Reference: Annex J (Inform and Influence)

1. **Situation.**

   a. **General.** An information environment ranging from primitive to sophisticated in the joint operations area (JOA) presents a challenge in the use of military information support operations (MISO). The Ahurastan use of psychological operations throughout the region is shaped by heavy Shi’a Islamic fundamentalism. The Ahurastan propaganda message is the most sophisticated and powerful in the region. Additionally, the general populace of Ahurastan has widespread access to global media influences. This affords the opportunity for JTF CASPIAN’s psychological operations to be delivered within Ahurastan. The population relies extensively on print media and information distributed through Islamic fundamentalist organizations. However, the extreme intolerance demonstrated by the Shi’a fundamentalist Islamic Ahurastan regime results in large portions of the Ahurastan population being unsatisfied with the current regime and prone to disaffection. This situation has resulted in Ahurastan committing large portions of its military to internal security. Taking advantage of the over commitment of government military and internal security forces, CFLCC’s MISO shall aim to destabilize Ahurastan government control as well as reducing the loyalty of its military forces.

   (1) **Within Azerbaijan,** internal security forces keep a close watch on ethnic and religious minorities. While not considered a major threat to Azerbaijani government stability, insurgency and terrorist attacks have become a large focus of the internal security effort. The insurgents’ increased demand for autonomy has resulted in continued repressive policies throughout the region. This repression provides an opportunity for Ahurastan to exploit resentment by minority groups within Azerbaijan against Azerbaijani governments.

   (2) **Ahurastan proxy insurgent military forces** are more a paramilitary force than a military organization. No one insurgent force has a formal doctrine, and generally they do not cooperate in military matters. However, recent events have presented Ahurastan with the opportunity to increase their influence with these groups through arms deliveries and appeals to a common religious and ethnic background. They rely on informal unconventional warfare when in the field against government security forces. Appeals to the common religious, ethnic, and historical ties have proven to be a powerful motivator in this region, and Ahurastan has used this opportunity to increase its reach within Azerbaijan. There is extensive evidence of sophisticated Ahurastan psychological operations aimed at increased instability within Azerbaijan being conducted by Ahurastan either directly or through Ahurastan proxy groups. Ahurastan psychological operations and activities shall try to induce and reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable toward them and unfavorable toward the U.S. and Azerbaijan.

   (3) **The psychological operations goal is to convince the local populations to:**

      (a) **Support the current government of Azerbaijan.**
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(b) (U) Favorably view the U.S. and its interests.

c) (U) Not interfere with JTF CASPIAN and Azerbaijan military operation.

d) (U) Make Ahurastan forces and proxy groups feel isolated, inadequately supported, and doubtful of success against JTF CASPIAN and Azerbaijani forces.

(4) (U) At the regional level, the goal is to influence attitudes of neutral nations to favorably view the actions of the JTF CASPIAN and Azerbaijan and to negatively view those of Ahurastan. At the international level, CFLCC’s psychological operations shall foster attitudes favorable to the coalition.

(5) MISO Tasks.

(a) (U) Enhance the psychological and deterrent impact of JTF deployment to the region.

(b) (U) Increase legitimacy and support of JTF CASPIAN among coalition members and other regional actors.

(c) (U) Increase legitimacy and support for Azerbaijani government, military and security forces.

(d) (U) Demonstrate coalition resolve to promote peace and prosperity in the region.

(e) (U) Support coalition stability and support operations.

(f) (U) Reduce will to fight among Ahurastan conventional and proxy forces.

(g) (U) Isolate and reduce ability of the Ahurastan government to command and control forces.

(h) (U) Support Joint Interagency Control Group strategic IO.

(i) (U) Analyze and counter enemy propaganda and misinformation.

b. (U) U.S. Perspective. The U.S. strategic intention is to conduct international information activities to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior to support U.S. goals and objectives, especially in the Caspian Sea region, and before the Arab League (AL) and the United Nations. The operational intention is to promote U.S. objectives within the JOA, while reducing the ability of the Ahurastan military forces to interfere with U.S. and Azerbaijan military operations at the tactical level, especially decisive operations in phase III.
c. (U) Neutral Perspective. The President of the United States shall be subject to some international pressure to stop the operation after the beginning of decisive operations.

