction of property and the disruption to the local population. This principle is important to maintain the good will of the local population or at least minimize the ill will generated. Commanders at all levels have a continuous responsibility to balance the long-term physical and psychological damage caused by search operations with the benefit gained. Record all damage caused during a search on the relevant search documentation.

**Tactical Site Exploitation Teams**

When possible, the battalion should establish a TSE team with the appropriate assets to support company and battalion operations. Companies should also establish TSE teams as an additional duty of Soldiers and leaders within their platoons, much like detainee teams or litter teams. Operations may dictate that the battalion team is not available, and there may not be a WIT with the EOD, if needed. Platoons must be able to execute the TSE mission on their own; however, this does not authorize them to act in place of or function as an EOD team. When time permits and a situation exist when EOD would normally be called to a site, the TSE must wait until EOD clears the site.

Team member selection must be a well-thought-out process. A commander will want the team to be composed of individuals who are meticulous; patient; have clear, methodical thought processes; and can handle pressure. When possible, the team should be restricted to noncommissioned officers and above. Testifying in the criminal courts of a host nation may be an unnerving experience for junior Soldiers, and in some cases, their inexperience may hurt the prosecutor’s case.
Tactical Site Exploitation Constraints

Depending on the type of operation, constraints on TSE operations may include:

- **Disruption.** Some searches can cause significant disruption. Units must plan for and, as far as possible, alleviate such disruptions through thorough planning. As far as practical, the unit should not allow time pressure due to disruption to impact search operations.

- **Public perception.** Public perception of the threat varies considerably depending on quantity, proximity, and the repulsiveness of enemy incidents. Public perception is a prime concern when conducting search operations. If the threat perception is low, the tolerance level for a search operation is low. The implications of search operations, such as cost, time delay, and individual inconvenience can assume disproportionate importance.

- **Security.** A search, by its nature, is an overt operation the enemy may observe. Take precautions to conceal the precise techniques and capabilities from the enemy so they cannot take measures to negate them.

- **Resources.** Search resources are limited. Do not misuse them because of poor planning.

- **Cost and commercial interest.** The cost of suspending commercial activities while a search is in progress may be large; however, installation searches can occur without vacating the premises. Such searches require exceptionally detailed planning.

- **Light conditions.** Human vision is the single most important asset in search operations; therefore, conduct most searches in daylight or equivalent artificial lighting. **Be aware that some devices are light-initiated.**

- **Waiting periods.** Waiting periods are an integral part of safety measures; however, they can significantly reduce the time available for searching. Where waiting periods are employed, the search advisor will decide the duration depending on the type of hazard. Where possible, adhere to a minimum five-minute waiting period.

- **Finding nothing.** In the majority of searches, the search team finds nothing. This situation can cause disillusionment and a lack of motivation that can lead to complacency or a lack of concentration. In order to alleviate complacency, conduct regular training searches where practical.

- **Searcher fatigue.** Searches are generally intensive and extensive, thus putting great pressure on the individual. Fatigue creeps up gradually, and the searcher is often not aware of the lowered efficiency. The command and control function is important in combating this problem. Leaders must monitor all searchers regularly, particularly during breaks or changes in search areas or equipment.
Chapter 3

Section 3. Battle Tracking

“Electronic status board used Excel spread sheet to track all ongoing missions from pre-execution through post execution shared via SIPRNET with all primary and secondary staff, company commanders, 1SGs, and company OPS NCOs. Status updated by battle captains as required or at least hourly.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

“The commander had to be in a position to see the whole battlefield… FBCB2/BFT made that happen really well.”

Captain, Primary Staff

“Staff situational awareness became a function of life verse a ‘check the block’ brief.”

Major, Primary Staff

Battle tracking is not easy, and staffs learn best by doing. The commander depends on the staff for accurate information; the staff must be able to provide near accurate information all the time and access to assets that can influence the fight as it develops. There is not much room for error in battle tracking; the commander needs precise and complete information to prevent misfortune.

The commander relies on the staff to fill that critical role in tracking the day-to-day operations of the battalion and brigade and their units’ operations and force status. A lot is riding on how well the staff performs their tasks in battle tracking. The information they provide enhances situational awareness for the commander. The better the commander’s situational awareness, the better his situational understanding, and the easier it is for him to make correct command decisions.

Communication

Communication is the most important thing in battle tracking, and staffs cannot function without effective communication with their subordinates and their higher headquarters. In the survey, staff officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) say there are still times when units are allowed to go “outside the wire” with minimal communications. Communication is the only link to pass on reports and information that are critical to mission success. The staff must establish redundant communication means for every mission.

Staffs must take steps to ensure that what is reported to them and what they report to the next higher headquarters is accurate and timely. Any first report is usually sketchy, may be missing key elements of information, or may be out right wrong. Treat any initial report as a “contact report” that will have some truth but is often incomplete. The staff should follow up this contact report with a second report once...
it verifies the information and sorts out the details. In this way, the staff mitigates the possibility of reporting confusing or conflicting information.

**Automated Information Systems**

The most important change to the way the staff does battle tracking is the introduction of automated information systems in the command post and operations center. In the survey, commanders and staffs said the widespread use of these systems greatly improved their capability to track units and to report; however, staff officers and NCOs need time to master the operation of each of these automated systems.

Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Blue Force Tracker, and Command Post of the Future were mentioned most frequently as the tools that are in every tactical operations center (TOC). Combining these with other feeds (such as real time video from unmanned aerial systems) provides the commander with up-to-the-minute pictures of his forces and their activities, and in many cases, he has direct “eyes on” enemy activity. Rather than waiting for its subordinate units to send reports, the staff in the TOC can pull reports quickly using automated information systems. In the TOC, large screen monitors display forces and information available immediately to the staff.

**Tracking Execution of Tasks and Operations**

The staff must have its own form of a current operation tracker that allows anyone to see what happened and what is currently going on. Most staffs used a simple matrix table with units listed on one side and events and actions listed on another side. This simple but effective matrix works and is applicable to both the manual (paper and pencil) and automated display of information.

As in any battalion mission, sometimes the commander or staff officer may get distracted by events in one of the sectors and lose track of the others. A current operation tracker allows them to reference anything they might have forgotten or missed. Other key personnel can familiarize themselves with events as they occur without requiring a staff member to give them a rundown of current events.

The current mission tracker allows the staff to cross-reference current reports with earlier reports and get clarification on any report as the situation develops. This tracking tool paints a picture of the situation on the ground as reported by the maneuver units. Later, the staff can use this tracker for an after-action review to help identify what went well and what needs improvement.

