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APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 4ID OPORD 21-01 (IRONHORSE CHALLENGE) (U)

(U) References: See Base OPORD and Annex B (Intelligence).

1. (U) Situation.

   a. (U) Terrain. See Tab A (Terrain) to Annex B (Intelligence).
   b. (U) Weather. See Tab B (Weather) to Annex B (Intelligence).
   c. (U) Civil Considerations. See Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Annex B (Intelligence).
   d. (U) Enemy Composition. See Exhibit 2 (Enemy Order of Battle & OSC-E Known Locations) to Tab D (IPB Products) to Annex B (Intelligence).
   e. (U) Enemy Forces.

      (1) (U) South Azeri People’s Army (SAPA). The SAPA insurgent movement remains tied to the strategic goals of Ahurastan conducting direct action against soft targets along lines of communication throughout the AO. Expect continued insurgent activity, with raids and ambushes of Azerbaijani military and security forces in northwestern Azerbaijan, especially against lightly defended police and border outposts. Anti-foreigner agitation may increase in both southeastern Georgia around Tbilisi and in northwestern Azerbaijan. It is likely that Ahurastani special purpose forces will move into Azerbaijan southern border regions to collect strategic intelligence. These actions warrant increase alertness on the part of coalition forces, especially against sabotage.

      (a) (U) SAPA Regions. SAPA is organized into six regions with a battalion sized insurgent force in Azerbaijan. In the 4th ID AO, SAPA is based largely on support from the Bilasuvar clans in the central southern region. They have also formed a front with separatist Talysh and Lezgin insurgencies. It receives support from Ahurastan in materiel, training, sanctuaries, and probable personnel. Talysh and Lezgin SAPP/SAPA insurgents have common a front with compatible goals at this stage, but they are likely to conflict later. SAPA operates among the less economically developed elements of Azerbaijani society and draws heavily on discontented refugees in the region. Ahurastan encourages SAPA and has provided clandestine support to SAPA for some time. There are recent indications that Ahurastan is increasing aid and providing guidance to SAPA. Azerbaijani border forces have reported isolated instances of cross-border fire from Ahurastan supporting SAPA elements in the border region.
1. (U) Region 1 (Barda Column) tasks are to provide surveillance, reconnaissance, conduct raids, and potentially interdict U.S. convoys. Purpose is to provide early warning, disrupt air operations, and prevent U.S. operations on main/alternate supply routes.

2. (U) Region 2 (Bilasuvar Column) is the Bilasuvar area that competes for recruits and support from many of the IDP camps in the area. The political head of the district is Gasim Aghamirov who joined South Azeri People’s Party (SAPP) after the 1998 elections, becoming frustrated at the lack of political freedom exercised by the Nakchivan clan. The military column is commanded by Mikal Paridue who is a member of the Bilasuvar clan and has links with the narcotics trade in the area. Possible missions include reconnaissance for Ahurastani ground forces and facilitate the movement of logistics, assets, and personnel to Ahurastani special purpose forces and/or remnant forces from the 77th MID (AH). The area which the Bilasuvar column operates has traditionally been hostile towards GOAZ.

3. (U) Baku Battalion’s task is to kidnap key government officials / sabotage key government facilities in order to disrupt and destabilize the government of Azerbaijan.

4. (U) Region 5 (Mugan Column) is the Mugan region aligning with SAPP/SAPA only out of convenience and focus on a common enemy, the ruling Nakchivan clan. The political head of the district is Gultakin Eldarov. Eldarov represents the Talysh minority in
Ahurastan and heads the Union of Pro-Azerbaijani Forces (UPAF) political party. His clan influence extends into the southeastern Talysh areas of Azerbaijan. Ali Humbatov, the grandson of Aliakram Humbatov, declared himself the commander of the military wing of the Talysh minority living in northwest Ahurastan and southeastern Azerbaijan. It is thought that Humbatov leads a single battalion consisting of three companies with approximately 50 men. Units are active in the area around Astara. The rural population strongly supports the militia and has rushed to join ranks. Within Azerbaijan, Eldarov and Humbatov are indirectly exploiting the UPAF-SANAM relationship within Ahurastan to create a “partnership for independence” between SAPP/SAPA and the Talysh clan with southeast Azerbaijan. Although, still dreaming of establishing a separate Talysh republic, they realize the indirect confederation that Eldarov made with the SAPP/SAPA is essential if the Talysh are to challenge the Nakchivan clan within Azerbaijan. Possible missions include interdicting coalition forces into Astara vicinity AH-AZ border.

(b) (U) **Strengths.**

1. (U) **Internal alliances.** SAPA columns have the ability to reinforce other columns outside of designated regions as necessary.

2. (U) **External alliances.** The Talysh and Lezgin clans and NK IDP have grievances against the GOAZ. Although each group has different goals, their disagreement with the central government draws these groups together for support.

3. (U) **Bilasuvar and Balad clan support.** Given the location of these clans, the SAPA columns in AO4 will be the most resourced and will receive the most population support than the other columns within the SAPA organization.

4. (U) **Military wing.** The SAPA columns organize by trained fighters and village guards. The trained fighters have operational experience, motivation, and training to conduct effective insurgency type activities.

