The Army's Strategic Vision
The All-Volunteer Army will remain the most highly trained and professional land force in the world. It is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive land power to the Joint Force and ready to perform across the range of military operations to Prevent, Shape and Win in support of Combatant Commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats.

Foreword
Over the past 238 years, the United States Army has proudly served the Nation by winning its wars and securing the peace. Today, nearly 153,000 Soldiers are forward deployed around the world. From Asia and across the Pacific, across the Americas and through Africa and Europe, the Army continues to be globally responsive and regionally engaged. In over 150 countries, Soldiers continue to uphold a proud legacy of defending our Nation and its interests. The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance reminds us of the Army's purpose and details our vision, direction, and strategic objectives.

Today, the Army remains the most highly-trained and professional All Volunteer land force in the world. It is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide landpower with strategic utility for the Joint Force, and stands ready to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats, across the range of military operations.

The Army prevents conflict through credible deterrence, and shapes the environment by assuring partners and allies while coercing adversaries. When necessary, the Army wins decisively through compellence. To prevent, shape, and win across the range of military operations, the Army must remain an expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality land force. The Army’s ability to deter, assure, coerce, and compel guarantees American military and diplomatic primacy and global leadership.

Looking to the future, the Army must consider five strategic priorities. The foundation of the Army rests in Army leaders who can adapt to the challenges posed by a complex future environment. The force they lead will be globally responsive, yet regionally engaged worldwide, with the capability to rapidly deploy, fight, and win whenever and wherever our national interests are threatened. Such a force must come from the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC), and can readily leverage the capabilities provided by joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) partners. The Soldiers in the Army of the future are committed professionals. They are the credentials of the Nation, which places their confidence in the Army as a profession. Keeping faith with Soldiers is an integral part of ensuring that the Army remains the premier All-Volunteer land force in the world. Although the Army is constantly adapting to prepare for the future, Soldier and Civilian leaders across the Total Army must be able to apply the experiences and hard-earned lessons that have been learned over the last decade of war, and continue to foster adaptability and innovation in their formations. At the same time, fiscal realities require us to eliminate redundant and poorly performing programs while sustaining those that have proven most beneficial. Anything less compromises the Army's ability to provide the forces that fight and win the Nation's wars.

Raymond T. Odierno,
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

John M. McHugh
Secretary of the Army
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Part 1: Context

The Strategic Environment

American military influence is a key part of the global strategic environment now and for the foreseeable future. The ready capabilities of American military forces allow the United States to respond quickly around the world, providing a presence that advances U.S. national security and contributes to global peace and stability. The world watches trends in U.S. force size and capability. Whether friend or foe, countries and non-state actors will make decisions based on U.S. capabilities, not just in the traditional domains of land, maritime, and air, but also in space and cyberspace.

An important aspect of the strategic environment is today’s global fiscal situation and resulting budget sequestration. Reduced funding available for the Army leads to significant reductions in planned end strength, readiness, and capital investments through at least 2023. If these fiscal constraints remain, resulting in an undersized and less ready Army, it leaves Congress, future administrations, and the Nation with severely reduced options for military action to prevent, deter or win conflict.

Over the past year a number of dangerous trends have worsened, threatening stability across entire regions. Throughout the Middle East and Africa, the Arab Spring transition has led to instability and violence, providing opportunities for terrorists to harbor, fund, and prepare future attacks. Political instability in Syria has degenerated into a civil and sectarian war and opened a Sunni-Shia fissure across the Middle East. China escalated its pressure on neighboring states over territorial issues and hardened its diplomatic position, heightening anxiety among U.S. partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific region. In Europe, NATO allies face hard choices between domestic spending and defense budgets due to global economic recession, with clear implications to their capabilities in future coalition operations. Russia remains wary of U.S. intentions and strives to block U.S. efforts to intervene in what it considers domestic issues in any country. Aside from Syria, the security environment in Iran, Pakistan and North Korea has become increasingly uncertain and highlights concerns over the potential loss of control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Meanwhile, allies and partners will continue to look to the United States for strength, leadership and stability, even in the absence of a likely near-peer competitor.¹

American military power deters aggressors from attacking U.S. allies, interests or violating U.S. based norms. Maintaining an international security environment favorable to U.S. national interests requires the U.S. military to protect the global commons and underwrite the stability of international trade. The demands of American global leadership have required almost continuous American military commitment since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. military has executed nearly every mission across the range of military operations from state-on-state warfare to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, counterdrug, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Throughout the world, states with weak governance have been prone to civil war and other forms of political violence. The effects of poverty and other economic factors,

¹ See “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” by the National Intelligence Council
in conjunction with ethnic and sectarian tensions, often exacerbate each other in those weak states, increasing the likelihood and severity of conflict. In the meantime, ever-present connectivity among populations enables conflict to spread rapidly. Major or even minor conflicts distributed over a large area will have a material effect on the U.S. and global economies, with a resulting effect on uncertainty and instability. The effects of those conflicts, and potential effects from climate change, will make it difficult for the United States to arbitrarily opt out of involvement, even if that involvement does include use of the military instrument of national power. Global diasporas and the population densities associated with urbanization will only amplify the effects of that connectivity.

State and non-state actors’ access to affordable technologies complicate the challenges that instability brings. Such technologies complement a broad range of readily available conventional weapons to enable those actors to create improvised and lethal weapons. In addition, social media will enable even small groups to mobilize people and resources in ways that can quickly constrain or disrupt operations, which can enable those organizations to be more agile than traditional military and civilian entities. The easy proliferation of technology and the methods and systems to use it, especially through the private sector, mean that there is no guarantee of U.S. technological superiority or information dominance. As a result, overwhelming reliance or dependency on advanced technology and platforms can be a critical vulnerability.

Ensuring stability in the international security environment requires the use of force in such a way that it does not promote future conflict as a first step towards conflict termination. Conflict termination short of total annihilation of an adversary requires the people involved to adjust their beliefs, perceptions, attitudes and preferences. It involves forms of authority and legitimacy that may run outside traditional relationships with political leaders or privileged groups. Effective conflict termination must establish security and stability among populations, which requires knowledge and influence on their cultural, political, and economic relationships. Stand-off and technical methods alone cannot acquire that knowledge nor fully inform the decisions necessary to terminate conflicts favorably.

The Army, as it concludes combat operations in Afghanistan, faces a strategic inflection point. It is reshaping its force from one optimized for large-scale counterinsurgency operations in multiple theaters of operation to a force that is more broadly capable of missions across the range of military operations. While this force may bear comparison to the Army that emerged from the Vietnam War, it enters the postwar period postured in a far better state than it did four decades ago. The Army is fully manned, with the most combat-seasoned force since World War II spanning both combat and support formations. The Army adapted to the demands of the war, resulting in world-class combat training centers that are an integral part of the overall readiness of the force that makes the Army the finest land army in the world. While drawdowns are unavoidable as the Nation emerges from two long wars, the Army will not undergo the wholesale gutting of the force that characterized the 1970s and 1990s.

Today, our Army remains globally responsive and regionally engaged throughout the world. As it has for the last 239 years, the Army remains responsive to the changing security needs of the Nation. In January 2012, the President and Secretary of Defense set the U.S. on a course to expand and rebalance our focus on the Asia-Pacific region, to include expanding our military presence, to ensure the region’s prosperity and security.
In the eyes of our allies, friends, and competitors, the Asia-Pacific is a land theater: five of seven U.S. mutual defense treaty allies and eight of the world’s ten largest armies are located in the Pacific. In addition, six of nine states with nuclear weapons are located in the region. The Army in the Pacific, now with 80,000 active and reserve troops assigned, is the largest of the military services in United States Pacific Command and the largest overseas command in the Army.