**Tracking Requirements**

This section provides the commander with a list of the tracking requirements presently being used in active combat theaters. This list is not an all-inclusive menu but can be a guide for the commander and his staff to use in preparing for operations. Each commander should tailor this list to his specific mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations requirements, deleting or adding items as necessary.
Commanders and staffs should track the following:

- Serious incident reports:
  - Death or serious injury of a coalition service member
  - Any report of a coalition service member missing in action
  - Death of or life-threatening injury to a Department of Defense contractor, Iraqi official, Iraqi soldier, or Iraqi policeman
  - The crash, hard landing, or precautionary landing of a coalition aircraft in the area of responsibility
  - Any aircraft mishap
  - Serious injury to or death of a detainee in custody
  - Unauthorized or unaccredited media in the unit area of operations
  - Rule of engagement (ROE) violation or human rights violation or any engagement where there is a question about ROE application
  - Escalation of force (EOF) incidents that result in local national (LN) injury or property damage.
  - Behavior by unit personnel that discredits the U.S.
  - Any alcohol or drug-related incident or any allegations of sexual misconduct by Soldiers
  - Any incident that creates negative media
  - Allegations of war crimes against coalition forces or Iraqi security forces
  - Negligent discharge of a weapon
  - Loss of communications with any element
  - Injury or death of a LN to coalition action
  - Injury or death of a LN through insurgent actions
  - Hostile contact between LNs
  - Breach of the perimeter of any coalition installation
  - Loss of a sensitive item or communications security compromise
  - U.S. forces vehicle, equipment, or property damage in excess of $2000
• Incapacitation of any leader staff sergeant or above
• Any action against top ten high-value individuals
• Commitment of the quick reaction force (QRF) or reserve forces
• Three or more Soldiers wounded in the same incident
• Reports of potential riots or demonstrations by 200 or more LNs
• All Iraqi security forces recruiting events
• Any attack by anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) against essential service site (ESS) or ongoing ESS project sites
• Any confirmed involvement of ISF personnel or civil authorities in illegal activities, to include AIF actions, black marketeering, or sectarian violence
• Border crossing incidents

• Significant activities (military)
  • Apprehension or release of detainees
  • Employment or change in status of any QRF
  • Direct or indirect fire incidents
  • Ordnance release by aircraft
  • Movement of enemy personnel against coalition forces
  • Location of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO)
  • Reports of possible improvised explosive device (IED) locations
  • Any IED detonation
  • Reports of successful psychological operations
  • Reports on the status of routes within the area of operations
  • Main supply routes and lines of communication locations
  • Emergency resupply requests
  • Sniper engagements, both friendly and enemy
  • Location of captured enemy vehicles, caches, vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), and personnel
  • Any change in graphic control measures
° Change in supporting military hospital bed status

• Current operations:

  ° Results from missions conducted during the past 24 hours
  ° Planned missions for the next 24 hours
  ° Enemy situation update
  ° Weather report and weather affecting mission execution
  ° Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and aviation support (direct support and general support)
  ° Status of enabler support to include attack aviation, tactical Unmanned Aerial System [UAS], close air support, and artillery assets/gun status
  ° Cross-boundary issues for combined and temporary operating areas
  ° Special operation forces operating in your area of operations
  ° Airspace de-confliction (restricted operating zone issues)
  ° Airspace clearance for controlled detonations.
  ° Fragmentary orders received from higher
  ° “Green 2s” (weapon accountability reports) received and sent
  ° Preparation of daily operations summary
  ° Preparation of daily commander’s battle update brief
  ° Information for division and corps requests for information
  ° Priority set for UAS coverage
  ° Evaluation and processing of mosque and sensitive-site entry requests
  ° Process and creation of storyboards and specific mission operational summaries
  ° Hot spots found by fixed-wing assets
  ° Threat tips passed to subordinate units
• Enemy tracking requirements list:
  ° Reports of civilians with video cameras
  ° Reports of civilians in possible observation post positions using cell phones or other early warning methods
  ° Threatening or anti-coalition propaganda
  ° Incidents of graffiti and what it means
  ° Inter-ethnic clashes
  ° Any event in the media that is anti-coalition or anti-Iraq government
  ° Discovery of enemy propaganda (video, printed matter, digital files)
  ° Reports of anti-coalition forces by LN
  ° Reports of assemblies, crowds, or rallies (scheduled or unscheduled)
  ° Reports of negative perception in the local news media
  ° Any contact with LN where perceptions of coalition and the Iraq government are discussed
  ° Reports of local perceptions regarding coalition and Iraq government programs
  ° Apprehension or release of detainees
  ° Movement of enemy personnel against coalition forces
  ° Location of UXO
  ° Any IED detonation.
  ° Reports on possible IED locations
  ° Sniper engagements (both friendly and enemy)
  ° Indirect fire attacks, including point of origin and point of impact
  ° Hand grenade attacks
  ° Location and capture of enemy caches and VBIED factories
  ° Damage or destruction of completed or ongoing projects
  ° Disruption of water, power, or sewer service
- Loss of commercial radio or television broadcast capability
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting LN businessmen
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting road and/or bridge infrastructure
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting petroleum infrastructure (pipeline, refinery)
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting any other significant infrastructure facility or object
- Intelligence summary
- Enemy situation update
Chapter 3

Section 4. Using Interpreters

The use of interpreters is integral to operating in a foreign land. The commander and the staff must realize that using an interpreter is time consuming, and there is the potential for making an already confusing situation more confusing when using an interpreter to get your message across or to understand the message from the other side. The commander and staff should remember that an interpreter is essentially a mouthpiece who repeats what the interviewer says in a different language. This sounds simple, but for those who have never worked with interpreters, problems can quickly develop. If you do not trust your interpreter, dismiss him and find another.

Commanders and staffs must practice the proper use and control interpreters to reduce the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding. When working with an interpreter, staff officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and commanders must be cognizant of the following:

- Do not assume your interpreter understands the meaning of what you say even if he knows the words. Be especially careful with American jargon and slang; it is better to avoid these all together.

- Impress on the interpreter the importance of relating exactly what is said. The interpreter should not ad lib or add meaning or phraseology that may convey a different meaning or intent.

Rehearse working with your interpreter in order to act as a trained team. Rehearse the following:

- Placement:
  - Practice positioning the interpreter in relation to you and the person you are speaking to.
    - When standing, the interpreter should stand just behind the interviewer and to the side.
    - When seated, the interpreter should sit right beside the interviewer but not between the interviewer and the individual being questioned.
  - Take care not to place the interpreter between you and the other person. Place your interpreter slightly to the side, just “off-camera,” where both parties can hear his words without focusing directly on him.
  - When you speak, do not look at the interpreter, look at the other person and speak to them.
Body language and tone:
- Have the interpreter translate messages in the same tone.
- Ensure the interpreter avoids making gestures.