(c) (U) **Weaknesses.**

1. (U) **Border access.** SAPA requires personnel, equipment, and training support from Ahurastan to continue operations. Key to SAPA maintaining support is to keep the infiltration and smuggling lanes open across the AZ-AH border. As Coalition Forces begin to interdict these lanes, the support SAPA receives from Ahurastan will decline due to losses. SAPA will have to utilize the personnel and equipment on hand.

2. (U) **Ability of GOAZ to address grievances.** Several groups including the NK IDP, Talysh, and Lezgin clans have outstanding grievances with the GOAZ government. Should GOAZ offer concessions which address these grievances, it is likely these groups will stop supporting SAPA.
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3. (U) Village guards. The village guards are untrained individuals that support SAPA’s trained fighters. These individuals have limited experience and limited training which hinder their ability to provide effective resistance outside of their particular village. Furthermore, these individuals are not the die-hard ideological fighters so loyalty to SAPA after capture is unlikely.

(2) (U) Free Karabakh Movement (FKM). Another insurgent group is operating in Azerbaijan under the name Free Karabakh Movement (FKM). FKM is composed primarily of refugees from the Armenian-occupied enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) and has the goal of driving out the Armenians and reestablishing Azerbaijani control of the region. While FKM operates primarily within NK, it draws support from the refugee camps in Azerbaijan, and FKM elements frequently move through areas where coalition forces will be operating. FKM is not directly supported by Ahurastan and shows no great support for Ahurastani ambitions. However, it does oppose the Azerbaijani government for not making greater efforts to recover NK, and it sees coalition forces as a potential roadblock to efforts to expel Armenia. FKM fighters will attack coalition forces if they perceive a threat or an attempt to interfere with their actions.

(3) (U) Air Capabilities. Ahurastan Air Forces have limited overall capability compared to U.S. and western nations, yet is a considerable regional threat given their air assets. The Ahurastan Air Forces maintain a marginally competent air to ground capability to support primarily the maneuver of ground forces with close air support and air interdiction missions. The air to air capability is limited to daylight intercepts using MiG-29, MiG-31, and F14A Tomcat aircraft. The Ahurastan Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) is considered to be highly competent and represents a serious threat to U.S. and coalition aircraft. The system is built an integrated array of third generation Russian surface to air systems which includes the SA-10 and SA-12. The system relies on older but still highly lethal systems, to include the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 as well as a variety of AAA systems, to protect civilian and military key facilities. Lastly, the Ahurastan military maintains a large quantity of mobile SA-11 and SA-15 systems.

(4) (U) Naval Capabilities. Ahurastan naval capabilities are limited primarily to coastal security operations in the Caspian Sea. They possess a limited capability to conduct amphibious operations along the Caspian coast. The Ahurastan navy is represented by the Caspian Sea Naval Brigade with its main naval base at Rasht. It was formed from elements of Iran’s Naval Armed Forces Command in the Caspian Sea Zone (4th Naval Region). Subordinate to their Naval Headquarters is a 407th Amphibious Brigade, which in combination with their limited naval assets can conduct limited amphibious operations in the Caspian Sea.

(5) (U) Chemical and Biological Capability. Ahurastan has a significant chemical warfare capability. It is likely to have stockpiled several tons of chemical agents in bulk and weaponized form, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents, which it seized from Iran during the revolt. Ahurastan has produced a limited number of surface-to-surface missile warheads and several thousand artillery rounds filled with these agents. With its Shahab-3 missile units, it can range the deployment ports in Georgia as well as airfields in Turkey and Iraq. Ahurastan is pursuing the acquisition of biological weapons (BW) as well. Russia remains a key source of bio-technology for Ahurastan. Russia's world-leading expertise in biological weapons makes it
an attractive target for Ahurastan’s pursuit of technical information and training on biological agent production processes. It has also been reported that Ahurastan had bought two new fungi strains from Canada and the Netherlands that can be used to produce mycotoxins. Ahurastan has conducted research on biological pathogens lethal to humans (anthrax) and animals (virus causing hoof and mouth disease) as well as deadly bio-toxins and may have procured several strains of ricin from the “Chechen Network” working out of Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge.

Ahurastan's biological weapons efforts include a number of components, including the production of ricin, anthrax, and botulinum toxin at the Hamadan University of Medical Sciences (Bu-Ali Sina University) and the weaponization of several biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, typhoid, plague and cholera. Ahurastan scientists are allegedly also conducting weapons-related genetic engineering research at the Tabriz University and the East Azerbaijan Science and Technology Park.

(6) (U) Unconventional Warfare and SPF Capabilities. Ahurastan's capacity for terror and subversion remains one of Tabriz's few levers in the event of a confrontation with the United States, since--barring the use of WMDs--it otherwise lacks the ability to challenge the United States. In the event of such a confrontation, Ahurastan might sponsor terrorism in Kuwait, Iraq, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in order to intimidate them and thereby undercut U.S. power projection capabilities in the region. Further, due to its ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas groups, it has the means to launch a destructive terrorist campaign against sensitive targets in several continents.