The position of the United States in the global security environment calls for a credible deterrent force capable of immediate response across the range of military operations, from military engagement and security cooperation all the way to general war. Manning, training, equipping, and supplying that force requires a significant investment in readiness, one that precludes a cadre army reinforced through mobilization. A credible force in readiness has strategic utility far beyond deterrence, providing the Nation a broad set of capabilities for shaping the environment.

When the United States seeks to deter a specific adversary, it is largely successful, as in Western Europe during the Cold War and today on the Korean peninsula. However, the far more frequent norm has been United States involvement in unforeseen locations like Somalia and Afghanistan and against adversaries it did not initially anticipate to fight. These conflicts are primarily a clash of wills that require close knowledge of populations and their social, political, and economic relationships to bring to effective closure. While some would seek to prosecute conflict without direct human interaction, it is inevitable that there will be a next crisis at an unanticipated time, in an unforeseen place, unfolding in an unforeseen manner, requiring the rapid commitment of Army forces. The capabilities the Army provides underwrite the American military and diplomatic primacy that makes the United States a global leader.

The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) reframes the Army’s overarching strategy to reflect the ongoing unpredictability inherent to the security environment, within the bounds of austerity and fiscal uncertainty imposed upon the Army and Department of Defense.

The 2013 ASPG was built upon the 2012 edition, keeping the same ends while refining the thought, vision, ways, and means to fulfill them. While the 2014 edition seeks the same goal of balancing long-term planning with short-term decision making to build the Army of the future, it does so under substantially different conditions than in 2012 and early 2013.

As the first part of The Army Plan (TAP), the ASPG informs the Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), which establishes planning priorities based on the vision outlined in this document. The Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM) provides programmatic guidance to align resources to the planning priorities. Implementation of the Army strategy also occurs through the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), which directs tasks to the Army based on the ends, ways, and means articulated in the ASPG.
The ASPG serves two purposes for the Army and its leaders. First, it provides a vehicle for leaders at every echelon to read, discuss, and think critically about how to exercise the disciplined initiative to operationalize the guidance provided herein. Second, this document provides the Army and its leaders a reference to explain to others what the Army does for the Nation, how the Army does it, and where the Army is going over the next decade. The Soldiers and Civilians of the Army have an obligation to remember the lessons of the past, while best preparing for an uncertain future.

The supreme test of all armies stems from the unpredictability of the future strategic environment. It is a future about which we know almost everything in general, but we rarely know enough in detail to give reasonable certainty. Instead, the Army must prudently approach the future in a way that prepares it to adapt rapidly to circumstances it cannot foresee. Rather than trying to get preparation exactly right, it must not be too terribly wrong. The United States does not seek war, but others must never doubt our ability to wage it and win decisively when it occurs.

Assumptions

The 2014 ASPG is predicated on several assumptions. Invalidation of any of these assumptions may warrant the development of a new ASPG document:

1. National policy guidance governing the military instrument of national power with respect to a major theater war will not change.
2. The Army will continue to man, train, organize, and equip forces based on the Regionally Aligned Force concept.
3. Total obligational authority will not increase above President’s Budget 2015-2019 levels.
4. Total obligational authority will not decrease below Budget Control Act sequestration levels.
5. The priority defense missions outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance will not significantly change. If replaced, they will be replaced with a similar construct.

Part 2: Mission and Roles of the Army

The Army’s Mission

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1 outlines the United States Army’s Mission from guidance given in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3013 and 3062 and Department of Defense Directive 5100.01:

The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force. We do this by—Organizing, equipping, and training Army forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; Integrating our capabilities with those of the other Armed Services; Accomplishing all missions assigned by the President, Secretary of
Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014

Defense, and combatant commanders; Remaining ready while preparing for the future.

The Army accomplishes its mission through the conduct of two basic roles and four enabling roles, which collectively form the conceptual basis for all operational concepts.

The Army’s Basic Roles

Deter/Defeat Threats on Land.

The most fundamental role for Army forces is to deter or defeat enemy threats on land. Army forces defeat enemy land forces, and incident to that role, assist in destroying an enemy’s will to resist (to include securing the means of conflict) or pose a credible threat. Enemies must know that when armed hostilities stop, they will still face an American Soldier with a weapon in hand. The operational core competency that supports this role is combined arms maneuver. This is the essential Army contribution to the pillar of the U.S. Defense Strategy, Project Power and Win Decisively.

Control Land Areas and Secure Their Populations.

Complementing the deterrence or defeat of threats on land is the control of those land areas, and when necessary, securing their populations. Army forces secure populations, resources, and terrain as part of this mission, until such time that civil authority can govern those areas. Those forces provide the assurance of support to host nations facing internal or external threats. Army forces can also do so coercively, such as the seizure of a lodgment and controlling the area within and around it. Those Army forces are the initial step to enabling a population to establish the rule of law and peaceful transition of political authority from military to civilian government. The operational core competency that supports this role is wide area security.

The Army’s Enabling Roles

Support to Security Cooperation

The Army, subject to Department of State and Combatant Commander strategies, conducts military engagement with foreign partners to promote specific U.S. security interests and encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries. This is a key, but not the only Army contribution to Build Security Globally, the second pillar of the U.S. Defense Strategy. Shaping—described as routine military and interagency activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries, reinforce alliances, and ensure or solidify our relationships with allies and

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Basic Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deter/Defeat Threats on Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Land Areas and Secure Their Populations</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Army Enabling Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Domestic Civil Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Support to Other Services, the Joint Force, and the Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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partners—will become increasingly important. The most visible means of the Army’s assurances to partners and allies comes in its support to security cooperation and other shaping efforts, such as the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. The Army also provides support to combatant commander (CCDR)-validated security cooperation requirements designed to build partner nations’ military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations through military-to-military engagements, security force assistance, security assistance, and exercises. An immeasurable benefit gained from the assurances built through security cooperation is strategic access through host nations. Those relationships and access are an investment best made early, as they are difficult to establish once a conflict arises. In addition to supporting CCDR requirements and U.S. Government (USG) foreign policy objectives, security cooperation also enhances the Army’s overall readiness, training, and leader development. Specific Army security cooperation objectives to support CCDRs are outlined in the Army Security Cooperation Strategy, published in January 2014.

Support Domestic Civil Authorities

Within the United States and its territories, the Army provides support to national, state, and local authorities as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), a key contribution to the first pillar of the U.S. Defense Strategy, Protect the Homeland. The DoD provides assistance upon request by an appropriate authority and after approval of the Secretary of Defense. Army units within the affected area may respond immediately under imminently serious conditions after a request for assistance from local authorities under the Immediate Response Authority to disasters and attacks as required by civil authorities and within limits established by law. One of the most important elements of this support is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise (CRE). The Army must be ready to conduct a no-notice response in support of civil authorities in the Homeland. Other than the CBRN Response Enterprise and some assigned theater enablers, most of those Title 10 forces would be contingency sourced in FY14. The responsiveness that gives Army units their expeditionary capability is just as valuable in domestic emergencies. The Army provides a significant portion of the DoD CBRN response capabilities, especially in large-scale complex catastrophes. Although the Secretary of Defense and supported CCDR decide command and control arrangements for Title 10 crisis response forces, the Army contributes a unique force multiplier for DSCA operations through dual-status commanders, who exercise tactical control over Title 10 forces and also command state forces, while reporting to separate federal and state chains of command. The Army may also provide an operational headquarters should it become necessary to exercise mission command of echelons-above-brigade units. The provisions for improved access to Army Reserve forces for DSCA in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act improved the responsiveness and capabilities of the Joint Force in this mission. As required by law, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains the Nation’s rivers and waterways, and has the primary responsibility for safeguarding communities from floods. The Corps of Engineers is also the primary agency for coordinating Emergency Support Function 3 (Public Works and Engineering) in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework.
Entry Operations

An essential element of the Army’s capabilities to conduct prompt and sustained land combat rests in its capability for entry operations, which involve the projection and immediate employment of military forces from the land, the sea or through the air onto foreign territory to accomplish assigned missions. To achieve the U.S. Defense Strategy’s mandate to “project power and win decisively” the Army must be able to enter foreign territory in the presence of armed opposition, including advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, among which are air/missile defense and WMD. Entry operations to gain access to a joint operational area may occur in either contested or permissive environments.