(1) (U) Most states bordering Azerbaijan will most likely declare neutrality. However, it is expected that the U.S. Department of State shall successfully negotiate overflight and basing rights in support of U.S. missions.

(2) (U) Because of Ahurastan aggression it is expected that international organizations such as the United Nations and Arab League will support JTF CASPIAN objectives. Yet, while the League may support the operation, some of its members will oppose the operations for internal political reasons.

(3) (U) Left-leaning political organizations in the West shall provide limited support to counter friendly initiatives and shall put pressure on the U.S. through the United Nations to limit the operation to only noncombatant evacuation operations. They shall stress the impact of combat operations on the common people already suffering from economic hardships and repression from within.

d. (U) Enemy Perspective.

(1) (U) Decision-Maker and Staff. Ahurastan senior leaders expect direct military action by JTF CASPIAN and the Azerbaijan military against their activities in the region. However, they count on international pressure and their ability to manipulate the local populations through their influence within their proxy groups (Azerbaijan insurgents and terrorist organizations) as well as their religious ties to Shi’a Islamic fundamentalism to limit actions against them. They expect international media support for JTF CASPIAN forces to begin to erode rapidly once decisive operations begin.

(2) (U) Intelligence Systems. In the AO, Ahurastan has a HUMINT-based intelligence operation supported by conventional force electronic collection and jamming equipment. Recently they have begun to augment this with a robust cellular telephone network. The Ahurastan HUMINT network is composed of both full-time and part-time operatives throughout the CFLCC AO.

(3) (U) Target Audiences. Refer to Tab B (Theater MISO Target Audiences) to this appendix.

(a) (U) Coalition MISO efforts will focus on potential target audiences within three broad groups: Ahurastani military and civilian populations, Azerbaijani civilian population, and the national populations of other countries in the CFLCC AO.

(b) (U) Non-targetable groups include all U.S. Forces in the JTF CASPIAN JOA and national press representatives.
(4) (U) Command Systems. Ahurastan military forces use modern communications equipment. Ahurastan proxy group (insurgent and terrorist organizations) field forces use simple telephones and amplitude modulation radios for military communications. Activities to degrade these systems and reduce confidence in them shall contribute to mission success.

2. (U) Mission. When directed, 1/4 ABCT conducts MISO in support of CFLCC objectives throughout AO 4 to defeat Ahurastan aggression, preserve the sovereignty of the Azerbaijani government, and promote security and stability in the region. 1/4 ABCT conducts MISO to destroy the Ahurastan military and government’s will to fight and to achieve hostility termination objectives on terms favorable to U.S. and AZ government.

3. (U) Execution.

   a. (U) Concept of Operations.

      (1) (U) MISO focused on influencing approved target audiences in order to achieve COMJTF CASPIAN goals and objectives of restoring stability to the region. MISO will center on deterring Ahurastani aggression and supporting friendly insurgent operations within Ahurastan. Key tasks are as follows:

         (a) (U) Promote a favorable image of coalition forces in Azerbaijan.

         (b) (U) Build confidence in and support for the Azerbaijani government.

         (c) (U) Highlight U.S. Government commitment to the Azerbaijani government.

         (d) (U) Assist in stabilization of Caspian Sea region.

         (e) (U) Isolate Ahurastan forces and promote divisiveness between the Ahurastan government and their populace.

         (f) (U) Support coalition operations that create dissention among Ahurastani political, military, social, ethnic, religious, and academic leadership.

         (g) (U) Delegitimize the Ahurastan government in the eyes of regional countries.

         (h) (U) Destroy the Ahurastan military’s will to fight, and encourage opposition to the war.

         (i) (U) Support ongoing UW operations.