(7) (U) Cyber Capabilities. Ahurastan has defensive cyber capabilities which it inherited in its breakaway from Iran. Iran had invested heavily in the buildup of their defense after the Stuxnet attack. Based on this prior attack on Iran, Ahurastan has made defending its networks a top priority. The central government owns all Ahurastan computer and phone networks. There are three primary access points between the internet and Ahurastan’s network. Service to two of these access points comes from Turkey and the third is via Iran. During hostilities with Iran, the third access point was shut down by Iran and remains disabled. Land based telephone access is provided via Iran and Turkey. Telephone access via Iran was not cut off following Ahurastan’s breakaway from Iran. Ahurastan’s network border is defended primarily by commercial equipment purchased through Iran and produced in Russia, China, and others. This equipment also allows them to monitor and track computer information and traffic entering and leaving Ahurastan. It also provides them the capability to block popular social networking sites like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in order to control any unwanted Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) campaigns or negative propaganda directed towards the Ahurastan government. The government and military sub network traffic is encrypted using commercially produced algorithms. Some of the people in Ahurastan have purchased non-sanctioned commercial network access points via satellite, which are used by both hackers and anti-government factions. In some cases these access points have been connected to the government’s network. The government of Ahurastan continuously tries to shut these commercial networks down, but is unable to keep up with the rapidly changing network configurations.

(8) (U) Network Defense. The defense of Ahurastan’s networks is performed by its military. Youth are recruited and trained at an early age after showing potential computer skills.
The officer corps is sent abroad to acquire degrees in information technology and other cyber related degrees. There are 300 regular military personnel performing these functions. Most network defense activities are conducted at the access points. At the current time Ahurastan has inherited and further developed Iranian offensive cyber capabilities. It has developed distinct cyber doctrine with a principal aim of isolating and silencing any enemy. The main agency involved in offensive cyber operations is the Ahurastan Business Network (ABN), a shadowy group of cybercriminals that formed around Tehran and gained notoriety through massive spamming and phishing attacks in 2014, then rose to prominence through sophisticated use of spear phishing attacks against government and financial leaders. The ABN enlists the aid of sympathetic hacker groups to conduct social engineering operations, such as phishing, to gain access to government and financial networks. They then target the networks for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attacks using botnets and other popular methods to cripple or even crash the networks. Specific characteristics of Ahurastan's computer network attacks include overwhelming financial networks with a large amount of fraudulent transactions that makes it impossible to tell the legitimate transactions from the fraudulent ones. This leads to effectively isolating the targeted nation state from the international banking system, processing credit card transactions, and other banking actions. Other targets include defacing and conducting Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attacks against government websites, placing these sites offline for days. Defacing government internet sites has proven an effective way to spread disinformation and propaganda to local and regional audiences already sympathetic to their cause, while swaying some neutral audiences. One striking feature about Ahurastan's DDOS attack capability is the extent to which it can largely be carried out by independent hackers, but encouraged by what appears to have been the Ahurastan defense agency.

(9) (U) Cyber Exploitation. The ABN also conducts cyber network exploitation. This provides Ahurastan a limited capability to gather information about coalition and Iranian networks as well as any data stored on these networks. In the past the Ahurastan has used this capability to extract force flow information, capability descriptions, and key leadership information. Ahurastan also finds private hackers to carry out the offensive and exploitation cyber work of the state. The millions of Ahurastan youth who already frequent social networking sites and bypass government censors are an inexpensive potential source of future hackers. The hackers they hire are very skilled and are able to spoof their internet protocols to make attacks appear to come from a location outside of Ahurastan. This spoofing makes it difficult for the attacked country to attribute the attack to the originating country. This creates a virtual sanctuary for the Ahurastan hackers. The Ahurastan government denies all accusations of sponsoring or any association with these private hacker attacks.

(10) (U) Reserve Command. Reserve Command will not be capable of conducting more than basic homeland defense for at least 60-90 days after the initiation of hostilities.

(11) (U) Operational Strategic Command - East (OSC-E). OSC-E is positioned close to the international border of Azerbaijan. OSC-E is a corps-like organization that has been conducting extensive brigade-level training within their northern training areas for over 2 months; however, there are no indications of a significant reserve mobilization. Even without reserve mobilization, based on current activities, disposition and posture of AH conventional
forces, it is anticipated that there will be no less than 30 days of increased, observable activities providing some advance warning preceding an organized and coordinated attack at the OSC echelon.

f. (U) **Enemy Centers of Gravity.**

   (1) (U) **Strategic.** The enemy strategic center of gravity is the government of the Ahurastan republic. President Dilenchy and the leaders of his National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan (NLMSA) are largely responsible in maintaining the active support of the Azeri population in Azerbaijan and at least the passive support of minority populations like the Lezgin, Talysh, and Kurds. The leadership uses its economic system to gain the popular support of its populace as well as attempt to win economic concessions from its regional neighbors. It uses its military forces to not only protect the new government from Iran but also to seize energy resources should its economic initiatives fail to provide favorable access Caspian oil reserves. It uses its international recognition to provide the state international legitimacy and its WMD acquisition will help preserve its independence from foreign incursion.