The Army mans, trains, and equips combat forces to conduct airborne (parachute), air assault (helicopter), and amphibious joint forcible entry operations to seize lodgments or other key objectives. Space and cyberspace capabilities also enable joint forcible entry operations. These joint forcible entry capabilities causes an enemy to defend against multiple non-contiguous efforts and provide the joint force commander the initiative. Although some entry operations may not be opposed, conditions may still require initial entry forces to establish and protect a lodgment.

Not all entry operations require forcible entry. While all Services have some capability for theater opening, the Army provides much of the theater opening capability within the lodgment. Army forces deploy some of this capability from outside the region while Army logisticians and transportation experts manage, coordinate, and conduct contract-related activities as soon as conditions permit. Army forces, while often employing established ports of debarkation, must also be capable of conducting entry operations through austere lodgments. The conduct of entry operations, whether forcible or otherwise, is heavily dependent on the relationships made prior to conflict with host-nation governments and militaries to enable access.

Army Support to Other Services, the Joint Force, and the Department of Defense

The Army is the backbone of the Joint Force. Effective joint operations are not possible without Army ground combat forces and critical enablers. A significant portion of the Army’s force structure is devoted to sustaining the force; not just Army units, but also other Service forces, and as required, multinational forces. Army sustainment is the backbone to the Joint Force’s versatility across the full range of military operations. That backbone underpins the operational and strategic reach to conduct military operations through the full length of a campaign, often in contested environments. Joint force commanders depend upon common-user logistics provided by the Army. Military expeditions throughout history, regardless of their tactical lethality or skill, have failed when disease and combat losses eroded their combat power, or a lack of supplies prevented them from maintaining gains or seizing opportunities. One of the most essential elements of American military primacy in expeditionary warfare is the Army’s ability to not only deploy large ground forces globally, but also employ them through the full duration of a campaign. Army contributions to the Joint Force include command and control headquarters, air/missile defense, wideband satellite communications, missile warning, and blue force tracking.
Agreements for Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) include, but are not limited to:

- Missile defense
- Fire support
- Base defense
- Transportation
- Fuel distribution
- General engineering
- Intratheater medical evacuation
- Veterinary services
- Logistics management
- Communications
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- DoD Detainee Operations Policy
- Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO)
- Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP)
- Chemical Demilitarization
- DoD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)
- DoD Level III Corrections
- Explosives Safety Management
- DoD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense
- DoD Biometrics
- DoD Forensics for most forensics disciplines
- Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of Contingency Operations
- Military Postal Service (MPS)
- Defense Mortuary Affairs Program
- DoD Support to United Nations Missions
- DoD Veterinary Services Program
- Military Immunization Program
- Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
- Contract Foreign Language Support to the DoD Components
- Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
A Strategic Concept for the Army: Prevent, Shape, Win

The Army's Strategic Vision

The All-Volunteer Army will remain the most highly trained and professional land force in the world. It is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force and ready to perform across the range of military operations to Prevent, Shape, and Win in support of Combatant Commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats.

This vision clearly articulates, within the context of the environment and existing guidance, what the Army does for the Nation, as well as the characteristics the Army must have in order to fulfill its mission. This strategic concept, first expressed as conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination, has been the foundation of the Army's obligations to the Nation. Today, the Army prevents conflict, shapes the security environment, and wins decisively when called.

As part of the Joint Force, the Army serves to deter potential adversaries by presenting a credible element of the military instrument of national power - specifically landpower that is decisively expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign quality. Potential adversaries must clearly perceive Army forces as being capable of appropriate and rapid response anywhere in the world, across the entire range of military operations, in activities ranging from security cooperation all the way to general war.

The Army's distinct contribution to the Nation's security is the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces on land to force an enemy to submit to our will. When our vital interests are in direct opposition with those of another state or non-state actor, only landpower will conclusively terminate conflict, short of that state's or actor's total annihilation. Ideally, this is done through deterrence, the most cost-effective form of military force; not only are wars averted far less costly than wars waged, but a strong Army—even when not engaged in combat operations—deters multiple adversaries simultaneously. While strikes and raids might deter some opportunistic aggression, or tip the balance in those cases where we choose to intervene in an on-going conflict, the ability to control land and secure its populations, up to and including regime change should it become necessary, is a threat that antagonists cannot ignore. Without this capability to compel, the United States is no longer a global leader, for our diplomacy lacks credibility, our assurance to partners and allies lacks meaning, and our promise to defend the Nation lacks substance.

Prevent

The deterrent value of Army forces depends not only on their basic character, quality and magnitude, but also on the perceptions of others that the U.S. and allied nations and groups are willing to employ them. Preventing conflict requires scalable forces, ranging from a very light footprint to the full employment of a force-in-being. Forward presence complements those scalable forces through an unmistakable signal of national resolve and commitment to our partners and allies. That broad spectrum of
capabilities offers CCDRs and policymakers exceptional utility through the employment of discriminating, scalable, and tailorable military power to safeguard our national interests.

**Shape**

In shaping the security environment to create security conditions favorable to U.S. and partner interests, the Army exercises coercive influence against adversaries, while assuring allies and partner nations. Shaping the security environment is much more than providing military equipment or technology to allies and partner nations—it is primarily a whole of government, multinational, relationship-based and people-centric mission. The Army supports CCDR theater campaign plans and USG integrated shaping efforts through security cooperation and other forms of military engagement. The resulting relationships based on trust and shared experience will be the basis for future cooperation with stable, self-sufficient and regionally influential partner nations and groups.

Shaping efforts complement deterrence by returning an unstable environment to a stable norm, while addressing lesser security threats before they have a chance to mature. At the same time, coercion and assurance complement compellence by setting theaters for decisive combat operations should they become necessary, which reduces the duration and overall severity of a conflict once joined.

**Win**

In the event prevention fails and shaping is ultimately insufficient, the Army, as a part of the Joint Force, compels land adversaries no other choice but to accept our terms. The Army provides compellence through its capacity, capabilities and readiness to terminate conflicts, up to and including removal of a ruling government and through the re-establishment of security, civil governance and rule of law. Through our ability to operate in and around populations and their territories, Army forces make permanent the temporary achievements of operational victory by achieving the far more lasting outcome of securing the strategic peace.

**Army's Qualities: What the Army Must Be**

To meet its obligations to the Nation, the Army is fundamentally an **expeditionary**, **strategically adaptive**, and **campaign quality** Army that fights as an integral part of the Joint Force.