Delivery:
- The interviewer should talk directly to the person with whom he is speaking, rather than to the interpreter.
- Speak as in a normal conversation, not in the third person. For example, do not say to the interpreter, “Tell him that…” Instead speak to the detainee directly, “I understand that you…” and instruct the interpreter to translate.
- Speak clearly, avoid acronyms or slang, and break sentences uniformly to facilitate translation.
- Some interpreters will begin to translate while the interviewer is still speaking. This is frustrating for some people. Discuss the preference of translation with the interpreter.

Security:
- Work under the assumption that the interpreter is being debriefed by a threat intelligence service.
- Always assume the worst.
- Avoid careless talk.
- Avoid giving away personal details.
- Do not become emotionally involved.

The most important thing to remember when using an interpreter is that the interviewer controls the conversation, not the interpreter.

Checklist for monitoring the interpreter
- Tell the interpreter precisely what is expected of him and how he should accomplish it.
- Tell the interpreter exactly what is to be translated. The interpreter should translate all conversation between the interviewer and the individual being questioned without adding or omitting anything.
- Do not reveal intelligence requirements (friendly force information requirements or essential elements of friendly information) to the interpreter.
- Brief the interpreter on actions to take at the end of questioning or in the event of enemy contact.
Practice Questions

The following is a basic list of everyday questions the interviewer can modify for the local population. Use this simple list to practice with the interpreter. The list contains common questions asked at a traffic control point. Keep in mind, these questions are only examples, and the interviewer can modify these questions based on the mission, unit guidance, and the situation.

- What is your name? (Verify this with identification papers and check detain/of interest/protect lists.)
- What is your home address? or What is your former residence if a displaced person?
- What is your occupation?
- Where were you going? (Get specifics.)
- Why are you going there? (Get specifics.)
- By what route did you travel here?
- What obstacles (or hardships) did you encounter on your way here?
- What unusual activity did you notice on your way here?
- What route will you take to get to your final destination?
- Who do you (personally) know who actively opposes the U.S. (or multinational forces)? Follow this question up with “whom else?” If they know someone, ask what anti-U.S. (multinational force) activities they know about, where they happened, etc.
- Why do you believe we (U.S. or multinational forces) are here?
- What do you think of our (U.S. or multinational forces) presence here?

These pointed and specific questions do not allow the person being questioned room for misinterpretation.
Chapter 3

Section 5. Personnel Recovery (PR)

Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of U.S. military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contractor, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment.

Army component commanders are responsible for PR within their areas of operation (AOs) unless directed otherwise by the joint force commander. Army component, corps, and division commanders establish a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to provide PR expertise for coordinating PR missions within their AOs and with other components. Major subordinate commands (brigades and battalions) coordinate PR using the expertise of their respective personnel recovery officers (PROs). PROs perform PRCC-like functions at brigade and below.

At the battalion and brigade level, planning for PR includes the integrated efforts of commanders and staffs, forces available and tasked organized to support PR, and personnel who evade and survive until they are recovered and reintegrated into their unit.

PR planning and preparation begins with the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and the commander’s intent, which enables the vertical and horizontal PR preparation and guides activities for subordinate commanders, staffs, forces, and potential IMDC personnel.

Units must routinely rehearse PR command and control processes and procedures. These rehearsals are essential to successful actions at all levels and the recovery of IMDC personnel.

The first focus of any brigade or battalion PR plan is proactive measures to prevent incidents that result in personnel becoming IMDC. These measures require education, training, and preparation of Soldiers and other U.S. personnel under the control of U.S. forces. Commanders and staffs must integrate capture avoidance techniques into every training scenario. Leaders at all levels are accountable for personnel assigned and attached (including contractors) and other U.S. persons working in their areas (when possible).

The second focus for PR is the recovery of personnel. A well-educated, trained, and prepared force denies its adversaries the opportunity to exploit IMDC personnel for purposes detrimental to the U.S. Government or U.S. military forces. Leadership, accountability, force preparation, and executing operations in a synchronized manner are keys to success and risk management.
During the execution phase of a PR mission, units must accomplish five tasks:

- **Report.** This task includes the rapid recognition and notification vertically and horizontally that personnel are suspected or known to be IMDC.

- **Locate.** This task includes actions taken across all sensors to find IMDC personnel.

- **Support.** This task includes actions taken to sustain IMDC personnel and their Families mentally, physically, and emotionally throughout the five tasks.

- **Recover.** This task includes employing all capabilities to regain positive and procedural control of IMDC personnel. The Army uses four principal methods to conduct recovery (see below).

- **Reintegrate.** This task includes immediate medical assessment and appropriate debriefings before returning recovered personnel back to duty and ultimately to their Families.

The Army uses four principal methods when planning and executing military recoveries:

- Immediate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by any Army capability in or adjacent to the area of the isolating event to rapidly locate and recover IMDC personnel using the PR execution tasks.

- Deliberate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by Army forces when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible, unsuccessful, or requires additional Army support.

- External supported recovery is the support provided by the Army to or received from other joint or multinational force components, including interagency organizations.

- Unassisted recovery is the sum of actions taken by IMDC personnel to achieve their own recovery and return to friendly control without assistance.

The ability of the Army to meet its PR responsibilities hinges on leaders at every level preparing their personnel for isolating events and recovering IMDC personnel. Leaders must integrate PR into ongoing planning, preparation, and execution activities as part of every day operations in all environments.

**Staff planning and integration**

The key to effective PR is a well-integrated, fully synchronized, rehearsed plan. Commanders and staffs must integrate existing command and control systems into PR planning, preparation, execution, and assessment at all levels.

The commander’s principal roles in PR are establishing PR command and support relationship; incorporating PR into his overall intent; delegating PR
decision-making authority to the lowest possible level; and allocating adequate resources to plan, prepare, rehearse, and execute PR missions throughout the operating environment.

The staff members perform a pivotal function in planning PR missions by providing the following relevant pieces to the overall brigade or battalion plan:

- S1 provides and sustains a system for immediate personnel accountability information.
- S2 is responsible for specific intelligence on the conditions/locations/or situations where insurgents have the opportunity to take U.S. personnel.
- S3 establishes a PRCC or a PRO that is the PR focal point for planning and execution.
- S4 coordinates and plans for logistical support of PR missions.
- S6 establishes dedicated PR communication nets and frequencies for survival radios and de-conflicts frequencies between PR nets and other operations.
- The chaplain plans the religious support to IMDC personnel during reintegration operations.
- The staff judge advocate advises the commander on rules of engagement and their impact on the execution of PR missions.
- The public affairs officer ensures PR information in the public affairs plan does not contradict civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and deception plans.