   (2) (U) **Operational.** Operational center of gravity is Ahurastan’s Operational Strategic Command – East (OSC-E). OSC-E represents a substantial offensive threat to the capital city of Baku and seizing control of Azerbaijan’s vast Kura River oil resources. This force is composed of one mechanized and two armored divisions supported by an adequate tube and rocket fires capability. While OSC-E can achieve the purpose of seizing key territory, it is dependent on assistance from the Ahurastan's other armed forces. It uses its Caspian Naval and amphibious forces to threat energy infrastructure in the Caspian and it is also used to help AH special purpose forces (SPF) infiltrate into the Azerbaijan interior. The SPF on their own as well as teamed up with SAPA militia elements threaten the Coalition's critically vulnerable lines of communication (LOCs). Ahurastan's integrated air defense system IADS used with its air forces allows Ahurastan to gain air superiority for limited times that assists OSC-E's freedom of maneuver towards its operational objectives. Its IADS and air forces also protect OSC-Es very vulnerable LOCs which traverse the Talysh Mountain Range as well as Ahurastan's strategic center of gravity, the government in Tabriz. OSC-W is used to fix Coalition forces in the Nakhchivan province of Azerbaijan. Its strategic WMD weapons combined with its strategic missile forces threaten the Coalition's ports and airfields which can greatly degrade the Coalition's ability to rapidly project combat power into theater. And if WMD is used against the capitals of Georgia and/or Azerbaijan, they also threaten the strategic centers of gravity by defeating the will of the people of those two nations.

g. (U) **Enemy Critical Factors.**

   (1) (U) **Ahurastan's Strategic Critical Capabilities, Requirements, and Vulnerabilities.**

      (a) (U) Strategic Critical Capabilities associated with the strategic center of gravity include control of the Ahurastan population, direct control of the AH military forces, and ability to obtain international support and recognition.
(b) (U) Strategic Critical Requirements associated with the strategic capabilities include internal security organizations, religious ideology, strategic command and control, media control, and bi-lateral agreements.

(c) (U) Strategic Critical vulnerabilities associated with the strategic capabilities are loyalty of internal security leaders and effectiveness of some of its internal security forces which can question the ability of the leadership to control dissident factions; government transparency and the call for more democratic systems by dissident political factions; a reduction in the popular economic satisfaction could lead to a support away from the current regime; strategic command systems are vulnerable to cyber attack; and bilateral agreements can be slow and foreign military assistance especially in the supply of modern weapons and training can be threaten by diplomatic sanctions.

(2) (U) Ahurastan's Operational Critical Capabilities, Requirements and Vulnerabilities.

(a) (U) Operational Critical Capabilities associated with the operational center of gravity include ability to seize key economic and political infrastructure with ground forces, and protection from air and missile attack.

(b) (U) Critical Requirements associated with the operational capabilities include mechanized /armored forces, air defense systems, and logistical enablers.

(c) (U) Critical Vulnerabilities associated with the operational capabilities include radars, fire control, and command systems which can be targeted by cyber and lethal systems; Class III/V resupply combined with mountainous ground lines of communication can be easily targeted and interdicted, engineer bridging assets are available but if targeted could hamper freedom of maneuver of the COG; Movement of WMD stocks is initially easily monitored unless proper deception methods are used; and surveillance and reconnaissance assets - electronic ones can be targeted and SPF has to infiltrate well before hostilities begin.

2. (U) Mission (Enemy).

   a. (U) **Enemy Mission.** Ahurastan controls critical economic/hydrocarbon resources and infrastructure in the vicinity of the Kura River Valley and adjacent Caspian Sea region with sufficient combat power to compel a settlement of the conflict on favorable Ahurastan terms resulting in negotiated partition of Azerbaijan.

   b. (U) **Enemy Operational Objectives (most likely).**

      (1) (U) Swiftly seize key areas of Azerbaijan and, through an effective information campaign, portray the invasion as supporting a large disenfranchised segment of the population against a corrupt GOAZ.

      (2) (U) Establish defense in depth to halt Coalition counterattacks and terminate hostilities in its favor and gaining international support for its action.
(3) (U) Disrupt or delay Coalition operations using third party cyber attacks.

(4) (U) Establish provincial governments in captured territory.

(5) (U) Restore basic services in captured territories.

(6) (U) Control flow of oil from BTC pipeline (Continued Coalition offensive action will be portrayed as a threat to the free flow of oil to the EU).

(7) (U) Engage UN; gain international support and recognition from key regional players.

3. (U) Execution (Enemy).

a. (U) Enemy pre-hostility actions. Ahurastan supports SAPA insurgent operations in Azerbaijan with the aim of discrediting the legitimacy of GOAZ. Insurgent attacks will threaten the security along lines of communication (LOCs). Attacks will be made along major highways with the purpose of physically isolating the capital with its information networks from the rest of the country. Increased insurgent activities can be expected around the Nagorno-Karabakh, peacekeeping area of operations, attempting to redirect Government of Azerbaijan (GOAZ) leadership concern toward its traditional enemy and away from an increasing threat along its southern border. Insurgent action in the Kura Basin oil reserve region in the southeast will occur in order to disrupt the flow of oil from the region and destabilize the government’s financial markets.

b. (U) Enemy Hostile Actions. Ahurastani forces have the capability to conduct an attack to isolate the Azerbaijani capital and seize the oil fields and infrastructure facilities. Azerbaijan defense plan will have different levels of success containing this attack. Expect Ahurastan and SAPA to combat coalition forces during all phases.