**Expeditionary**

The Army has been, and remains, an expeditionary force: organized, manned, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, to accomplish its assigned mission. Being expeditionary is not just limited to short-duration or rapid response missions. There is no guarantee of deploying to a mature theater like Western Europe during the Cold War or the ones that emerged after over a decade of war in Southwest and Central Asia. Instead, the Army faces great uncertainty as to where it must deploy,
with the likelihood of an austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival if necessary. Those challenges will be the norm, not the exception, in the future strategic environment.

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), which are strategically positioned for rapid response, are a critical component of this quality. In conjunction with strategic sealift and airlift, APS provides joint force commanders prompt access to the combat formations and enablers needed to not only defeat adversaries in major combat operations, but also respond to humanitarian crisis, and engage with partners and allies.

Strategically Adaptive

The Army, its organizations, and its Soldiers must be strategically adaptive, including the operational and institutional aspects. Such adaptation is more than tactical adaptation to challenges. It requires a broad mindset that considers the environment, threat, and adaptation in ways that may not always be immediately apparent.

Operationally, the Army must be physically and intellectually agile to adapt to conditions, tactics, and even methods of conflict that may be impossible to accurately predict. Although operations in Afghanistan and Iraq started as rapid and effective offensive operations, the changes in those conflicts also illustrate the difficulty in predicting the true duration or character of a military campaign. It is unlikely that future adversaries will attempt to compete against our strengths; rather, they will seek to exploit our vulnerabilities. Tactical excellence, while necessary for strategic success, cannot and will not achieve those strategic ends on its own.

Compounding the difficulty of prediction is the increasing frequency and impact of human interaction. The volume of data, as well as the difficulty of distinguishing indicators and warnings against extraneous information is increasing. Given the inherently human nature of conflict, identifying many of these indicators and warnings requires a degree of nuance that is often beyond the capabilities of technical means of intelligence collection. The Army will need to maintain and improve our human and technical collection, and, more importantly, the speed and accuracy of our analysis process to address this increasingly complex environment.

Institutionally, the Army must have capabilities and processes responsive to and capable of change to meet the Nation’s demands. That adaptation entails building the force from an intellectual seed corn that must be protected, rather than used as a manpower bill payer for shortages in the Operating Force as in previous times of austerity. Very often, this intellectual seed corn is at the operational and strategic level, and requires true investments in education, not solely for their academic credentials, but to better enable the force to rapidly adapt to future uncertainty in ways that training and doctrine alone cannot address. It also requires the Army to retain the ability to expand to meet the needs of a national emergency or war.

Campaign Quality

The campaign quality of an Army is its ability to successfully accomplish all of its missions throughout the full duration of a campaign. These missions
span the full range of military operations from peacetime engagement to major combat operations, and require a force that can sustain its efforts for as long as necessary, capable of adapting to unpredictable and often profound changes in the strategic context and character of the conflict. The Army must reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to terminate a conflict, whatever form it may take, on terms favorable to the United States.

As a modern, combat-ready, globally deployable force, the Army must be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat across the range of military operations to defeat adversary land forces, seize and control terrain with their associated populations, and destroy an adversary’s will to resist. As part of that capability, the Army has a forcible entry capability that allows it to conduct—and sustain—land operations anywhere in the world. That forcible entry capability could not exist without strategic lift and reach provided by the Air Force and Navy.

As part of the Joint Force, a campaign quality Army provides a full range of options to the Commander in Chief, reinforcing the roles of the United States as a global leader and security partner of choice. It also underpins meaningful assurance, deterrence, coercion and if necessary, compellence. The military instrument of national power alone, however, is rarely sufficient to address the true sources of armed conflict. As a result, the Army must continue, and where possible, improve its leadership in integrating capabilities from the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to achieve national political and military strategic objectives. As has occurred many times in the past, it will be Army forces that are called upon to enable those non-military instruments to reinforce and make permanent the transitory gains achieved through combat operations.

The Total Army

The Total Army is a foundation of the Army strategy and planning to fulfill the Nation’s military needs. Recent wars have seen a degree of integration across the Soldiers and Civilians of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve that we must retain as one Total Army. To support national strategies, policies and Joint Force commitments worldwide, we emphasized and increased operational use of the RC to provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements. In the years to come, the Army will continue to rely on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to meet future commitments. Continuing operational use of the RC provides predictable, recurring, and sustainable operational capabilities, and strategic depth to the Total Army, both in its formations and their collective readiness to respond when called.

In accordance with the Army Total Force Policy, the Total Army will be manned, trained, organized, sustained, equipped, and employed to support CCDR requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives. Readiness is the most fundamental factor affecting the continued relevance of the Total Army, regardless of component. While the RC will continue to participate across the full spectrum of missions at home and abroad, there are missions such as domestic consequence management and civil support operations that particularly leverage the responsiveness and versatility in the RC.
No part of the Total Army can afford the luxury of being overstructured at the expense of training and readiness. Doing so creates an operational liability to the Joint Force and a strategic vulnerability for the Nation.

**Part 3: The Army in Transition**

The Army remains the Nation’s principal instrument of compellence on land, with the lethality, flexibility, and staying power to terminate conflicts on terms favorable to the United States. Those qualities are also the basis of the deterrent the Army poses to potential enemies. Between those ends, the Army shapes the security environment, whether through assuring allies and partners, or coercing adversaries. Army forces operate in and around the culture and politics of populations. They offer a versatile, discriminating tool to achieve strategic objectives using the appropriate force required to end wars and conflicts, in ways that the application of firepower alone cannot deliver.

The strategic guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012) outlines 11 priority missions for the DoD. The Army has a significant role in 10 of the 11 missions, which will focus the training, organizing, and equipping of units assigned those missions. The Army uses three of the missions to guide the force-sizing construct: Conduct Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare, Deter or Defeat Aggression, and Defend the Homeland and Provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. We also believe that potential missions related to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction may impact the Army’s required capabilities and capacity. The Army’s support to the Joint Force in unified action includes critical enablers such as aviation, air/missile defense, intelligence, engineers, logistics, medical, signal, operational contract support, and special operations, both while enroute to and operating within expeditionary environments.

With the projected end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army must downsize to a postwar structure and end strength, while rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. In past drawdowns, the Army has sought to recast itself as a leaner, more capable force. However, the Army is approaching this postwar reality in a fundamentally different manner than before. Rather than reorganizing the Army as a force primarily for contingency response as it did from the 1970s to the 1990s, the Army will expand its engagement to proactively address the security environment. The Army continues to maintain a stabilizing regional presence, building and strengthening alliance and partner capacity, and providing essential enabling capabilities to the joint force to ensure operational access and rapid contingency response if and when needed. Regionally aligned forces, bolstered by the capabilities provided in mission tailored forces, directly address this proactive engagement which is an integral part of the Army’s Strategic Vision. Our next transformation effort, *Army 2025 and Beyond*, will explore new methods and ideas to design, develop, and employ Army forces to best fulfill our obligations to the Nation.
Regionally Aligned Force

Regionally Aligned Forces are those Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands, as well as those capabilities that are service retained (but aligned to a Combatant Command (CCMD)) and prepared by the Army for regional missions. It includes Total Army organizations and capabilities that are forward stationed, operating in a CCMD area of responsibility, supporting from outside the area of responsibility, and those prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. CCMD requirements will drive regional missions, requiring an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.

The goal of regional alignment is to provide CCDRs predictable, task-organized, and responsive capabilities to achieve Guidance for the Employment of the Force end states and meet other requirements across the full range of military operations, to include joint task force-capable headquarters, crisis or contingency response, operations support, theater security cooperation, and bilateral or multilateral military exercises.