         (j) (U) Support the establishment of humanitarian aid and civil military operations.

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(k) (U) Enhance an orderly post-conflict transition for stability operations by non-coalition follow-on forces.

(l) (U) Encourage Azerbaijanis to actively support the coalition and JTF CASPIAN.

(2) (U) **General MISO Guidance.**

(a) (U) **MISO Objectives.**

1. (U) Deter Ahurastan attack on Azerbaijan.

2. (U) Undermine SAPA support.

3. (U) Support CMO to minimize refugee interference.

4. (U) Degrade Ahurastan air defense resistance.

5. (U) Deter Ahurastan WMD release

6. (U) Degrade Ahurastan Armed Forces offensive capability.

7. (U) Destroy Ahurastan Armed Forces moral and will to fight.

8. (U) Support CFLCC deception efforts.

(b) (U) **MISO themes to avoid.**

1. (U) JTF is a U.S.-led occupation force pursuing U.S. objectives to extend regional influence.

2. (U) Religious or cultural differences.

3. (U) References to historical conflicts in the region.

4. (U) References to securing future energy sources for the West.

5. (U) Azerbaijan is heavily dependent on U.S. assistance.

(c) (U) **MISO themes to stress.**

1. (U) Legitimacy of JTF CASPIAN operations and charter by UN.

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2. (U) U.S. and coalition forces are here to promote security and stability in the region.

(3) (U) MISO Programs.

(a) (U) Phase I (Deter). MISO objectives focus on discouraging Ahurastan aggression against Azerbaijan; discouraging support for insurgent organizations with emphasis on SAPA; discouraging Ahurastan use of WMD; and enhancing CFLCC deception operations.

(b) (U) Phase II (Seize). MISO objectives continue to emphasize discouraging support for the SAPA insurgents; gaining air superiority by discouraging Ahurastan air defense resistance; neutralizing the Ahurastan WMD capability by discouraging WMD release; and supporting the destruction of Ahurastan armor forces combat effectiveness by degrading Ahurastan Armed Forces offensive capability. MISO objectives shift from degrading Ahurastan Armed Forces offensive capability to destroying Ahurastan Armed Forces morale and will to fight as the full force and weight of coalition air and ground forces descends upon Ahurastan forces.

1. (U) MISO Themes.

   a. (U) Inevitable destruction of SAPA insurgents in Azerbaijan by coalition military and police forces and the consequences of supporting SAPA insurgents, to include banditry, vandalism, terrorism, and economic depression.

   b. (U) Consequence of being a JTF CASPIAN air defense target.

   c. (U) Consequences of WMD release on innocent civilians, the potential escalating US response against Ahurastan, and the international legal ramifications for each individual responsible for the release of WMD.

2. (U) Target Audience.

   a. (U) SAPA combatants (non-ideologues) and SAPA sympathizers in DP camps, and Azeri supporters.

   b. (U) Ahurastan air defense officers, soldiers, and pilots.

   c. (U) Ahurastan WMD commanders and soldiers.

   d. (U) Displaced persons in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

   e. (U) Ahurastan Armed Forces junior leaders and soldiers.

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3. (U) Delivery System.

a. (U) Deep. Commando Solo broadcasts radio messages to Ahurastan WMD forces and air defense assets in Ahurastan

b. (U) Close. HN radio stations (re-enforced by SOMS-B) broadcasts messages to Ahurastan Armed Forces and Azeri people in south and central Azerbaijan. Leaflets are dropped on advancing Ahurastan Armed Forces

c. (U) Rear. Tactical MISO teams support CMO activities

(c) (U) Phase III. (Dominate) MISO objectives shift from degrading Ahurastan Armed Forces offensive capability to destroying Ahurastan Armed Forces morale and will to fight as the full force and weight of coalition air and ground forces descend upon Ahurastan forces. In addition, MISO forces support CMO to enhance restoration of Azerbaijani territory and reduce civilian casualties due to mines/UXO.