(1) (U) Prior to conventional attack by AH, some of conditions/assumptions need to be in place, or perceived to be true by AH.

(a) (U) Ahurastan must perceive an opportunity and attack on short notice.

(b) (U) Extremely poor weather conditions for at least 3 days reducing coalition air capability.

(c) (U) Perceived break-up of the coalition partners.

(d) (U) Withdraw of coalition forces.

(e) (U) An attack by SAPA creates mass casualties potentially reducing coalition resolve.
(2) (U) Potential Courses of Action (COAs). Both courses of action assume OSC-E has been committed and culminated offensive operations by the time the 4th ID is committed.

(a) (U) Enemy COA #1. (Refer Exhibit 3 – Enemy Course of Action Sketches to Tab D (IPB Products)).

1. (U) Mission. OSC-East attacks to seize oil fields isolating oil production facilities, the government in BAKU, and the Apsheron Peninsula in order to set conditions for favorable negotiations and recognition as a nation state. OSC-E defends along the Kura and Araks River basin in order to consolidate their gains in Azerbaijan while maintaining lines of communications into Ahurastan.

2. (U) End State. OSC-East mechanized and armor forces control Azerbaijan oil production resources in BAKU and the Apsheron Peninsula with combat forces as far west as Yevlak. The government’s existence/lives are directly threatened by AH forces. A disruption zone established protects main battle forces and to destroy specific coalition systems (engineer, recon, and communications systems). Full mobilization of AH Reserves Forces will be underway to deter coalition leadership from interfering.

3. (U) Recon/Security. Reconnaissance will initially be the primary effort attempting to gain information on the details of AZ defensive positions (maneuver units and obstacle positions). Once the initial penetration is complete, recon forces will attempt to find AZ indirect fire systems and communications nodes. After OSC-E secures their final objective locations, the recon effort will shift to providing security for their forces in defensive positions and will seek to defeat coalition reconnaissance efforts, detect attacking forces, disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach, and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement by main defensive elements.

4. (U) Disruption Zone. During the initial conventional attack, OSC-E is not likely to establish an operational-level disruption force. Subordinate divisions/brigades may establish temporary disruption zones in order to initiate attacks on specific coalition systems/capabilities (indirect fires, recon, communications, and logistics). OSC-E will establish the disruption zone in the Defense to Control phase from the Araks/Aras River as far northwest as Yevlakh (38T PK 8100 9800), integrating security forces forcing the coalition to struggle for enough maneuver space to begin the offense or disrupting the coalition offensive unhinging the coalition timeline and synchronization.

5. (U) Battle Zone. OSC-E will conduct two simultaneous penetrations having two different but mutually supporting purposes.

a. (U) The 77th MID in the west will attack from their current locations in Ardabil Province, 77th MID into Azerbaijan to the north towards Yevlakh (38T PK 8100 9800) and 84th MID attacks northeast towards Sabirabad (39T TE 8400 3200) in order to restrict coalition freedom of movement. Objectives:
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(1) (U) Seize river crossing sites along the international border near Horadiz (38S QJ 0400 6700) (77th MID) and Bahramtepe (38S QK 5400 3030) (84th MID).

(2) (U) 84th MID defeats or neutralizes 6th & 11th (AZ) Territorial Brigades and 2nd (AZ) Artillery Brigade.

(3) (U) 84th MID secures bridges near Imishli (39S TE 4920 1500) and Sabirabad (39T TE 8930 3830).

(4) (U) 77th MID defeats or neutralizes 7th, 12th, and 16th (AZ) Territorial Brigades.

(5) (U) 77th MID secures LOCs/road networks between the crossing sites and Yevlakh (38T PK 8100 9800).

(6) (U) Transition to the defense and establish the OSC-East Disruption Zone to protect the forces moving along the coast toward Baku.

b. (U) The Assault Force for OSC-East (88th TD, 407th Amph) will attack along the coast in the east to accomplish four key tasks in support of the Exploitation Force’s (18th TD) goal of isolating Baku (AZ COG). Those key tasks are:

(1) (U) Defeat or neutralize 5th (AZ) Brigade near Lankaran (39S UC 1300 9100).

(2) (U) Seize objectives near Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800), and Alyat (39S UE 6400 2300) defeating or neutralizing 1st (AZ) Artillery Brigade and 1st (AZ) AT Regiment.

(3) (U) Secure objective near Hajikabul (39T UE 2300 3400), which allows them to control the BTC pipeline and east-west access to Baku.