Regional alignment also provides a more effective approach for non-traditional threats in an increasingly interdependent security environment. The Army seeks to train Soldiers and grow leaders who can adapt to changing conditions across the range of military operations. Regional alignment also prepares Army forces to build sustainable capacity in partners and allies to address common security challenges, consistent with principles of good governance and rule of law. Forces organized under this concept support enduring CCDR requirements for military engagement, strengthening relationships with key allies and partner nations by providing consistent and committed interaction. Units organized under the regionally aligned force concept also provide an immediate force-in-being to assure partners and deter potential adversaries.

Mission Tailored Force

Mission Tailored Forces are those Army units manned, trained, and equipped for the conduct of a specified mission. Rather than orienting on a particular geographic region, mission tailored forces maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of unified land operations and combined arms warfare, but have capabilities tailored primarily to their mission. They complement, and are informed by the capabilities of regionally aligned forces in meeting CCDR requirements.

Roles for mission tailored forces include, but are not limited to:

- Global Response Force (GRF) to defeat anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats
- Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), to include support to forces conducting weapons of mass destruction elimination (WMD-E) operations.
- Conventional Army habitual support to other services or special operations forces for specified missions.
- Army cyberspace forces.
- Combat operations to decisively defeat a threat.

Mission tailored forces span the Total Army and are likely to be stationed in the United States. They are best suited for use when requirements for proficiency in a
specific mission outweigh needed readiness for a broader range of missions in a geographic region.

Implications to the Army

The implications of the Army’s strategic concept and its supporting concepts of regionally aligned and mission tailored forces cut across many of the basic functions of the Department of the Army. Areas of emphasis include training and leader development, readiness, modernization, cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

Training and Leader Development

Training is a crucial investment in force readiness. Soldiers, civilians, leaders, and units cannot accomplish an assigned mission without the knowledge and skill needed to survive first contact, seize the initiative, and prevail. The Army cannot respond to future unknown challenges without developing adaptable leaders today. Over the last decade, the Army generated combat power through enablers such as contractors or other external support. In the current fiscal austerity, leaders and their organizations will have to look internally to perform many of those functions, which emphasizes the essential responsibilities in mentorship and oversight that are the obligations of leaders at all levels.

Training across the Total Army serves two main purposes: preparing units to be versatile and ready to support CCDRs worldwide, and developing military and civilian leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The outcome of Army training efforts will be more agile and adaptive forces capable of supporting regional requirements or contingency missions when assigned.

Training for operational adaptability can take place at home station and combat training centers, overseas with allies and partner armies during joint and multinational exercises, in Army institutions and while deployed. Security cooperation and other shaping activities build on combat experience to enhance training and leader development, and when executed, the training and experience gained from large formation exercises will be critical to developing ready and relevant leaders in combat formations. Training for operational adaptability, also builds the understanding of a region, its people, and their dynamics that are necessary for the competence that underpins the relevance of Army forces for the CCDRs that must employ them.

Complementing training is leader development, which is the single best insurance for the Total Army’s ability to adapt to the uncertainty that future challenges will bring. Both collectively provide the foundations of mutual trust, shared understanding, and purpose necessary for the practice of mission command. Implicit to those foundations is an acceptance of risk and uncertainty on the part of leaders who trust their subordinates to operate with disciplined initiative within the bounds of commander’s intent. The demands placed on training and leader development become even more important given the continuing expectation to provide regionally aligned corps and division headquarters capable of operating with and alongside JIIM partners. Army leaders must recognize that problems, whether strategic, operational, or even tactical, do not have predetermined solutions. While training can prepare Soldiers to
address conditions of relative certainty, education prepares Soldiers to address situations that training alone cannot answer.

**Readiness**

The Army’s non-negotiable contract with the Nation is to be ready to respond when called. Of readiness, force structure and modernization, **readiness is the vital element of the Army mission, because it applies** to personnel, materiel and supplies, equipment readiness, and training. The sum of those elements, properly balanced, enables a ready and modern force that can immediately and effectively apply military power when called.

A leaner, well-equipped, and highly trained force is better able to meet contingencies than a large force that is ill-trained. Similarly, a force with modern equipment, but without the people to employ it, is not ready. The deterrent and coercive value of the Army is a direct function of its readiness. That readiness may be tiered to give the Army an immediate response capability, while managing risk to forces that may require additional preparation prior to employment.

An ill-trained, unready force is twice a liability: it is not a credible deterrent, and it invites challenges which it may prove unable to meet. The hollow Army of the 1970s, with undermanned units maintained at low readiness against an immediate threat, took over a decade to repair, and the cultural scars of that experience did not fade until after 1991. The Nation, in reacting to contingencies, has consistently “bought back” readiness lost over years of peacetime. The risk in such an approach is the very real potential for being unable to accomplish immediate contingency requirements when the Nation calls.

**Modernization**

The basis of the Army’s core capability rests in its Soldiers. The Army organizes its Soldiers first, and then trains and equips them to prevail against the challenges they will face. A decade of war has damaged or destroyed many of our systems, requiring supplemental funding for three years after the end of combat operations in Afghanistan to reset our equipment. This continued reset will also maintain important capabilities in the Army’s organic industrial base.

As we restore our current capabilities, we also look to the future, but declining resources may stop, delay or extend programs which may degrade future capabilities and increase risk. The Army has established a framework for modernizing its equipment over time in the Army Equipment Modernization Strategy, which focuses our efforts on the Soldier and squad as the foundation of our Army.

This means building from the Soldier out and equipping our organizations for tactical overmatch in all situations. Among those initiatives are a single integrated network, as well as vehicles that are survivable, mobile and lethal. In general terms, we will improve and procure equipment that is versatile and tailorable, yet cost-effective and affordable. Our task is prioritizing declining resources against our planned programs while maintaining the ability to conduct research and development in defense-related disruptive sciences and technologies. We should prioritize maintaining modernized systems with potential for extended service, while divesting legacy systems where possible. We should also consider the full range of climate change effects which
could potentially increase risks to the Army’s supply chain and impact operations and mission assurance.

The Army will modernize its network in alignment with DoD’s Joint Information Environment. Information Technology Management Reform initiatives provide governance, architecture development and agile acquisition for information technology that provides a critical component to empowering our Soldiers.

**Cyberspace**

Cyberspace has significantly increased the speed and reach of global communications. Ideas and messages are now exchanged almost instantaneously with even the most remote locations in the world. There are significant implications for our Army as we seek to understand, influence, and control human behavior through the use of landpower. As the Army prepares for the future it must appreciate this increasing convergence between land and cyberspace operations—at all levels of war.

While the network and its critical infrastructure are vulnerable to remote attack, attribution of attacks in cyberspace is difficult. The Total Army must be able to defend its key systems and ensure the continuity of critical network functions in the face of disruption. Similar to other domains, Army leaders and organizations must be capable of employing capabilities in cyberspace, but not to the point of dependency should those capabilities be negated.

This convergence between land and cyberspace has created dependencies and vulnerabilities for the Army’s ability to exercise mission command through the Army network. The Army will prioritize the defense of its network and key systems against increasingly sophisticated and evolving threats in order to retain freedom of maneuver and exploit its advantages. As the Army addresses these challenges, it will build cyberspace capabilities that are integrated within a Joint construct, but also include integration with Army units down to the tactical edge. Finally, when authorized, the Army must be prepared to plan and conduct cyberspace operations in support of national, joint, and service requirements.