The PRCC or the PRO is the central point for gathering information from the staff sections into a cohesive plan. During execution of a PR mission, the PRCC and PRO become the focal points to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. The PRCC and PRO are best located in the operations section. While PR normally requires all staff functions for support, it is principally an operations function and responsibility.

Recommended grades for PROs are combat arms E-7s and above with Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information access and intermediate PR skills training. PRO responsibilities include:

- Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate units.
- Coordinating immediate recoveries for their units.
- Gathering PR-specific information developed by PRCCs and disseminating information to subordinate units.
- Coordinating for unit fire support coordination measures and control measures.
- Ensuring subordinate units have access to standing operating procedures (SOPs) developed by the PRCC.
• Identifying subordinate unit PR equipment shortfalls to the PRCC.
• Ensuring sufficient evasion aids are available within subordinate units.

A PRCC/PRO SOP establishes procedures and actions required for effective PR missions. PR SOPs should standardize actions between the brigade and the battalions and must be rehearsed and understood by all to be effective. Examples of what a PR SOP might cover include:

• PR incident reporting procedures.
• PR forces status reports.
• IMDC personnel actions.
• Recovery force actions.
• Required information and format for decision briefings.
• Reintegration procedures.
• PR rehearsals.
• Battle rhythm integration.

The collaborative efforts of the entire staff facilitate the collection of relevant PR information so the commander can make effective decisions. Some specific staff duties (not all-inclusive) listed below illustrate how PR is integrated throughout individual staff functions (brigade staff).
## Typical Specific Staff Duties for PR Operations (not all-inclusive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical staff member duties</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-1 (Personnel)</td>
<td>Provide accountability information to PR cells and other staff agencies to ensure 100 percent force accountability is maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain accountability of all forces (military, Department of the Army [DA] civilians, and DA contractors) and information.</td>
<td>PR cell requires information on IMDC personnel. This is especially important if the individuals in question did not complete DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), or civilian equivalent form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain a personnel information database.</td>
<td>PR cell must be informed of duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) incidents and casualty reports. Additionally, ongoing IMDC events require support to the Family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty reporting.</td>
<td>PR cell might require additional staffing to fulfill assigned responsibilities. Additional maneuver forces may also be required for PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze personnel strength data to determine current capabilities and project future requirements. Track the status and location of recovered personnel until they complete the reintegration process.</td>
<td>PR cell might require additional staffing to fulfill assigned responsibilities. Additional maneuver forces may also be required for PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-2 (Intelligence)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manage intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and integrate IPB efforts with other staff members and echelons.</td>
<td>Support PR planning and execution with PR-specific intelligence planning. Counter-PR capabilities and potential adversary courses of action with respect to IMDC personnel, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and maintain relationships and procedures with other intelligence staffs, units, and organizations.</td>
<td>Provide conduit to other intelligence agencies, including theater and national level, for collection of PR specific intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminate intelligence.</td>
<td>Ensure PR cell is informed of PR-specific intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store sensitive materials.</td>
<td>Maintain isolated personnel reports and evasion plans of action completed by potential IMDC personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-3 (Operations)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish operations center.</td>
<td>Establish PR cell. Cell functions as the PR focal point for the commander and staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare, coordinate, and distribute SOPs and plans and orders information management, etc.</td>
<td>Establish IMDC reporting requirements and PR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend task organization of and mission assignment to subordinate elements.</td>
<td>Assist commander in identifying and organizing subordinate units that are PR mission capable. Synchronize all required assets for PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan, coordinate, and supervise training, exercises, and rehearsals.</td>
<td>Include PR training for commanders and staff, recovery units, and individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-4 (Logistics)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate with G/S-5 for host nation (HN) support.</td>
<td>Provide conduit for PR cells to coordinate HN support of PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop logistics plan to support operations (with the G/S-3).</td>
<td>Forward arming and refueling point locations, Class III/V availability, and equipment procurement specific to PR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify contracting requirements.</td>
<td>Access to contractor information will be required during an IMDC event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate or provide mortuary affairs.</td>
<td>Ensure information on recovered remains is shared with PR cells (they might be tracking an IMDC individual when that individual is in the mortuary).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-5 (Civil-Military Operations)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish and operate the civil-military operations center to maintain liaison with other U.S. governmental agencies, HN civil and military authorities, and nongovernmental and international organizations in the area of operations.</td>
<td>Conduit for PR cells to coordinate support with these agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide G/S-2 with information gained from civilians in the area of operations and assist the G/S-2 with the analysis of the civil dimension.</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organizations or local civilians may have information related to an IMDC event. This information must be shared with the G/S-2 staff and PR cells. Identify (before an IMDC event occurs) medical facilities and other key structures where IMDC personnel might be taken and held by hostile forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate with the public affairs officer and PSYOP officer to ensure that disseminated information is not contradictory.</td>
<td>Ensure PR information in the CA plan does not contradict public affairs, PSYOP, and deception plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise supervision over attached CA units.</td>
<td>Conduit for PR cells to gather information on possible IMDC events.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations)</td>
<td>Dedicated systems for PR cell. computers, communications, software, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide the architecture necessary to collect, process, display, store, and disseminate relevant information to support command and control functions.</td>
<td>Interoperability of these systems is critical across the entire joint force during PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate, plan, and direct all command, control, communications, and computer operations support interfaces with joint and multinational forces, to include HN support.</td>
<td>PR cell must have alternate systems for collecting and disseminating PR relevant information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that redundant communications means are planned and available to pass time-sensitive information.</td>
<td>Dedicated PR communication nets, frequencies for survival radios, and frequency deconfliction between PR nets and other operations nets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manage radio frequency allocations and assignments and provide spectrum management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-7 (Information Operations [IO])</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommend IO effects to influence adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions.</td>
<td>Integrate PR considerations into PSYOP, deception, and public affairs plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronize and coordinate offensive and defensive IO with the overall operation.</td>
<td>Mislead the enemy about the purpose of recovery operations or mask the capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures of recovery units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate preparation of the IO portions of plans and orders.</td>
<td>Include PR IO actions in the plan or order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate IO with other agencies (such as U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Ambassador).</td>
<td>Conduit for PR cells to gather information from these agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-8 (Resource Management)</td>
<td>Program funding for reintegration activities, PR equipment acquisition, and PR education and training initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor resource utilization.</td>
<td>Articulate and justify funding requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulate and justify funding requirements.</td>
<td>Articulate justification for PR funding requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize requirements.</td>
<td>Prioritize PR funding requirements with other command requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop future budgets.</td>
<td>Include PR in future budget formulation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical staff member duties</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>Recovered personnel may require MEDEVAC from the recovery vehicle to a location where definitive medical care is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), including Army dedicated MEDEVAC platforms (air and ground).</td>
<td>Recovered personnel may require inter-theater MEDEVAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate for aeromedical evacuation aircraft.</td>
<td>Coordinate medical (including psychological) personnel to assist during reintegration of isolated personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide health care and support for the force.</td>
<td>PR cell must know location of available hospital facilities in the event recovered personnel are injured or wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalization support of sick, wounded, or injured personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor unit and enlisted Soldier training (including sergeant’s time training), making corrections as necessary.</td>
<td>Ensure PR training is included in unit enlisted training programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend/coordinate rehearsals.</td>
<td>Ensure IMDC events are evaluated during unit rehearsals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical staff member duties</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise the commander and staff of the impact of the faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations.</td>
<td>Indigenous population reactions to IMDC personnel can be affected by the religious and cultural beliefs of the population. Assess feasibility of utilizing local religious elements to prevent IMDC events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide religious support to hospitalized personnel.</td>
<td>Provide religious support to IMDC during reintegration operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical staff member duties</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide international and operational law assistance, including advice and assistance on implementing the Department of Defense law of war program.</td>
<td>Advise commander on the rules of engagement impact on PR missions. Assess feasibility of and advise commander on legal use of funds to effect recoveries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Missing U.S. Personnel Staff Battle Drill**