(4) (U) Defeat or neutralize elements of the 10th (AZ) Territorial Brigades near Ashagi Surra (39S UD 2990 6950).

c. (U) The OSC-East Exploitation force (18th TD) will initially follow the 88th TD passing through it in Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800), clear the LOC between Salyan and Alyat (39S UE 6400 2300), link-up with 407th Amph BDE there and continue attacking towards Baku. 18th TD defeats 1st (AZ) MECH DIV isolating Baku and the oil production facilities on and near the Apsheron Peninsula. 88th TD secures pipeline assets north of the Kura River. The 407th Amphibious Brigade secures the eastern flank of the assault force and exploitation force from seaborne counterattack and is prepared attack as an independent maneuver detachment to envelop AZ forces via seaborne assault to seize and objective near Alat (39S UE 6400 2300).
6. (U) **Support Zone.** The support zone contains communication assets, CSS, indirect and direct fire assets, combined arms reserve, and other supporting assets. The support zone will initially locate near Bilasuvar (aka Pushkino) (39S TD 9000 7000).

7. (U) **Failure Option.** Ahurastan forces assume defensive positions along the Araks and Kura Rivers establishing a defense with a disruption zone, a battle zone, and support zone to deny coalition forces access to east, southeast Azerbaijan, and the oil fields.

8. (U) **HVTs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior to Hostilities</th>
<th>D-Day through D+8</th>
<th>D+9 and beyond</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAPA communications Cells</td>
<td>Engineer breaching and bridging equip</td>
<td>FA and MRL Target Acquisition equip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer breaching and bridging equip</td>
<td>OSC-E and DIV communications nodes</td>
<td>Ground recon systems/organizations/communications</td>
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<td>Ground recon systems/organizations/communications</td>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
<td>FA and MRL Target Acquisition equip.</td>
<td>SAPA communications and Direct Action Cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-E and DIV communications nodes</td>
<td>Air Defense and Fire Control systems</td>
<td>Logistics systems in AZ (Bilasuvar aka Pushkino)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Haul CSS vehicles/rail lines</td>
<td>Air-to-Ground Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>OSC-E and DIV Communications nodes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. (U) **Advantages and Disadvantages.**

a. (U) **Advantages.**

(1) (U) Mass and speed quickly overwhelm AZ territorial brigades minimize brigade effectiveness and resolve.

(2) (U) Reduces dependence on SAPA assistance/support to disrupt the coalition movement from Georgia.

b. (U) **Disadvantages.**

(1) (U) 77th MID cannot control Yevlak alone with such a large disruption zone and allows to AH only disrupt the coalition attack, not block or defeat it.

(2) (U) Routes are narrow and canalized for movement and logistics.

c. (U) **Failure Option.** (Refer Exhibit 3 – Enemy Course of Action Sketches to Tab D (IPB Products)).
(b) **Enemy COA #2.** (Refer Exhibit 3 – Enemy Course of Action Sketches to Tab D (IPB Products)).

1. **(U) Mission.** OSC-East attacks to seize oil fields isolating oil production facilities, the government in Baku, and the Apsheron Peninsula in order to set conditions for favorable negotiations and recognition as a nation state. OSC-E defends along the Kura and Araks River basin in order to consolidate their gains in Azerbaijan while maintaining lines of communications into Ahurastan.

2. **(U) End State.** OSC-East mechanized and armor forces control Azerbaijan oil production resources in Baku and the Apsheron Peninsula with combat forces as far west as Yevlak. The government’s existence/lives are directly threatened by AH forces. A disruption zone established protects main battle forces and to destroy specific coalition systems (engineer, recon, and communications systems). Full mobilization of AH Reserves Forces will be underway to deter coalition leadership from interfering.

3. **(U) Recon/Security.** Reconnaissance will initially be the primary effort attempting to gain information on the details of AZ defensive positions (maneuver units and obstacle positions). Once the initial penetration is complete, recon forces will attempt to find AZ indirect fire systems and communications nodes. After OSC-E secures their final objective locations, the recon effort will shift to providing security for their forces in defensive positions and will seek to defeat coalition reconnaissance efforts, detect attacking forces, disrupt and delay an attacker’s approach, and destroy key attacking elements prior to engagement by main defensive elements.

4. **(U) Disruption Zone.** During the initial conventional attack, OSC-East is not likely to establish an operational-level disruption force. Subordinate divisions/brigades may establish temporary disruption zones in order to initiate attacks on specific coalition systems/capabilities (i.e. indirect fires, recon, communications, and/logistics). OSC-E expects this penetration from Ardabil Province to be successful and will plan to establish an operational level disruption zone most likely with elements from the fixing force (77th MID and possibly elements from 84th MID or 88th TD). OSC-E will establish the disruption zone in the Defense to Control phase from the Araks/Aras River as far northwest as Yevlakh (38T PK 8100 9800), integrating security forces forcing the coalition to struggle for enough maneuver space to begin the offense or disrupting the coalition offensive unhinging the coalition timeline and synchronization.

5. **(U) Battle Zone.** OSC-E will conduct two simultaneous penetrations having two different but mutually supporting purposes.

   a. **(U) The 77th MID in the west will attack from its current locations in Ardabil Province north towards Yevlak (38T PK 8100 9800) and northeast towards Imishli (39S TE 4920 1500) in order to restrict coalition freedom of movement. Objectives for the 77th MID are:**
(1) (U) Seize river crossing sites along the international border near Horadiz (38S QJ 0400 6700) and Bahramtepe (38S QK 5400 3030).