**Space**

The Army will continue to fully exploit Space as a combat multiplier and critical enabler for our Soldiers, weapons, and battlefield systems. The Army will continue its contribution to Joint Space Operations, including special capabilities, and extend space services to all ground component forces including our coalition partners. Given growing and accelerating adversary A2AD capabilities, satellite jamming, cyber attack, and anti-satellite capabilities the Army must train to fight with degraded space services; while Army and Joint space forces fight to protect, defend, rapidly restore our space enablers. The Army must work closely with our Joint and Coalition partners to enhance space architecture resilience, and assure this vital global extension of our sensors, networks, and mission command capabilities.

**Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction**

WMD pose an enduring challenge to peace and stability world-wide and to the vital interests of the United States and its partners. To this end, the Army will be
prepared to conduct operations world-wide in a CBRN environment. The Army will lead CWMD missions in the land domain and provide the preponderance of trained and equipped forces to support DoD CWMD efforts in the homeland and OCONUS as part of Joint and interagency requirements. Agile, adaptive and integrated conventional forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), specialized Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and CBRN forces, and missile defense provide a unique mix of scalable and tailorable capabilities across the Total Army. This support ranges from Joint CWMD operations from CWMD planning and regional support through all phases of CCDR Theater Campaign Plans. The Army’s fundamental CWMD goals are to protect Army capabilities, interdict and eliminate adversarial capability when necessary, respond swiftly across the CWMD spectrum if WMD use occurs and enhance capacity of partners and allies during steady state operations.

Part 4: Strategic Priorities

As it refocuses itself as a leaner force, the Army must remain the most highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world. An Army, with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force, and stands ready to perform operations in support of CCDRs to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad. To guide its approach for the future, the Army has five strategic priorities for the force:

Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World
A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army
A Ready and Modern Army
Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession
The Premier All Volunteer Army

These priorities inform the Army’s strategy, and its associated ends, ways and means.

Strategic Priority: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World

End: Soldiers and Civilians across the Total Army with the morals, ethics, individual toughness, fighting spirit, intellectual capacity, tactical competence, technical proficiency, and strategic perspective to understand the complex contemporary security environment and Unified Action partner capabilities to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational task forces and teams to prevail in peace and war.

- Recruit, Identify, and Develop Talent Informed by Long-Range Trends.
  Execute the Enterprise Army Brand strategy, leveraging a unity of effort approach to communicate the Army’s story and build America’s trust in its Army. Recruit and develop the talent, both physically and intellectually, in the quality and quantity that will support the leader base of the future force, informed by U.S. long-term demographics and trends.
• **Educate Leaders for an Uncertain Future.**
Enable leaders, in conjunction with joint, multinational, and interagency partners, to operate in circumstances of uncertainty, capable of applying not only tactics, but far more importantly, the appropriate operational art, informed by strategy, to attain the policy goals that govern military action.

• **Train Leaders and Provide Them with Relevant Experience.**
Through traditional assignments and broadening opportunities, create leaders who can effectively temper sound tactical judgment with strategic and institutional awareness in a JIIM environment, informed by critical thinking skills and the ability to develop innovative solutions applicable to difficult or unfamiliar situations.

• **Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century.**
Institutionalize the gains of the last decade of combat while eliminating toxic leadership and the deleterious effects of prolonged combat. Retain professional leaders who demonstrate the resilience, values, trust, and skills, whether operationally deployed or in a training environment, to build a self-policing organization skilled in the practice of arms.

• **Develop Leaders Who Are Proficient in Cyberspace and Enhance Our Cyberspace Professional Workforce.**
Develop Army leaders who understand and can quickly adapt to rapidly changing capabilities and risks, including a changing electronic warfare environment. While recruiting, educating, training and retaining cyberspace professionals in the Total Army, create a deeper workforce where all members of the Army, military and civilian, have a level of expertise in cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA) and its associated activities.

**Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army**

**End:** A ready and capable Total Army that provides joint and multinational forces with expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality landpower that assures partners, while it deters, coerces, and when necessary, compels adversaries across the range of military operations.

• **Regionally Align Forces.**
Provide predictable and dependable capabilities to CCMDs and ASCCs in the form of deployable and scalable task forces, with clearly articulated and appropriate authorities for their employment, and sufficient compellence to underwrite credible deterrence. To meet recurring and emerging demands, CCDRs will request assigned or allocated forces.

• **Set Theaters Via Capable Army Service Component Commands and Theater Support Forces.**
Ensure that Army forces are prepared to execute contingency plans in multiple combatant command areas of responsibility, rebalancing national focus to the Asia-
Pacific region while maintaining presence and vigilance in the Middle East. The Army is the only service with the capability and capacity to provide the combatant commander with many theater framework capabilities including logistical preparation of the theater, the mission command system, operational preparation of the environment, and, integration of operational contract support, fires, and protection.

- **Rebalance the Operating Force.**
  Reduce the overall number and sizes of headquarters, while sustaining as much combat capability as possible, even with an overall reduction in end strength. Distinguish authorities between tactical, operational, and theater strategic structures to best posture the Army to meet ongoing and contingency sourcing requirements.

- **Balance Active and Reserve Component Force Readiness.**
  In the short-term, maintain the Army Contingency Force of forces slated to deploy to combat operations, while ensuring the defense of Korea, and sourcing the Global Response Force. Attain highest possible readiness with available resources for collective training for the rest of the Army at the small unit level, prior to rebuilding readiness over time across the Total Army for the full range of military operations.

- **Develop and Implement Mission Tailored Forces.**
  Enable the Army to support CCDR contingency sourcing requirements with mission tailored forces, which are apportioned against a particular set of mission requirements. Mission tailored forces complement and balance the capabilities provided to CCDRs through regionally aligned forces.

- **Provide Ready and Trained Forces (conventional force, SOF and technical enablers) for operations across the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction mission spectrum.**
  Provide conventional forces and SOF improved capability and capacity for WMD detection, exploitation, identification, interdiction and elimination in the homeland and overseas. The Army must be prepared to provide forces capable of preventing the need for CWMD operations, mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation, and assisting partners and allies in building their own CWMD capacity.

- **Reform, Restructure, and Rebalance the Generating Force.**
  Provide a nucleus for future growth and leverage combat experience to inform training, education, concepts, and doctrine by rebalancing uniformed representation in the Generating Force.

- **Improve Energy and Water Security Environmental Stewardship and Sustainable Practices.**
  Through effective and efficient management of energy and water, immediate requirements are reduced and improve intra-theater mobility and distribution, reduce life-cycle sustainment costs, and decrease the amount of combat power dedicated to transporting those resources. The practice of good environmental
stewardship and sustainable practices reduce immediate requirements in combat operations, preserve the ability to train, test, and conduct other activities, such as building goodwill and strengthening the partnerships and cooperation needed for the Army’s future posture.

- **Maintain a Responsive Force Posture and Effective Network Of Installations.**
  Through an enterprise approach, enable the Army’s infrastructure and industrial base, which includes installations, housing, facilities, ports, terminals, arsenals, and laboratories to best support readiness of the Total Army and the Army’s overall preparedness for global contingencies.

- **Continue to Modernize Business Operations.**
  Instill a process improvement culture that continuously informs Army thinking and improved process efficiency at all levels.

**Strategic Priority: A Ready and Modern Army**

**End:** An operationally ready and responsive Total Army manned, trained, and equipped to rapidly deploy, fight, sustain itself, and win against complex state and non-state threats in austere environments and rugged terrain. The American Soldier remains the most discriminately lethal force on the battlefield. The Army can successfully execute all of its missions across the range of military operations.