1. (U) MISO Themes.

a. (U) Inevitable destruction of SAPA insurgents in Azerbaijan by coalition military and police forces and the negative consequences of supporting SAPA insurgents, to include banditry, vandalism, terrorism, and economic depression.

b. (U) Emphasize the international community is in Azerbaijan to help displaced persons and telling DPs to stay away from military bases and convoys.

c. (U) Surrender and desertion are viable options to fighting against coalition forces; and the hardships faced by solders’ family at home.

2. (U) Target Audience.

a. (U) SAPA combatants (non-ideologues) and SAPA sympathizers in DP camps, and Azeri supporters.

b. (U) Azeri citizens.

c. (U) Ahurastan Armed Forces junior leaders and soldiers.

3. (U) Delivery System.

a. (U) Deep. Commando Solo broadcasts radio messages to Ahurastan WMD forces and air defense assets in Ahurastan.
b. (U) Close. Host Nation (HN) radio stations (re-enforced by SOMS-B) broadcasts messages to Azeri people in south and central Azerbaijan. Tactical MISO teams disseminate messages in DP camps and urban areas in south and central Azerbaijan.


(d) (U) Phase IV Stabilize. Establish Security and restore services. Reinstate pre-existing humanitarian assistance programs, restore border, and continue counterinsurgency operations. MISO objectives support neutralization of the SAPA insurgency in Azerbaijan by discouraging sympathies for the insurgents and by promoting the legitimacy of the Government of Azerbaijan. Emphasize that the Government of Azerbaijan is a stable, secure, and legitimate government recognized by the international community. JPOTF will prepare to target emerging insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and individuals who will attempt to foment popular discontent and perpetuate instability.

1. (U) MISO Themes.

a. (U) Inevitable destruction of SAPA insurgents in Azerbaijan by coalition military and police forces and the negative consequences of supporting SAPA insurgents, to include banditry, vandalism, terrorism, and economic depression

b. (U) Emphasize that the Government of Azerbaijan is a stable, secure, and legitimate government recognized by the International community

2. (U) Target Audience.

a. (U) SAPA combatants (non-ideologues) and SAPA sympathizers in DP camps, and Azeri supporters

b. (U) Azeri citizens

3. (U) Delivery System.

a. (U) Deep. N/A

b. (U) Close. Host Nation (HN) radio stations (re-enforced by SOMS-B) broadcast messages to Azeri people in south and central Azerbaijan. Tactical MISO teams disseminate messages in DP camps and urban areas in south and central Azerbaijan.
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c. (U) Rear. HN radio stations broadcast Government of Azerbaijan legitimacy programs. Military Information Support Teams (MIST) work with Department of State and HN agencies to promote the legitimacy of the Government of Azerbaijan

b. (U) Tasks to Units.

(1) (U) Incorporate MISO into operations plans.

(2) (U) 1/4 ABCT subordinate unit shall support counter propaganda campaigns as directed by the joint psychological operations task force.

(3) (U) 1/4 ABCT subordinate and supporting commands shall support deception operations as directed.

(4) (U) 1/4 ABCT subordinate and supporting commands shall coordinate with JPOTF for support such as leaflet dissemination, loudspeaker broadcasts, audiovisual products, television broadcasts, computer home pages, and face-to-face communications.

(5) (U) 1/4 ABCT subordinate and supporting commands shall evaluate and report reactions of target groups they have intimate contact with and recommend potential objectives to be stressed, avoided, and analyzed for possible creation of MISO themes.

(6) (U) Direct liaison is authorized between cells coordinating deception, operations security, intelligence, PA, and civil affairs to support operations.

4. (U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support).

5. (U) Command and Signal. Refer to Annex J (Inform and Influence) and Refer to Annex H (Signal).

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A - MISO Task Organization - TBP
Tab B - MISO Target Audiences - TBP

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Tab C - MISO Communication Infrastructure – TBP.
Tab D - MISO Product Approval Authority - TBP