**Situation**
U.S. military person is declared duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN)

**Triggers:**
1. Service member missing during routine accountability check
2. Media announcement/SIGINT hit of captured U.S. soldier
3. Service member unaccounted for during consolidation after combat action

**CCIR**
1. Is the person legitimately unaccounted for?
2. Last confirmed location and time seen.
3. Is the person isolated/missing?
4. Is the person detained/captured?
5. If detained/captured, are abductors identified?
6. Can we confirm location?

**Effect:** Clarify Status; Determine Location; Return Service Member Unharmed

**Key Staff**
- PRCC/PRO
- S3
- S2/S2X
- S1
- PAO
- S6
- Battle CPT
- Chaplain

**Key Tasks**
- Initiate 100% accountability check
- Initiate focused intelligence and activate HUMINT teams
- Divert aerial assets into over-watch of last known location
- Build IO story line; discourage non-compliant actors from supporting hostage-takers
- Commander develops full situation awareness/understanding
- Neutralize abductors
- Return U.S. personnel safely

**Decision Points**
- IMDC Alive
- Abductors Identified
- Location Known

**Flow Chart**

![Flow Chart Diagram]

**Figure 3-5-1**

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U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
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Personnel Recovery Mission Execution

During execution, PRCC/PRO must be able to process large quantities of information. Information from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; on-scene observations; and radio communications may be reported at close intervals and via different methods. PRCC/PRO filters and sorts this information to identify and validate PR relevant information into an operating picture focused on the operational PR environment and disseminates this picture to all concerned. Information collected may contain the following:

- Location, intentions, medical condition, and identity of IMDC personnel
- PR training level of IMDC personnel
- Tactical situation around IMDC personnel
- Communications capabilities of IMDC personnel
- Location and capabilities of enemy forces in proximity to IMDC personnel
- Location, status, and capabilities of Army forces
- Location, status, and capabilities of other component forces
- Terrain and weather enroute to and near IMDC personnel
- Assets available to execute and or support PR missions

Immediate response to an IMDC situation includes the following:

- Notify through command channels, immediately.
- Begin troop leading procedures for an immediate recovery.
- Seal the area with local ground forces.
- Request additional ground forces for outer perimeter.
- Request aviation assets to prevent vehicles or personnel from leaving area.
- Verify 100 percent personnel accountability.
- Conduct immediate recovery, if feasible.
- Inform PRCC (vertical) and other PROs (horizontal) of situation.

Decision making during a PR event mirrors the decision-making process used during overall execution. During execution, decision making focuses on the five PR execution tasks and selecting the appropriate recovery method to conduct those tasks based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) coupled with the situational
understanding of commanders and staffs. As execution decisions involve routine actions or actions that differ from the plan with minor variance, the immediate recovery method is a course of action suitable to execution decisions.

Continuous assessment is essential during execution. PR execution assessment involves deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes and the current situation. Assessments during execution are often constrained and may dictate immediate changes to the plan. The most important question when assessing execution is whether the existing PR plan is still valid based on the current situation.

Successful PR mission execution requires effective PR information management and communicating that information to those who are in a position to act on it. Successful execution is contingent upon the brigade or battalion having a designated and trained PRO. The PRO must have a useable PR SOP, understand PR doctrine, and have rehearsed contingency plans for PR. PR rehearsals are the most important preparation activities. Practicing PR actions prior to an actual IMDC event is critical to successful PR operations.

Once recovered personnel are back in friendly control and the recover task is complete, the reintegration task begins. The level of reintegration varies with each recovered person and is specific to his or her experiences during the event. During reintegration, recovered personnel receive medical support required because of the event. If medical evaluations and debriefings indicate that recovered personnel are fit for duty, they are returned to their parent units. If initial debriefings and medical evaluations indicate that further actions are required, recovered personnel are generally transported out of the area of operations for further debriefings and/or medical care. Final reintegration efforts are not complete until recovered personnel are returned to their units and a duty status determination is made.
Chapter 4

Section 1. Battle Staff Actions for Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IED-D)

The goal of the battle staff in the IED-D arena is to attack the IED system proactively rather than react to the individual device. To accomplish this goal, the battle staff must have proficiency in the following related areas and disciplines:

- Battle tracking
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning
- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
- Social network and link analysis
- Pattern and trend analysis
- Terrain visualization
- Predictive analysis
- Targeting
- Tactical site exploitation
- Tactical applications of cultural knowledge
- Counter-IED radio electronic warfare system applications and employment

IED defeat is best accomplished with a mix of lethal and nonlethal means. The battle staff must therefore also engage in information operations, civil-military operations, and coalition operations with allied and host-nation forces and organizations.