(2) (U) Defeat or neutralize 7th, 11th, 12th, and 16th (AZ) Territorial Brigades and 2nd (AZ) Artillery Brigade.

(3) (U) Secure bridge near Imishli (39S TE 4920 1500).

(4) (U) Secure LOCs/road networks between the crossing sites and Yevlak (38T PK 8100 9800).

(5) (U) Transition to the defense and establish the OSC-East Disruption Zone from Yevlak to the Araks River in order to protect the Assault and Exploitation Forces’ attack towards Baku.

b. (U) The Assault Force for OSC-E (84th MID and 88th TD) will attack east through Bileh Savar (39S TD 7200 6200), east through Bilasuvar (aka Pushkino) (39S TD 9000 7000) and Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800), and then north to Shirvan (39S UE 2100 2200) in support of the Exploitation Force’s (18th TD) goal of isolating Baku. The likely key tasks for the 84th MID are:

(1) (U) Defeat or neutralize 1st and 6th (AZ) Territorial Brigades.

(2) (U) Seize objectives near Bilasuvar (aka Pushkino) (39S TD 9000 7000) and Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800) which allows the 88th TD to cross the Kura River.

(3) (U) Seize objective Shirvan (39S UE 2100 2200) supporting 18th TD (Exploitation Force) goal of isolating Baku.

c. (U) The likely key tasks for the 88th TD are:

(1) (U) Follow the 84th MID crossing the Kura River vic. Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800).

(2) (U) Defeat or neutralize 1st (AZ) AT Regiment east of Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800).

(3) (U) Defeat or neutralize 1st (AZ) MECH DIV securing objective allowing control of nearby cities vic. Alat (39S UE 6400 2300) and west of Baku (39T UE 9900 6800).

d. (U) The OSC-East Exploitation force (18th TD) will initially follow the 88th TD crossing the Kura River vic. Salyan (39S UD 2700 8800), clear the LOC between Salyan and Alat (39S UE 6400 2300), link-up with 407th Amph BDE and continue attacking towards Baku. 18th TD defeat or neutralize 1st (AZ) MECH DIV enabling them to isolate Baku.
and the oil production facilities on and near the Apsheron Peninsula. 88th TD secures pipeline assets north of the Kura River. The 407th Amphibious Brigade secures the eastern flank of the assault force and exploitation force from seaborne counterattack and is prepared attack as an independent maneuver detachment to envelop AZ forces via seaborne assault to seize and objective near Alat (39S UE 6400 2300).

6. (U) **Support Zone.** The support zone contains communication assets, CSS, indirect and direct fire assets, combined arms reserve, and other supporting assets. The support zone will initially locate near Bilasuvar (aka Pushkino) (39S TD 9000 7000).

7. (U) **Failure Option.** Ahurastan forces assume defensive positions along the Araks and Kura Rivers establishing a defense with a disruption zone, a battle zone, and a support zone to deny coalition forces access to east, southeast Azerbaijan, and the oil fields.

8. (U) **HVTs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior to Hostilities</th>
<th>D-Day through D+8</th>
<th>D+9 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAPA communications Cells</td>
<td>Engineer breaching and bridging equip</td>
<td>FA and MRL Target Acquisition equip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer breaching and bridging equip</td>
<td>OSC-E and DIV communications nodes</td>
<td>Ground recon systems/ organizations/ communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground recon systems/ organizations/communications</td>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBM systems and associated fire control</td>
<td>FA and MRL Target Acquisition equip.</td>
<td>SAPA communications and Direct Action Cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-E and DIV communications nodes</td>
<td>Air Defense and /Fire Control systems</td>
<td>Logistics systems in AZ (Bilasuvar aka Pushkino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Haul CSS vehicles/rail lines</td>
<td>Air-to-Ground Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>OSC-E and DIV Communications nodes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. (U) **Advantages and Disadvantages.**

a. (U) **Advantages.**

(1) (U) This COA offers the best opportunity to inflict heavy casualties.

(2) (U) This COA provides multiple avenues into AZ.

(3) (U) Significantly shorter distance from attack positions in AH to their final objectives in AZ.

(4) (U) Will provide space for support areas and TBM systems allowing AH to range anywhere in AZ.
b. (U) **Disadvantages.** Cold or severe weather during the 88th and 18th Divisions’ movement could completely halt their movement through quite difficult and high elevation mountain ranges.

c. (U) **Failure Option.** (Refer Exhibit 3 – Enemy Course of Action Sketches to Tab D (IPB Products)).