- **Train for Operational Adaptability.**
  Create leaders and organizations that are physically and intellectually agile enough to adapt to conditions, tactics, and even methods of conflict that may be impossible to accurately predict. In the short-term, address both the forces that will have opportunities for collective training at combat training centers and others that must train collectively through other means until resources allow the availability of combat training center rotations to normalize.

- **Reset the Force.**
  Reconstitute those capabilities and equipment needed for the emerging security environment from the cumulative effects of sustained high operational tempo, with its effects on Soldiers, Civilians, Families, leaders, equipment and infrastructure. Divest those capabilities and equipment for which no true requirement exists.

- **Downsize the Force.**
  Provide a force of sufficient readiness to meet the defense strategy. Under the President’s Budget, balance readiness, modernization, and end strength by FY17. Under the Budget Control Act balance readiness, modernization, and end strength by FY19.
• **Modernize the Force.**
Retain readiness for future challenges through modernization and equipping efforts commensurate with the changing environment. Under the President’s Budget, defer but do not stop modernization to cover immediate readiness needs of the force through FY19, with the goal of an undersized, but ready Total Army by FY18. Under the Budget Control Act, reduce modernization accounts by 25%, with no program unaffected, to achieve balance in readiness, force structure, and modernization by FY23. The APPG will designate prioritization for specific programs.

• **Modernize the Network.**
Enable leaders to have the right information at the right time to make the right decisions through the LandWarNet, a single, secure, standards-based network from the DoD Information Network (DoDIN) down to the small unit level.

• **Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations Into the Generating Force and Operating Force.**
Advance the capabilities gained over the last 12 years in countering irregular threats and building partner capacity through concepts, doctrine, and training that incorporates that experience.

• **Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence.**
Through shaping operations and other military engagement, expand multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental contacts, reinforce preventive measures, help build the capacity and competence of U.S. allied and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen the cohesion of alliances, and increase U.S. influence.

• **Adapt the Army Force Generation Model.**
Sustain the Total Army's ability to provide a manned, trained and equipped force to meet the full range of current and emerging CCDR requirements, to include areas such as space, cyberspace, missile defense, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

• **Better Integrate the Total Army.**
Develop the right mix of operationally ready and responsive Total Army forces, capabilities, and processes to rapidly meet CCDRs’ emergent requirements.

• **Provide Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters for Land-centric Joint Campaigns.**
Enable divisions and corps to serve as regionally capable joint force land component command (JFLCC) and joint task force (JTF) headquarters for activities across the range of military operations.

• **Ensure That Forces are Capable of Joint Entry Operations.**
Preserve and enhance capabilities for joint entry operations to overcome anti-access/area denial environments and enable joint operational access for forcible and non-forcible entry.
• **Integrate Resilient Space Capabilities.**
  Enable all personnel, not just space specialties, to leverage space capabilities for improved combat effectiveness in contested operational environments, even in the face of adversary attempts to degrade, disrupt, or deny access to space capabilities.

• **Build Resilient Mission Command at the Tactical and Operational Level.**
  Enable Army forces to operate through enemy attacks on its mission command systems, to include denial of capabilities in specific domains, to include space and cyberspace.

**Strategic Priority: Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession**

*End: Soldiers and Civilians who exemplify the morals, ethics, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and professional stewardship inherent to the Army Values, committed to the defense of our nation and way of life, continuing to earn the trust of the American people and their confidence in our Army.*

• **Preserve the Earned Trust of the American People and their Confidence in Our Army.**
  Serve as a Total Army: Soldiers, Civilians and Families of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, who share the same professional ethic and commitment to the defense of our nation and way of life. Accentuate the military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and professional stewardship that mark our Army's heritage as the defender of our Nation in peace and war, since 1775. The 187 Campaign Streamers that adorn the Army flag today are proud testimony to our Army's service.

• **Enforce a Professional Environment Across Our Army.**
  Enforce a professional environment across our Army, free of harassment that promotes and respects the individual dignity of all Soldiers and civilians, allowing them to realize their full potential. By preventing sexual assault, we will maintain an Army that is true to our values. We will remain vigilant to insider threats and hold accountable those who do not share those values. Empower, through environments of trust and respect that are inclusive of Soldiers, Civilians and Families from diverse backgrounds, a culturally adept force that can operate globally.

• **Enhance Army Professionalism through Army Values.**
  Renew the foundation of our Army's strength by daily living the Values of our Profession and exhibiting the character, competence and commitment that are hallmarks of an Army Professional. Build the comprehensive physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual resiliency of our Soldiers, civilians and their families to enable them to thrive personally and professionally.
Army Strategic Planning Guidance

Strategic Priority: The Premier All Volunteer Army

End: A professional force composed of the highest quality Soldiers and Civilians dedicated to the Army for the long term for a career in uniform and a lifetime of service through retirement. Supporting the force is a level of regular military compensation, retirement, and health care, while honoring the service and sacrifice of our Veterans, Retirees, Wounded Warriors and Families. “Once a Soldier, Always a Soldier.”

• **Improve Programs Supporting Soldiers, Civilians, Families and Wounded Warriors.**
  Remain an Army committed to Quality of Life (QOL) for its Soldiers and Families as a critical factor in maintaining the all volunteer force. Through the Ready and Resilient Campaign, Soldier for Life, and Wounded Warrior Care programs, improve the safety, health, readiness and resilience of our people in order to preserve and keep faith with our most valuable resource—Soldiers and their families. Additional guidance will appear in the *Army Safety and Occupational Health Strategic Plan.*

• **Safeguard the Nation’s Trust in a Professional Army.**
  Maintain the trust between the Soldier, the Army and the American people. Support Soldiers, Civilians and Families through appropriate compensation, sustainable benefits, leader development, training systems and programs that support Soldiers, Civilians and Families. Assist Soldiers transitioning out of Army service in returning to civilian occupations successfully as a contribution to the Nation. Ensure that Soldiers, Veterans, and their families receive the benefits and recognition they have rightly earned.

• **Optimize Soldier and Civilian Acquisition, Management and Development.**
  Retain the capabilities of its combat seasoned force, remove obstacles to effective personnel management, and maintain the bonds of trust with Soldiers and Families while reducing numbers responsibly to arrive at a leaner, balanced force.

**Army Innovation: Force 2025 and Beyond**

The *Force 2025 and Beyond* initiative will drive Army innovation for the next several decades. Initiated by The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff, this forum for the Army will holistically evaluate new ideas while also examining trends and technologies that will produce a leaner, more capable, and more expeditionary force. *Force 2025 and Beyond* will be the means for the Army to identify capability requirements and future force design. Over time, *Force 2025 and Beyond* will shape the ASPG objectives as we maintain overmatch and set the conditions for fundamental long-term change in the Army.

**General Prioritization and Timing**

The vision, priorities, ends, and objectives in the ASPG will inform the rest of the TAP for phasing and implementation. Programming guidance to the force appears in
the APPG and APGM. The remainder of the guidance to the Army appears in the ACP, which provides direction and guidance for the years of execution to Army Commands (ACOM), ASCCs, Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Headquarters, Department of the Army.