An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. The current trend in the Iraq area of operations is to use military explosives with nonmilitary initiation (detonation) systems.
The enemy organization is a network of financiers, planners, and operatives based on familial, tribal, religious sect, or criminal ties. The personnel within the network have discrete functions organized in levels of operational significance. A common IED network has three distinct levels:

- **Level 1. Network command and control:**
  - Acquires funding and materiel from external sources
  - May be the bomb maker
  - Provides inspiration to network, and sometimes direct leadership of a subordinate cell
  - Well-guarded by Level 2

- **Level 2. Cell leaders, security, and support:**
  - Frequently blood relatives of Level 1
  - May lead attacks to motivate Level 3
  - Provides weapons and support
  - Often leave tracks while performing security mission

- **Level 3. Trigger pullers:**
  - Young relatives of middle and upper level personnel
  - Poor, unemployed, need money
  - Fervent *jihadis*
  - Unsophisticated, disposable, and, in some cases, unaware

A long chain of events occurs before (to the left of) IED detonation. Various members of the IED cell or network execute the following discrete events in the chain, sequentially or in parallel:

- Recruit for and plan operation.
- Identify logistical sources and procure device components.
- Assemble device.
- Train personnel who will emplace and detonate device and train assault force.
- Store device.
- Reconnoiter target or proposed IED site and prepare site (dig hole, rig vehicle, prepare structure).
• Move device from storage.
• Rehearse attack, and emplace IED.
• Initiate attack.
• Escape.

Because the network and cell members live among the civilian population, their IED-related activities are more or less transparent to the civilians. Civilians do not report these activities to coalition forces (CF) for a variety of reasons, including fear of retaliation, indifference, or sympathy to the insurgent cause. Too often, the coalition forces’ detection threshold of an IED is its detonation.

The goal of battle staff IED-D actions should be to move the detection threshold of IED-related activity closer to the civilian detection threshold. The battle staff accomplishes this through a combination of lethal and nonlethal operations.

Central Command Commander’s guidance of 17 September 2005 requires brigade combat teams to perform the following three tasks:

• Conduct operations to defeat the IED system and the device
• Establish an IED-D task force, cell, or board in every headquarters to adapt counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in a time-sensitive manner as enemy TTP change
• Integrate counter-IED (C-IED) enablers into all operations. These enablers include the following:
  ° Explosive ordnance disposal teams
  ° Combined explosive exploitation cells
  ° Weapons intelligence teams
  ° C-IED targeting program cells
  ° Electronic warfare officers and electronic warfare coordination cells
  ° Route clearance teams
  ° Military working dogs with special search training
  ° Biometrics Automated Toolset

The tenets of IED defeat are the framework for implementing this command guidance.

There are six IED-D tenets: predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, mitigate, and exploit. The three tenets performed by the battle staff are predict, prevent, and exploit:
Predict. The battle staff applies pattern and social network analysis tools against the insurgent network organizational model and events chronology to determine the when, where, and who elements of the IED network.

Prevent. The prevent activity is centered on targeting and encompasses lethal and nonlethal operations, which result in actions to identify, capture, or kill specific individuals.

Exploit. The battle staff has access to the resources required for technical and intelligence exploitation of IED materials and detainees. They should ensure that these resources are brought to bear on the problem.

Overall, battle staff actions support defeat of the IED system, not the IED itself. These actions are designed to identify, prioritize, facilitate, and support IED-D operations.
Chapter 4

Section 2. Counter-Sniper Staff Processes

In the hierarchy of enemy actions that kill or wound coalition Soldiers, the insurgent sniper does not rank particularly high. However, the impact of sniper-induced casualties is greater than just the raw numbers. Sniper casualties exact a heavy psychological toll on individual Soldiers and their units. The enemy also uses insurgent sniper activities as vital tools in his information and recruiting operations. This section briefly outlines the staff’s role in the counter-sniper fight.

A sniper is an individual skilled in field-craft and marksmanship who provides precision fires at selected targets from concealed positions.

Types of enemy snipers:

- **Armed irregular.** This type has little formal military training and no formal long-range marksmanship training. The armed irregular seldom selects deliberate targets and does not deliver accurate fires. He is intimately familiar with the area of operations and uses it to his advantage.

- **Trained marksman.** This is a trained soldier and an above-average shot. He is armed with standard-issue or a scoped version of standard-issue rifle. Trained marksman are common in urban environments and are employed individually or in teams to cause casualties, disrupt, and harass. This category encompasses the majority of snipers in Iraq.

- **Well-trained sniper.** This type is specially selected and trained and equipped with a modern, purpose-built, scoped sniper rifle. He is capable of 1,000-meter killing shots and skilled in avoiding detection. The well-trained sniper is a very dangerous adversary that requires extensive planning, coordination, and support to eliminate. The longer an insurgency continues, the greater is the likelihood of encountering this sniper.

An enemy sniper rarely operates alone. Identifying the sniper cell will enable you to attack it to the left of the shot. The typical sniper cell structure consists of the following:

- **Leader:**
  - Experienced sniper
  - Trainer for his cell
  - Performs most support functions

- **Two to four additional personnel**
  - Shooter
  - Driver, spotter, and security; all three functions may reside in one person
• Fire support provides protective or masking fire with conventional weapons

• Videographer (optional); work may be performed along with other functions

The following battle staff actions affect enemy sniper employment:

• Conduct pattern analysis of enemy sniper activity to determine:
  ° Times, places, and frequency of sniper activity.
  ° Weapons employed (type, caliber, ammunition type).
  ° Target selection (discrete or random).
  ° Shot effectiveness (bullet placement, missed shots, killing or wounding).
  ° Firing distances and angle of fire.
  ° Number of shots and time intervals.
  ° Support personnel or vehicles.
  ° Use of bait (hoax IED, point of origin for indirect fire, etc.).

• Employ persistent surveillance to identify and respond to changes in environment:
  ° Unmanned aerial system
  ° Every Soldier as a sensor
  ° Tactical human intelligence teams
  ° Force protection personnel at static locations
  ° Entry control and traffic control points

• Collect, analyze, and disseminate enemy sniper tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP):
  ° Enable small unit leaders to adjust friendly TTP.
  ° Enable small unit leaders to develop effective countermeasures.

• Support counter-sniper fight with forensic and legal measures.
  ° Conduct tactical site exploitation of enemy sniper positions, hide sites, vehicles, weapons, or support equipment.
  ° Collect biometric data from known or suspected enemy snipers.
  ° Manage all data effectively to link insurgents with sniper activity.
• Support counter-sniper fight with resources.
  ° Provide effective personnel management of sniper teams.
  ° Ensure all snipers and sniper employment officers are school-trained.
  ° Provide training resources (time, ranges, ammunition) to maintain proficiency before and during deployment.
  ° Provide required weapons, ancillary equipment (scopes, communications gear, special uniform items), and maintenance.
  ° Plan and execute doctrinal employment of sniper assets.
  ° Ensure periodic legal review of sniper rules of engagement.
Appendix A

A Special Funds Primer

Commander and Staff Funds Management

Rules of engagement:

- Use funds identified for the requirement
- Abide by contract laws, fiscal laws, funding policy, and fragmentary orders
- Take positive steps to reduce costs
- Be judicious in the use of funds (litmus test—would use of funds embarrass Department of Defense if shown on prime time national news broadcast?)
- Institute a robust management control program (would use of funds pass a Congressional audit?)