(3) (U) **Integrated Fires Command – East (IFC –E) Task and Purpose.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IFC –E</th>
<th>Task and Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Arty BDE</td>
<td>T: Reinforce the fires of divisional artillery brigades P: Enable the maneuver of the DTGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Arty BDE</td>
<td>T: Reinforce the fires of divisional artillery brigades P: Enable the maneuver of the DTGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th MRL BDE</td>
<td>T: Counterfire - suppress enemy artillery formations P: Prevent disruption of the OSC attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th AV BDE</td>
<td>T: Fix the 1st (AZ) DIV P: Prevent their maneuver against the OSC, enabling the piecemeal destruction of the enemy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) (U) **Special Purpose and Commando Forces Task and Purpose.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPF</th>
<th>Task and Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th SPF</td>
<td>T: Infiltrate AZ P: Conduct reconnaissance, targeting, and link up with SAPA 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and Baku Columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th, 12th, 13th Commando BDEs</td>
<td>T: Infiltrate AZ P: Conduct reconnaissance and targeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) (U) **Strategic Forces Task and Purpose.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AH Strategic Forces</th>
<th>Task and Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd BDE (SCUD/ Shehab 3)</td>
<td>T: Attack JTF HQ and airfields, GOAZ Facilities in Baku, Black Sea Port facilities P: Reduce JTF effectiveness, reduce GOAZ legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde (SS-21)</td>
<td>T: Attack 1st (AZ) ART BDE P: Attrit and fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd MRL Bde</td>
<td>T: Attack 1st (AZ) Arty BDE in support of 407th Amphib. BDE P: Attrit and fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th MRL Bde</td>
<td>T: Attack 5th (AZ) Territorial BDE in support of 407th Amphib. BDE P: Attrit and fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>888th MI Bde</td>
<td>T: Conduct Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO 4ID OPORD 21-01 (IRONHORSE CHALLENGE) (U)

| CYBER | attacks using botnets against GOAZ defense and financial networks  
P: Disrupt Military C2 and financial networks |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1st IW BDE | T: Conducts IO tasks to discredit GOAZ  
P: Reduce effectiveness of AZ Defense Forces |

4. (U) **Sustainment (Enemy).**

a. (U) OSC-E Logistics and Personnel. The integrated support command (ISC) is a collection of combat service support units possibly augmented by combat support units tailored for a specific mission. The materiel support system is a mix of very modern and less modern capabilities varying depending on the priority of the supported units. Generally, high-priority or elite units enjoy the benefits of a robust materiel support system that affords a higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness to rapid changes in plans. For such units, the system may be fully automated to track requirements and control the issue of supplies. Less capable units (including reserve and militia forces) typically have little or no automation support. Generally logistics priorities are: ammunition; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); spare parts and technical supplies for equipment maintenance and repairs; and rations, clothing, and medical supplies. As OSC-E forces advance north they will establish contact with and support SPF and SAPA units in sector. Logistics support bases will be established at key intersections and as needed by heavy forces, but must be small, dispersed, and well-concealed to avoid detection and attack by coalition forces. Sustainment forces and supplies are moved as far forward as possible without compromising survivability.

b. (U) **Enemy Logistic Vulnerabilities.**

   (a) (U) Extended supply lines.

   (b) (U) Combat service support equipment 40-60% mission-capable.

   (c) (U) Limited precision munitions.

   (d) (U) Limited spare parts.

   (e) (U) Limited chemical stockpile.

   (f) (U) No rotary wing reconstitution.

   (g) (U) Limited personnel replacements.

5. (U) **Command and Signal (Enemy).**

a. (U) OSC–E Command, OSC-E command is comprised of four maneuver divisions, one amphibious brigade, and Integrated Fires Command East (IFC-E). See Exhibit 2 (Enemy Order
b. (U) Control. Command Posts (CPs) are usually mobile by design transitioning to the semi-fixed/fixed locations during the defense.

c. (U) OSC-E Signal. During operations both Ahurastan and SAPA forces will use messengers, and Frequency-Modulated (FM) and Amplitude-Modulated (AM) radios for routine communications. Reported recent acquisitions throughout the region are hand-held FM radios. These systems are vulnerable to monitoring, jamming, and exploitation. AH has sophisticated electronic warfare equipment and expected to disrupt friendly operations within the Operations Area. They have a moderate capability to monitor and jam United States’ electronic equipment. Equipment is available through international arms dealers and nations friendly to Ahurastan that are eager to sell their excess military equipment. Ahurastan has known tactical radar systems or other electronic equipment with which to monitor troop movements and the buildup of forces at air and seaports. Ahurastan has practiced against other regional nations in the area, and have gained valuable hands-on experience. However, Ahurastan forces have not operated in the type of high intensity EW environment they can expect if they attack United States forces. Ahurastan radio-intercept operations against United States forces shall focus on gathering information on friendly organization, equipment, movement, and intentions. Radio Direction Finding (DF) determines the location of friendly emitters by intercept. The ability to monitor the friendly electronic spectrum decreases as distances from friendly force front lines increases.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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MG

OFFICIAL:

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G2

ATTACHMENTS:

Tab A – Terrain
Tab B – Weather
Tab C – Civil Considerations
   Exhibit 1 – Dislocated Civilian Camps
Tab D – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products
   Exhibit 1 – Azerbaijan Defense Plan
   Exhibit 2 – Enemy Order of Battle & OSC – E Known Locations
   Exhibit 3 – Enemy Course of Action Sketches
   Exhibit 4 – SAPA Profiles
   Exhibit 5 – Recent and Present Significant Activities – TBP
   Exhibit 6 - Operational MCOO - TBP