The Army’s Strategic Priorities balance the accomplishment of assigned missions with competing demands of readiness, modernization, infrastructure consolidation, and end strength across three basic time horizons. Across all three time horizons, fiscal realities require the Army to terminate redundant and poorly performing programs while sustaining those that have proven most beneficial, while rebuilding the basic competencies that are the foundation of a ready force. The short-term (FY 16-19), is a recovery path in which the Army, while reducing manning to end strength goals, recovers readiness and rebalances investments in modernization lost in the first years of the Budget Control Act. The mid-term (FY 20-22) is a transition period as the Army continues to invest in modernization and readiness to abate risk to the force should it be called to support one sustained conflict. In the long-term (FY 23 and beyond), the investments in modernization and readiness made in the short-term and mid-term horizons under the Budget Control Act will begin to pay off in the full expression of an undersized, but campaign-quality Total Army.

Risk Guidance

Short Term (FY 16-19)

The priority for resourcing in the short-term (FY 16-19) will be on ensuring the full readiness of those forces that can expect to deploy and fight upon notification, with a secondary goal of achieving sufficient depth to meet immediate contingency demand. Those forces include units designated to defend the Korean Peninsula against North Korean aggression, the GRF, the Army Contingency Force, units assigned to the CBRN Elimination Response Elements, and those forces deploying next into ongoing combat operations. The remainder of the force, while still grounded in the basic roles of the Army, will be subject to a tiered readiness system, in which about 20% of the Operating Force will receive the funds necessary for collective training. Units other than that 20% of the Operating Force will assume risk in collective training above the small unit level until after the Army downsizes to its end strength and force structure goals. That risk must be managed within the context of the increased military engagement that underpins the Regionally Aligned Force concept. The Army’s reduction will also include infrastructure consolidation, contractors, and headquarters structure. Under the President’s Budget, the Army seeks to achieve end strength goals by the end of FY17, while under the Budget Control Act, the Army will not reach reduced end strength goals before the end of FY19. For modernization, the Army is taking short-term risk. The Budget Control Act has delayed many Programs of Record and led to the conclusion of the development of the Ground Combat Vehicle after it completes the current technology development phase. It has also delayed high priority capabilities such as the Army’s LandWarNet. While the Army remains focused on Soldier-centered modernization and procurement, it must focus science and technology (S&T) investments to develop the potential of emerging game-changing landpower technologies to retain a materiel edge and enable forces to prevail in any tactical
Army Strategic Planning Guidance

situation. While the Army cannot readily reverse divestitures of force structure, institutional knowledge, and its organic industrial base on command, it must nevertheless plan for reversibility should circumstances necessitate expanding the Army in time of war. As the Army emerges from the short-term, it will have achieved its end-strength reduction targets, and will have begun maintaining forces beyond the contingency force package and Global Response Force at full readiness. These end strength reductions create a second order impact on our ability to maintain the Premier All-Volunteer Force. We must not repeat the same mistakes made during the 1990s drawdown when American public perceived the Army as “no longer hiring.” To ensure we continue to attract and man a quality force, the Army cannot accept risk in recruiting and marketing to prospects and their influencers. We must maintain the Army’s reputation as a valued choice of service.

Mid-Term (FY 20-22)

The priority for resourcing in the mid-term (FY 20-22) will be on rebuilding readiness across the Total Army, with the goal of achieving sufficient depth to resource the full duration of one sustained joint campaign. As part of Force 2025 and Beyond, by 2020, the Army will be a more globally responsive force, capable of decisive action across the range of military operations. Readiness will shift away from tiered readiness for less than 20% of the force back to broader readiness across the Total Army, reducing the tension between military engagement and broader readiness for contingency sourcing requirements. The Army will resume its deferred modernization initiatives, making capital investments and modernization improvements that build on the previous efforts in S&T and preservation of the organic industrial base, with programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. As the Army emerges from the mid-term, it will have balanced readiness, modernization, and end strength to enable it to resource forces for a sustained joint campaign, while reaping the benefits gained from short-term inputs to modernization.

Long-Term (FY 23-beyond)

In the long-term (FY23 and beyond), the Army will have achieved sufficient balance to mitigate risk across readiness, modernization, and end strength. Army modernization programs should begin to enhance key capabilities in the force. While the Army will have protected investments in cyberspace and air/missile defense, the Army will emerge undersized for the challenges it faces in the defense strategy. The Army will have achieved the Force 2025 and Beyond objective of becoming a leaner, more lethal, expeditionary, and agile force than today. Beyond 2025, the Army will be a fundamentally changed force, uniquely enabled and organized to conduct expeditionary maneuver.

Conclusion

The Army is at a crossroads as it emerges from over a decade of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Nation has traditionally reduced its armed forces after a war, even in domestic and international environments that promise no
certainty of future prediction. Nonetheless, the Army can and must provide the forces that will fight and win the Nation's wars when called.

What we do know of the future is that it will be complex, volatile, and dangerous. Addressing future challenges will require an expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality Army that prevents conflict, shapes the security environment, and when necessary, decisively wins conflicts to attain the strategic ends and policy goals that govern all military action.

We must be wary of future visions that promise the Nation easy conflict termination or casual disengagement from a conflict once joined. While the Army may not always prosecute major combat operations in a war, it must prepare in peacetime to provide a hedge that mitigates the risks inherent to armed conflict. Doing so is our charter in ensuring that the Army can deliver its strategic contribution to the security of the United States.
Annex A: ASPG Vision of Resolution

2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance
CSA Strategic Priorities and Objectives by Time Horizon

Army Strategic Vision
The All-Volunteer Army will remain the most highly-trained and professional land force in the world; uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force, ready to perform across the range of military operations to Prevent, Shape, and Win in support of Combatant Commanders to defend the Nation and its interest and home and abroad both today and against emerging threats.

CSA’s Priorities

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<tr>
<th>Short term</th>
<th>Mid-term</th>
<th>2023+</th>
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<td><strong>Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World</strong></td>
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<td>Recruit, Identify, and Develop Talent Informed by Long-Range Trends</td>
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<td>Increase Broadening Opportunities</td>
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<td>Train Leaders and Provide Them with Relevant Experience</td>
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<td>Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century</td>
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<td><strong>A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army</strong></td>
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<td>CF-SOF Interdependence, Interoperability, and Integration</td>
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<td>Set the Theaters with ASCCs/Theater Forces</td>
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<td>Ready and Trained CWMD Forces</td>
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<td>Regionally Aligned Forces</td>
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<td>Rebalance the Operating &amp; Generating Force</td>
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<td>Continue to Modernize Business Operations</td>
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<td>Maintain a Responsive Force Posture and Effective Network of Installations</td>
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<td><strong>A Ready and Modern Army</strong></td>
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<td>Integrate Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>Train for Operational Adaptability</td>
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<td>Build Resilient Mission Command</td>
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<td>Adapt ARFORGEN</td>
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<td>Global Stabilizing Presence</td>
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<td>Integrate Resilient Space Capabilities</td>
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<td>Modernize the Force</td>
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<td>Integrate Total Army</td>
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<td>Downsize the Force</td>
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<td>Ensure Joint Entry Ops Capability</td>
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<td>Reset the Force</td>
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<td><strong>Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession</strong></td>
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<td>Recruitment, Identification, and Development</td>
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<td>Professionalism through Army Values</td>
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<td><strong>The Premier All Volunteer Army</strong></td>
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<td>Strengthening the Nation’s Trust in a Professional Army</td>
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<td>Safeguard the Nation’s Trust in a Professional Army</td>
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<td><strong>Force 2025 and Beyond</strong></td>
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*Force 2025 and Beyond* will shape the objectives over time as we maintain overmatch and set the conditions for fundamental long-term change in the Army.