Types of funds:

- Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
- Central Command (CENTCOM) rewards
- Iraqi Security Force Funds (ISSF) Quick Response Funds

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

Think of CERP as a tool for winning “hearts and minds” of the local population. CERP enables the landowner (usually a brigade combat team) to provide urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance by funding programs that will immediately assist the local populace.

Generally, CERP funds are intended to meet those urgent requirements that cannot wait for a more normal funding stream (such as Military Construction and Operations and Maintenance [OMA]). When considering the use of CERP, commanders and staffs should focus on urgent projects, goods, and/or services that will employ substantial numbers of local workers and local firms. All projects must be coordinated with local governments and regional coordinators, civil affairs elements, and provincial reconstruction teams.

The three primary components of CERP are reconstruction, death benefits/battle damage, and Iraq Economic Initiative.

Some specific examples include:

- Emergency repairs of critical facilities.
- Critical infrastructure shortfalls that can be rapidly resolved.
• Projects to reduce the risk of injury to the local populace.

• Procurement of critical equipment to replace lost, stolen, non-repairable items or to establish critical community essential services.

• Rapid reconstruction following combat operations.

• Types of projects where the commander can use CERP funds include:
  • Water and sanitation infrastructure.
  • Electrical power generation and distribution.
  • Food production and distribution.
  • Telecommunications.
  • Agriculture.
  • Transportation.
  • Irrigation.
  • Civic clean-up activities.
  • Healthcare.
  • Civic support vehicles.
  • Economic, financial, and management improvements.
  • Protective measures to enhance durability or survivability of critical infrastructure site.
  • Education.
  • Repair of damage not covered by the Foreign Claims Act (battle damage).
  • Rule of law and governance.
  • Payments to individuals on release from detention.
  • Repair to civic or cultural facilities.
  • Condolence payments to individual civilians.
  • Micro-Grants.
  • Other humanitarian or reconstruction projects.
Do not use CERP for the following:

- Any expenditure that directly/indirectly benefits U.S. military, coalition, or local security forces
- Providing goods, services, or funds to national armies, national guard forces, border security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, highway patrol units, police, special police, or intelligence or other security forces
- Entertainment
- Weapons buy-back except as authorized by law and separate implementing guidance
- Reward programs
- Removing unexploded ordnance
- Duplicating services available through municipal governments
- Support to individuals or private business (exceptions are possible)
- Security force operations
- Salaries, bonuses, or pensions of Iraqi military or civilian government personnel

Brigade commanders can authorize CERP payments (as of date of this handbook) for the following:

- Condolence payments or battle damage payments up to $2,500
- Micro-Grants up to $2,500
- CENTCOM rewards

The CERP is a remarkably effective tool in preempting enemy operations while denying them sanctuary and arms. The rewards program provides money, goods, or service as a reward for information and other nonlethal assistance beneficial to force protection or operations against counterinsurgency and international terrorism. The program pays for information leading to arrest of wanted persons, the discovery of weapons caches, etc.

There are currently (as of the date on this handbook) three levels of money awards:

- Micro-Rewards:
  - $500 per incident or $1,000 per month
  - Can be authorized by brigade commanders (reward approving officer)
• Small rewards:
  ° Amounts >$500 to < $10,000
  ° Designated for high-value targets or weapons caches
  ° Brigade commander can authorize payment up to $2,500

• Large rewards
  ° Amounts > $10,000
  ° Designated for capture of high-value targets or large weapons caches that pose a significant threat

Commanders points of emphasis:
• All rewards must be approved at the appropriate level.
• Units must keep records of each payment
• Units must report payments through their chains of command
• The payee’s identity must be protected
• Rewards can be paid to detainees for information that assists U.S. or coalition forces.
• Rewards can be cash or “like-kind” commodities.
• All Iraqi Security Forces are eligible for rewards

Restrictions:
• Rewards may not be paid to U.S. military, employees, contractors, citizens of the U.S. or allied and coalition forces armed forces.
• Rewards may not be paid for deceased persons unless the person is killed during operations based upon information provided or specifically approved by Secretary of Defense.
• Company commanders must avoid developing relationships with payees.
• No payment for information gathered by illegal means (extortion)

**Iraqi Security Force Funds Quick Reaction Funds**

Quick reaction funds are to be used for training, equipping, and maintaining the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to include force protection, facility repair, communications, and equipment. Quick reaction funds are intended to provide commanders with the flexibility to rapidly support all elements of the ISF.
The following types of projects can be funded with quick reaction funds:

- Reconstruction or repair of any ISF building
- Office equipment, supplies, and computers used by ISF
- Uniforms for ISF
- Transportation provided exclusively for ISF
- Equipment for ISF
- Training and training equipment for ISF
- Infrastructure repairs to ISF facilities
- Emergency life support for ISF

Quick reaction funds cannot be applied to:

- Humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
- Direct or indirect benefit to U.S. or coalition forces.
- Entertainment or local population or ISF.
- Cash handouts.
- Mixing or adding to OMA or any other appropriated or non-appropriated funds.
# Appendix B

**Religious Support Team (RST)**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT 1</th>
<th>Conduct Religious Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT 1.1</td>
<td>Conduct combat worship services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 1.2</td>
<td>Conduct noncombat worship services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 1.3</td>
<td>Conduct memorial ceremonies and services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT 2</th>
<th>Conduct Rites, Sacraments, and Ordinances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT 2.1</td>
<td>Conduct baptism worship services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 2.2</td>
<td>Conduct/coordinate other faith group requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT 3</th>
<th>Pastoral Care and Counseling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT 3.1</td>
<td>Conduct on-the-spot counseling sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 3.2</td>
<td>Conduct crisis counseling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 3.3</td>
<td>Conduct traumatic event management debriefings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT 4</th>
<th>Institutional Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT 4.1</td>
<td>Visit hospitalized unit members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 4.2</td>
<td>Provide religious support to mass casualties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT 5</th>
<th>Professional Support to the Commander and Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT 5.1</td>
<td>Present indigenous religions briefings to the commander and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 5.2</td>
<td>Conduct meetings with all joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 5.3</td>
<td>Ensure chaplain inclusion in all aspects of the JIIM planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 5.4</td>
<td>Address religious sensitivities in targeting cell and information operations planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 5.5</td>
<td>Advise the commander on unit trends</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 6</td>
<td><strong>Management and Administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 6.1</td>
<td>Create and coordinate a religious re-supply plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 6.2</td>
<td>Establish and/or maintain post/camp/station/base chapels as required/authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 7</td>
<td><strong>Religious and Humanitarian Support to Civil Military Operations (CMO)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 7.1</td>
<td>Conduct meetings with local JIIM CMO officers in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 7.2</td>
<td>Provide support to CMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 7.3</td>
<td>Provide support to humanitarian assistance operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 7.4</td>
<td>Conduct/attend meetings with local religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 8</td>
<td><strong>Religious Support Planning and Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 8.1</td>
<td>Prepare religious support annex to the current operations order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 9</td>
<td><strong>Religious Support Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 9.1</td>
<td>Conduct moral leadership training (60 minutes maximum [max])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 9.2</td>
<td>Conduct suicide prevention training (60 minutes max)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT 9.3</td>
<td>Conduct reunion training (60 minutes max)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

Coping With Stress in Stability and Support Operations

The information contained in this appendix was extracted from Tip Card #02, *Coping with Stress in Stability and Support Operations*, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, March 2004.

At its worst, the day-to-day stress that comes with stability and support operations can be as stressful as major combat operations. The danger may be high, and the mission may be unclear. Some civilians may be hostile, and the rules of engagement may be more stringent. It is often difficult to recognize threats, and concrete progress is sometimes difficult to see. Boredom, the lack of privacy, restricted movement, and separation from home further add to the stress. Under these conditions, anyone can begin to show signs of distress, and it is important to know how you can help yourself and your buddy.

Learn effective relaxation techniques:

- Play cards or sports.
- Talk with friends.
- Write a letter or diary.
- Read a book.
- Take slow, deep breaths.
- Imagine a favorite place.

These techniques can help you refocus in action, recharge after grueling or boring work, and relax in order to sleep. Request training on relaxation techniques from mental health or combat stress control teams and unit ministry teams in your area.

What to do for yourself:

- Remind yourself that these feelings are normal, given the situation.
- Get enough sleep, food, water, and exercise. If you are physically stressed, your ability to deal with the day-to-day stressors of stability and support operations is reduced.
- Focus on the mission at hand. Break down objectives into smaller tasks, and reward yourself with rest breaks after each task is accomplished.
- Stay connected with buddies in your unit.
- Maintain contact with friends and family at home whenever you can. If something at home is bothering you, talk about it with your buddies, your leaders, or anyone else you trust.
- If things start to feel out of control, talk to your unit sergeant, chaplain, medic, or commander as soon as possible.
What to do for your buddies:

- Know the members of your team and welcome newcomers when they arrive. Help them learn the skills they need.

- Be on the lookout for sudden changes in how your buddies act. If you see such changes, ask them about it.

- Include your buddies and new Soldiers in relaxing activities.

- Offer encouragement and recognition when your buddies do something well.

- If you are concerned for your buddies, talk to them about how they are doing.

- If you think that your buddy may be having a hard time and will not talk to you, let your leadership know about your concern.

What to do for your subordinates:

- Keep your team informed of new developments but be careful not to pass on rumors.

- Be on the lookout for changes in behavior or performance and act to address issues before they become problems.

- Organize team events to help Soldiers relax and have some fun. Give subordinates private time whenever possible.

- Ask team members how they are handling the deployment and how things are going back home.

- Ensure subordinates get a fair share of morale, welfare, and recreation activities and communication from home.

- If you are concerned about certain Soldiers, talk to them and listen to what they have to say.

- Conduct sensing sessions as frequently as possible, and make sure Soldiers’ feelings are expressed and heard.

- If necessary, refer Soldiers to unit chaplains, mental health, or combat stress control team assets for help.
Appendix D

How to Face the Injured and Dead

The information contained in this appendix was extracted from Tip Card #07, OIF Tip – How to Face the Injured and Dead, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, March 2004.

In combat or disaster situations, you may see, hear, smell, and perhaps have to handle badly injured and dead men, women, and children of all ages.

You may be struck with mixed feelings of pity, horror, revulsion, and anger at the senselessness or malice of the event. It is even more painful when a victim reminds you of someone you love or yourself. You may feel guilty for failing to prevent it, for surviving it, or for not helping enough. These reactions are normal, a part of being human. You may blame yourself or the United States.

Keep in mind that these feelings are honorable and confirm your humanity. At times, however, you may feel emotionally numb and may use “graveyard humor” to make the suffering and deaths seem less terrible. Whatever you feel, remember that the mission must continue.

What follows are lessons learned from people who have faced such horrible experiences. These tips can help you conduct the mission and live with the memories without being haunted by them.

1. Remember the larger purpose of what you must do. You are showing care, giving hope, and preventing disease for the living. You are recovering the bodies for registrations and respectful burial.

2. Limit exposure to the stimuli: Do not sightsee; use screens, poncho curtains, partitions, covers, body bags, and barriers to keep away anyone who does not need to see.

3. Wear gloves and disposable uniforms if available.

4. Mask odors with disinfectants, deodorants, or air fresheners. Save perfumes or aftershaves for afterwards. Do not be surprised when odors trigger memories.

5. Be compassionate, but avoid focusing on any individual victims, especially those you most identify with. Do not focus on personal effects.

6. Personnel who did not search the body should examine any materials collected for identification of the body or intelligence.

7. Remind yourself the body is not “the person,” just the remains.

8. Keep humor alive, even “graveyard humor” with buddies who understand it, but do not get too graphic or too personal (do not pick on each other).
9. Do not desecrate or steal from the victims; those actions are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

10. Ask unit or local ministers to conduct memorial services and perform personal religious rituals as appropriate.

11. Schedule frequent breaks, maintain hygiene, drink plenty of fluids, and eat good food. Command should arrange facilities for washing hands and face, followed later by showers and fresh clothes.

12. Have your team get together for mutual support and encouragement. Acknowledge the horrible aspects of the situation, but do not dwell on detailed memories.

13. Help buddies or subordinates in distress by being a good listener. Do not jump in with “off the shelf” answers. Do not mistake feelings as weakness; communicate that these feelings are normal and honorable. Remind subordinates that the mission must go on, and the team needs everyone.

14. If forewarned of the mission, prepare yourself for what you will see and do and take the supplies and equipment mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.

15. After the mission is complete, do not feel guilty about distancing yourself mentally from the suffering or tragic deaths of individuals.

16. Do not be disheartened by horrible dreams, feeling tense, or intrusive memories. These reactions are normal, and it is better to acknowledge them now than to suppress them. Share these reactions with your buddies and keep positive humor alive.

17. One to three days after the exposure to a stressful event, participate in a critical event debriefing with trained people from your supporting unit ministry and/or behavioral health/combat stress control team.

These techniques and coping skills cannot make a horrible and tragic event acceptable or easy, but they can help you and your teammates better cope with the stress in order to complete the mission. Be proud of what you have done, and use these lessons learned to take care of yourself, your buddies, and your family when you get home.
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